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ABSTRACT 
Internal wars are by default the business of others, until someone says they are 
not.  Artificially contained within the confines of the current international system, 
insurgent conflicts are considered domestic affairs only until they threaten external 
interests.  In judging intrastate conflict by and large from a crisis-response perspective, 
conventional assessment methodologies, oriented largely toward interstate wars, tend to 
fall short in objectively analyzing the historical and dynamic aspects of internal wars.  
This thesis develops an Adaptive Security Construct (ASC) that aims to correct such 
shortcomings through the multi-disciplinary integration of three conceptual lenses: a 
qualitative situation estimate, a game-theoretic dynamic conflict model, and geospatially 
oriented nexus topography. Using Sudan’s internal wars as a case study, where the 
existence of signed peace-agreements in both the south and Darfur exist in apparent 
contradiction of these conflicts’ causes, the ASC iteratively correlates the analysis of 
each of the three lenses to provide an observer a more objective external view of conflicts 
that are inherently “internal.”  This thesis presents the ASC as an iterative process and 
perspective that enables the formulation of general imperatives and specific approaches 
in response to contemporary arenas of conflict, both in Sudan and within the international 
community at large. 
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What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. 
          - Carl von Clausewitz 1 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
While war between nations may be on the wane, conflict within countries is not. 
Africa is rife with internal wars; eight of the top ten entries in “The Failed States Index 
2007” are sub-Saharan states.2  According to twelve political and economic indicators, 
these countries are in imminent danger of dissolution, continued violence, and escalating 
bloodshed.  For the second year in a row, Sudan has topped the list, due primarily to the 
escalating violence in the province of Darfur.  Internal wars are not new, yet the 
prevalence of intrastate conflict illustrates the extent to which rebels and regimes 
manipulate the conditions of internal wars to further their own interests.  Deprived of the 
bipolar opposition of Cold War superpowers, contemporary international relations are 
mired in the ambiguities of sovereignty at the margin; countries that were once at least 
tenuously aligned with superpower patrons now find themselves immersed in internal 
crises of identity and self-determination.  Internal wars, insurgencies, and the violence 
committed by non-state actors have come to the forefront of contemporary world affairs.  
1. Purpose 
This thesis develops a construct that allows for the iterative assessment and 
engagement of the factors influencing insurgent conflict in Sudan.  Two premises are 
fundamental to this objective.  The first acknowledges internal wars as a distinct 
expression of conflict.  An internal war is fought between elements of states that might 
otherwise be considered singular entities in international affairs.  Internal wars are not 
                                                 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 87. 
2 The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine, “The Failed States Index 2007,” Foreign Policy 
(July/August 2007): http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865 (accessed August 10, 
2007).  The other sub-Saharan states in the top ten were the Central African Republic, Chad, Somalia, 
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Democratic Republic of Congo.  The only non-African states in the 
top ten were Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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fought between states, they are fought within states; societies fight not just each other but 
within themselves as well.  In these conflicts, insurgencies comprise those entities that 
violently oppose the formalized status quo, be that an incumbent regime or some other 
manner of recognized sovereignty.  The second premise, reliant upon the first, asserts that 
internal conflicts are perceived differently by external actors who become involved in the 
domestic struggles of others.  Here, the requirement for objectivity becomes increasingly 
important.  Put bluntly, modern states experience difficulties when they become involved 
in the internal squabbles of others.  In attempting to project their own universal 
perspectives onto internal wars, intervening nations are invariably perplexed by the 
apparent suboptimal behavior of warring factions.  Such perspectives reflect biases of the 
observer; understanding why other countries fight within themselves is problematic. 
This issue identifies the need for a systemic process and perspective for assessing 
internal wars.  As a process, such a construct must allow for an adaptive and iterative 
analysis of internal conflict; it defines a method of assessment.  That method becomes a 
means of translating theory into practical policy applications, a bridge that in US political 
history has a long record of tumultuous crossings.3  As a perspective, the construct 
requires a familiarity with the history and contemporary relevance of the internal war 
being examined; it defines the context of assessment.   A policy action will fail if it does 
not accurately account for the local conditions it is meant to address.  Using the Sudan as 
a case study, this thesis incorporates both process and perspective within an Adaptive 
Security Construct (ASC) by which the insurgencies of internal wars are assessed in 
order to develop engagement options for exogenous actors. 
The contemporary relevance of such a study is readily apparent.  One source 
listed 19 major ongoing armed conflicts in 2003; there is “a growing preoccupation with 
these phenomena of violence in the world, and particularly in the ‘South’ or the 
‘developing world’.”4  Several theories exist that attempt to quantify the politico-military 
                                                 
3 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).  
4 Christopher Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries: War, Memory, Progress (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2006), 2.  The source references the Uppsala Conflict Database, available online 
at http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/ (accessed August 10, 2007). 
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aspects of weakened or failed states.  A large portion of this literature is based upon 
analyses of historical examples of insurgent warfare, and then attempts to draw far-
reaching parallels to current conflicts.5  Using current modeling techniques, this thesis in 
part overcomes such limitations by applying several perceptual lenses to separate yet 
interrelated conflicts within Sudan, a nation of significant importance in African regional 
stability.  Sudan provides a unique case study as government forces and rebel factions are 
engaged in conflict in several distinct areas, to include the escalating humanitarian crisis 
in Darfur, as well as secessionist engagements within the country’s historical North-
South divide.  In contrasting insurgent conflict in several regions of Sudan, it is possible 
to substantiate the validity of the ASC, derive practical implications for external 
intervention in the region, and enhance a general conceptual perspective of internal wars. 
2. Scope 
The scope of this thesis involves the development of an assessment construct, the 
ASC.  It does not purport to offer a means by which the specific conflicts in Sudan will 
be resolved, let alone provide a solution to internal wars in general.  Rather it proceeds 
from the underlying supposition, already offered, that dealing with internal wars, 
particularly from the position of an outside actor, requires an objective process and 
perspective grounded within an analytic framework.  Both mainstream academia and 
media portrayals of these conflicts tend to overly rely upon single-factor explanations for 
the violence in these areas.6   “At times the attention of governments and of public 
opinion has seemed to lurch from one ‘crisis’ to another: from Bosnia to Somalia to 
Rwanda to Afghanistan to Iraq to Darfur.”7  Sporadic assessments of these “crises” belie 
their historic origins; internal wars are not spontaneous.  Time may also alter the reasons 
for which internal wars are fought: what started a war may not be what sustains it. This 
forms the underpinnings of an objective perspective in assessing insurgencies and 
internal wars; such a process requires a familiarity with specific chronology and context, 
                                                 
5 Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries, 2-9. 
6 Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn, eds., African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 1. 
7 Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries, 2. 
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not a premature attempt to attribute causality.  Internal wars and the insurgencies they 
spawn are a complex not simple phenomenon.  The ASC provides a comprehensive 
means to analyze those complexities. 
A second concept inherent in the scope of this project is that comprehensive 
analysis requires the integration of qualitative and quantitative analysis of insurgent 
conflict.  Assessments of internal violence cannot rely solely upon empirical (primarily 
financial or economic) indicators to assess the status of “weak” or “failed” states.  Such 
measures often disregard the complex and convoluted sociopolitical facets that would 
otherwise lead to a different assessment.  Insurgencies themselves defy conventional 
theories of military engagement in that the numerical strengths of opposing factions 
provide a misleading indicator of their resilience.  The further the insurgent force is 
reduced in number, the more difficult it is to defeat.  The opposite holds true for 
government forces, as the greater the numerical defeat of the regime’s military, the 
weaker it becomes.  It is therefore difficult to quantify the true strength of opposing 
factions, let alone to accurately predict the outcome of an internal war.   
In concert with the limitations of purely statistical measures, an over-reliance on 
subjective assessments by subject matter experts can also result in erroneous conclusions, 
a phenomenon colloquially termed the “Chalabi effect” in reference to recent US 
involvement in Iraq.  When coupled with the political, economic, and cultural factors that 
characterize internal wars, deriving purely empirical implications for external 
engagement options is increasingly arduous.  Rather than directly attribute a singular 
causality, there are instead several groups of issues that appear to foment internal wars.  
Recent research has demonstrated a correlation between rainfall patterns and a propensity 
for conflict in Darfur, with distinct implications for the continuance of violence there.8  
Additional studies indicate that ethnic marginalization is positively correlated with the 
probability of civil conflict, regardless of whether the incumbent regime in fact represents 
                                                 
8 Mohamed Suliman, “Civil War in the Sudan: From Ethnic to Ecological Conflict,” The Ecologist 23, 
no. 3 (May/June 1993), 104.  A conceptualization of “how environmental scarcity is linked to domestic 
political unrest” can also be found in Jason J. Morrissette and Douglas A. Borer, “Where Oil and Water Do 
Mix: Environmental Scarcity and Future Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa,” Parameters 4, no. 
4 (Winter 2004-05): 87. 
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a minority or majority of the populace.9  Though posits of causality are overstated, these 
issues do reflect the long history of sociopolitical and economic characteristics in Sudan.   
B. BACKGROUND 
For all but ten years of the half-century since gaining independence in 1956, 
Sudan has been embroiled in internal warfare.  Sudan is Africa’s largest country and is 
also the current home to the Council of the Arab League.  Sudan recently abstained from 
assuming the chairmanship of the African Union.10  These factors begin to suggest root 
tensions of Sudanese internal strife: ethnicity and religion, territory and resources.  
Several areas of insurgent conflict exist within the geopolitical bounds of Sudan.  Of 
these, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the persistence of a North-South divide are 
the most significant, both in terms of international effects and domestic upheaval.  In 
Darfur, mostly ethnic African and Muslim pastoralists battle government-supported 
militias primarily composed of Arabic nomads, also known as “Janjaweed.”  In the 
contested divide of northern and southern Sudan, local insurgent factions and the central 
government in Khartoum continue to oppose each other in spite of a Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA).11  Paradoxically, peace has been declared in the south while the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) has been disdained by both sides in the west. Violence is 
manipulated to benefit militant leaders on both sides of these conflicts.   
The dynamic and geopolitically fluid global arena has demonstrated a requirement 
for irregular military engagement in areas of limited or absent governance.  Countries like 
                                                 
9 Lars-Erik Cederman and L. Girardin, in “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto 
Nationalist Insurgencies,” American Political Science Review 101 no. 1 (February, 2007): 173, present 
findings that “cast doubt on the tendency to ignore ethnic politics as an explanation of civil wars.”  See 
also, James D. Fearon, K. Kasara, and D. D. Laitin, “Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset,” American 
Political Science Review 101 no. 1 (February, 2007): 187, stating: “We find that although there has been a 
tendency for states with ethnic minority leaders to have had a higher risk of civil war, the tendency is weak.  
It is neither statistically significant nor substantively strong.”  
10 The abstention is considered a political maneuver by which the regime in Khartoum acknowledged 
problems internal to its borders and thereby ironically improved external perceptions of its legitimacy.  
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), “United Nations Sudan Bulletin,” UNMIS (February 1, 2007): 
http://www.unmis.org/english/2007Docs/UMAC-Bulletin-feb01.pdf (accessed August 10, 2007).  
11 Theodore S. Dagne, Library of Congress, and Congressional Research Service, "Sudan: The Crisis 
in Darfur and the Status of the North-South Peace Agreement," CRS Report for Congress RL33574 




Figure 1. Map of Sudan 12 
                                                 
12 United Nations, “Map of Sudan,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, 
May 2004. 
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the Sudan provide non-governmental actors and extremist fundamentalist organizations a 
power-vacuum within which conventional military means of employment are either cost-
prohibitive (politically and/or legally) or logistically infeasible.  Neither economic 
sanctions nor diplomatic initiatives have found a significant degree of success in 
curtailing violence in the Sudan.  The struggle in Southern Sudan has resulted in over two 
million deaths over a 21-year period, while displacing four million people within 
Sudan.13  While the CPA seeks to mitigate the antagonism of both sides, the pending 
independence referendum in 2011 itself questions the possibility of a lasting peace.  In 
Darfur, at present it is estimated that approximately 450,000 persons have been killed 
since 2003, with an additional 2.3 million displaced either internally or into neighboring 
Chad.14  The sole insurgent faction to sign the DPA has since broken ranks with the 
government of Sudan; an escalation of fractious insurgent conflict prevails and has 
spilled over into neighboring countries.  Despite international sanctions, the efforts of 
humanitarian relief organizations, and the presence of both African Union (AMIS) and 
United Nations (UNMIS) peace-keeping forces, the Sudanese regime and opposing 
factions continue to resist an effective negotiation process or an arbitrated solution.  Each 
of Sudan’s internal wars presents a distinct set of challenges to both domestic opponents 
and the international community alike.   
1. Conflict in Sudan’s North-South Divide 
Civil war between northern and southern Sudan preceded independence, 
beginning in 1955.  Southerners expected to be politically discounted in a unified Sudan, 
a view substantiated by the installation of a military regime in 1958 and the subsequent 
banning of southern political parties.15  Following seventeen years of war, both sides 
signed the Addis Ababa accords on March 27, 1972.  These accords guaranteed 
                                                 
13 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Sudan – Complex Emergency: 
Situation Report #14” (May 9, 2007): ¶1, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ 
(accessed August 10, 2007). 
14 Dagne and Congressional Research Service, “Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and the Status of the 
North-South Peace Agreement,” 8.  Sources present a broad range of casualty estimates of civilians in 
Darfur, of which the quoted figure is on the high side.  Measures of displaced persons are commonly 
considered more easily quantified and thus may serve as a better indicator of the scope of domestic conflict. 
15 Edgar O’Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1977):  48-53. 
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autonomy for a southern region, encompassing the provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al 
Ghazal, and the Upper Nile, with a regional president appointed by the national president 
on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly.16 After ten years of 
tenuous peace, the Addis Ababa accords were abrogated by the Sudanese government 
under Gaafar Mohamad Nimiery following the discovery of petro-resources. The 
National People’s Assembly and the Southern Regional Assembly were dissolved, and 
the national introduction of Islamic Shari’a law took effect on September 8, 1983.  
Conflict reignited between north and south, further intensified by repeated regime 
changes in Khartoum and a protracted suspension of peace negotiations following the 
August 16, 1986 shoot-down of a Sudan Air civil airliner by southern insurgents.17  
Deep-rooted ethnic divisions were further polarized along religious lines by the Islamist 
agenda of the National Islamic Front (NIF) government that came to power in 1989. 
Several peace negotiations were initiated throughout the 1990’s, all of them 
ineffective.   The southern insurgency was divided into several factions that failed to 
attain a unified bargaining position.  Southern opposition eventually coalesced at the turn 
of the century under the leadership of John Garang and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), which had until then steadfastly asserted sovereign autonomy for the 
south of Sudan.  On January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People 
Liberation Movement signed the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
Naivasha Kenya, which “effectively ended the 21-year old civil war and triggered a six-
year interim period.18   
According to provisions of the CPA, at the end of the interim period southerners 
will hold a referendum that will decide their political future as either an independent or 
                                                 
16 Douglas H. Johnson, African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 222. 
17 Edgar O’Ballance, Sudan: Civil War and Terrorism: 1956-99 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000): 
156.  The Nimiery regime was ousted by a coup in 1985. 
18 Dagne and Congressional Research Service, “Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and the Status of the 
North-South Peace Agreement,” 15.  The authors misidentify Nairobi as the signing location. Other sources 
indicate a preference for independence within southern Sudanese public opinion, ironically coincidental 
with a pervasive distrust of the interim Government of South Sudan (GoSS). See “The Leading Website for 
South Sudan Secession and National Independence,” (n.d.) http://www.southsudannation.com (accessed 
August 10, 2007).  
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federated Southern Sudan.  Meanwhile, from the perspective of the newly termed 
Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum, the regime’s “central strategic and 
tactical objective [regarding the south] is to remain in power by whatever means 
necessary.”19  Though the CPA may foster a present aura of cooperation, the future 
expectations of both sides continue to reflect fundamentally opposed visions of what the 
final resolution should be.  Illustrative of a paradox in peace agreements, the CPA 
appears to exist in spite of the mutually-exclusive objectives of its signatories. 
2. Conflict in Sudan’s Darfur 
Conflict in Darfur is commonly identified as an opposition between ethnic 
African and Arab populations based upon patriarchal lineage and tribal affiliation.  In 
actuality, this ethnic identification is not at all clear-cut; distinctions are further 
complicated by tensions over resource allocation.  The area’s tribal-based population is 
centered on two traditional economies: millet farming, which is generally practiced by 
African Muslim peasants, and nomadic camel and cattle pastoralism, long considered the 
domain of Arab nomadic tribes.  Both forms of sustenance rely on increasingly scarce 
arable land.  Neither farmers nor nomads can be assigned an exclusive ethnic affiliation, 
as years of intermarriage have occurred since Arabs arrived in the region in the 14th 
century.  This has blurred the delineations between ethnic groups.20  During a period of 
widespread famine and drought in the 1980s, conflict over resources and land-reform 
policies caused a Manichean split in Darfur’s population; tribes began an autochthonous 
trend in identifying themselves as either distinctly African or Arab.21  Following the 
resurgence of civil war in Southern Sudan, in which both the southern insurgency and the 
central regime sought to use Darfur as a mobilization and staging ground, opposing sides 
began to form local militias as a coping mechanism for the increasing violence.  Both the 
                                                 
19 John Prendergast, “Resolving the Three Headed war from Hell in Southern Sudan, Northern 
Uganda, and Darfur,” Africa Program Occasional Paper Series, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, no. 3 (2005), 1.  
20 Alexander De Waal, “Who are the Darfurians:  Arab and African Identities, Violence and External 
Engagement,” African Affairs, no. 105/415 (2005: 181-205. 
21 Autochthony refers to a process of nativism in constructed opposition to outsiders.  For additional 
examples of autochthony in civil strife, particularly as institutionalized in the government policies of Cote 
D’Ivoire, see Bøås and Dunn, eds., African Guerrillas. 
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Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the 
primary insurgent factions in Darfur, claim the government of Sudan has systematically 
targeted African ethnic groups since the early 1990s.22   
In February 2003, these newly organized rebel groups began to openly target 
Government of Sudan (GoS) security forces and Arab militias, the latter known as the 
“Janjaweed.”  On April 25, 2003, SLA forces attacked a military base at Al Fasher 
airport, in the provincial capital of Northern Darfur, destroying a half-dozen aircraft and 
capturing a Sudanese Air Force general.23  In response, the regime’s counterinsurgency 
operations intensified as combined Janjaweed raids and Sudanese Armed Forces air 
strikes were directed at African villages throughout Darfur.  Through the use of proxy 
militias, regime forces now targeted the civilian population in an escalating series of 
reprisal and repression to attain local control. 
The first attempt at a negotiated solution, brokered by Chad, was the April 8, 
2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.  Indicative of the factionalism that pervades 
insurgent forces in Darfur, an element of the JEM declined to sign the ceasefire, fighting 
continued, and, in fact, escalated.  The next attempt at a ceasefire was brokered by the 
United States on behalf of the African Union: the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA).  This agreement was signed by the GoS and only one faction from the SLA, led 
by tribal leader Minni Minawi, who has since recanted on the agreement in claiming non-
compliance by the central regime.  Both the SLA and JEM factions have periodically 
aligned to form a unitary opposition, but pervasive factionalism continues to derail any 
proposed negotiating process.  International efforts to curtail the violence in Darfur have 
achieved little success.  The United Nations peacekeeping forces (UNMIS) in Southern  
 
 
                                                 
22 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), “Proposal for Peace in Sudan in General and Darfur in 
Particular,” (n.d.), available online at http://www.sudanjem.com (accessed August 10, 2007); and Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), “Political Declaration,” March 14, 2005: available at: http://www. 
sudan.net/news/press/postedr/214.shtml  (accessed August 10, 2007). 
23 Paul D. Williams and Alex Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 
Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (March, 2005): 30.  Additional sources present conflicting estimates as to the 
number of government soldiers killed, ranging from several dozen to over one hundred. 
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Sudan are hampered by government-imposed travel constraints.  The African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been largely ineffective due to limitations on their 
mandate, size, and support base.24 
The underlying conditions of internal war in Sudan are ethnopolitical 
marginalization and resource allocation.  In the south, these conditions are expressed 
through the continued and violent tensions of Southern Sudanese relations with the north, 
resulting from the perceived imposition of an Islamic agenda, religious, ethnic, and 
economic repression, and the long-standing frustrations of unfulfilled expectations of 
autonomy and self-determination.  In Darfur, conflict revolves around the ethnic 
polarization of Arab and African Muslim segments of the population, in conjunction with 
economic competition between sedentary peasants and nomadic tribes.  These issues are 
exemplary of the sociopolitical and economic characteristics historically present in 
Sudan.  When the underlying conditions of political marginalization and resource 
allocation are coupled with the factionalism of opposing sides, a dynamic analytical 
setting emerges.  This setting presents a case study background allowing for the 
development of an assessment methodology.  That methodology is the “Adaptive 
Security Construct” underlying the structure of this thesis.  The ensuing section outlines 
the manner in which the ASC’s development takes place. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Fully encompassing an assessment model as both a perspective and process 
necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach.25  “Perspective” refers to the removal of 
observer bias from the assessment, while the “process” provides an actionable set of steps 
by which the assessment takes place.  The limitations of mono-causal explanations and 
solely quantitative or qualitative models suggest that relying on a single analytic lens 
produces a myopic resultant that may well obscure critical facets of the topic under 
                                                 
24 Paul D. Williams,  “Military Responses to Mass Killing:  The African Union Mission in Sudan,” 
International Peacekeeping, no. 13/12 (June, 2006): 175-177. 
25  The use of a mixed-methods approach is utilized in order to combine qualitative initial assessments 
with empirical follow-on analysis as subject to data availability.  See also, John W. Creswell, Research 
Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2003), 136-9.  
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discussion.  While not all-inclusive, this thesis’ adaptive construct utilizes three analytic 
lenses to examine the specific case-study of Sudan’s internal wars.  Within that case-
study, insurgent groups are selected as the predominant analytic focus, though the same 
overall methodology can potentially be used to examine any of several alternate sets of 
actors, to include formal state institutions and authority, or, instead, a more 
comprehensive analysis of population measures.26   
The security environment of a state or region of interest is the result of numerous 
dynamic relationships that are unlikely to be captured in a single assessment.  An 
adaptability of analytic focus is considered inherent in the iterative nature of this product, 
and lends itself to the titling of the Adaptive Security Construct (ASC).  An outline of the 
rationale, concepts, and stages of the ASC is presented below; the outline and 
implementation of its development occurs in the chapters to follow. 
1. The Adaptive Security Construct (ASC) 
In creating a comprehensive perspective of Sudan’s internal wars, the core of the 
ASC consists of three distinct analytic stages.  The first stage involves a qualitative 
estimate of “what” comprises the Sudan: the identification and outline of the topic 
environment.  This involves an intentionally porous delineation of the study’s 
geopolitical boundaries, as the realities of contemporary affairs rarely allow for a clear 
separation of what may be a domestic as opposed to an international concern.  The same 
blurred distinction exists within the decision-making processes of actors within that 
environment; rarely are actions taken or courses selected in isolation of either inter- or 
intra-national factors.  As an integrated model of internal wars derived from the literature 
and past experiences, the Qualitative Situation Estimate (QSE) provides an organizing 
framework for those considerations that further guides the ensuing analytic stages. 
The second stage of the ASC involves the use of a game-theory approach to 
outline the dynamic interactions of opposing sides in Sudan’s internal wars.  This 
Dynamic Conflict Model (DCM) relies heavily upon tenets of rational-choice theory, 
though assumptions of unitary behavior on the part of opposing actors are tempered by 
                                                 
26 Suggestions for future research to this effect are briefly outlined in the conclusion of this thesis. 
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the contextual characteristics identified in the ASC’s first stage.27    Established methods 
of game-theoretic analysis are introduced and then employed in a multi-level process by 
which Sudan’s internal wars are “gamed” to a set of possible outcomes.  This stage of the 
ASC provides an analysis of the “why” and “how” of insurgent conflict in Sudan.   As 
part of the ASC’s comprehensive intent, the Dynamic Conflict Model also allows for a 
perceptual bridge between the Qualitative Situation Estimate and the detailed data 
requirements of the third stage, which entails the use of Nexus Topography (NT). 
The NT stage of the ASC addresses the “who” and “where” of Sudan’s internal 
wars.  Whereas the second stage employed an analysis of opposing actors, the third stage 
extracts the insurgent factions themselves and examines their specific capabilities, 
structure, and development.  Network analysis provides a useful set of tools to identify 
the internal “strengths and weaknesses” of Sudan’s insurgent actors.  The focus in this 
stage is on analyzing organizational facets of insurgent groups rather than the individuals 
that comprise them; specific areas of interest include comparisons of objective, coalition, 
and tribal affiliations.  The analysis of these capabilities provides a valuable adjunct to 
the second stage’s analysis of strategies and outcomes, while the sequencing of a game-
theory approach and network analysis is based largely on the expected realities of 
operationalizing the ASC as an employable and feasible analytic tool.  The complexities 
of foreign entanglements place distinct limitations on the timely availability of the data 
requisite of each form of approach.  Previous analytic endeavors illustrate this 
juxtaposition of requirements: “Understanding the value-maximizing choices of nations 
demands chiefly an analytic ability in vicarious problem-solving.  Analyses that 
concentrate on capacities and outputs of organizations, or on bargaining among 
individuals, demand more information.”28  The projected availability of data and a 
reliance on increasing levels of data granularity lead to the selected chronology of what 
remain in essence a set of complimentary yet distinct analytic approaches.   
                                                 
27 Additional corrections are addressed in this stage, to include issues of player loss-aversion and 
bounded rationality, according to which the information available to each player regarding the adversary 
maybe incomplete and distorted.  These concepts are more fully articulated in Chapter IV, which discusses 
the underlying tenets of both rational-choice and game-theoretic models prior to “gaming” Sudan’s wars. 
28 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
2nd. ed. pbk. (New York: Longman, 1999), 387. 
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Following the third stage of the ASC, the construct correlates the results from 
each of the three stages to identify commonalities, and, perhaps more importantly, gaps in 
derived information.  Lessons drawn from each endeavor are thus substantiated, to be 
further validated by what is intended to be an iterative application of the ASC as a whole.  
This thesis in essence provides a theoretical “first-run” of an operationally applied ASC, 
a stepping stone from which future analyses can be further refined.  From this analytic 
correlation, both general imperatives and specific avenues of approach can be extracted 
that may, in reference to the specific case-study of Sudan’s internal wars, yield an 
assessment that ultimately contributes to the successful resolution of that country’s 
protracted violence.  Intended to provide an overall heuristic perspective and process, a 
summary view of the ASC is presented in Figure 2 below. The ASC is now broken down 




Figure 2. The Adaptive Security Construct (ASC) 29 
 
                                                 
29 (*) Depending on the availability of data in other applications of this construct, social network 
analysis can potentially be used for the situation estimate, thus allowing for additional model applications. 
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2. Structure and Outline 
Chapter I has identified the relevant purpose and scope of this study of Sudan’s 
internal wars.  The introduction to this thesis has also laid the foundations for the ASC, 
an alternative and integrated methodological approach to the strategic assessment of 
evolving intrastate conflicts.  The rationale for the selection of the subordinate steps of 
that approach forms the core of each subsequent chapter, portrayed within the specific 
context of Sudan.  Each chapter presents a largely self-standing module, the individual 
values of which are then correlated to produce a comprehensive picture. 
Chapter II identifies the primary “environment” of this study, in which insurgency 
is used as a keystone around which the remainder of the analysis is oriented.  The same 
analytic framework may be applied to any other number of relevant aspects of conflict in 
Sudan, yet insurgencies present an oftentimes disregarded or marginalized aspect of 
Third World concerns, overshadowed by emotional appeals within the international 
community in regard to humanitarian or economic conditions.  Insurgencies, rather than 
being a result of these conditions, exist as a correlated if not causal mechanism by which 
these conditions are facilitated and manipulated by the combatants involved.  For 
example, insurgency in Sudan has direct implications for the humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur, for Sudan’s possible appeal as a safe-haven to terrorist organizations, and for 
regional stability within the Horn of Africa as a whole.30  Chapter II defines the relevant 
concepts and dynamics of insurgencies as organized movements. 
Chapter III presents the QSE, a situation estimate of Sudan’s history and 
contemporary context.  The specific aspects of four intrastate actors are examined, to 
include the state, counterstate, population, and external forces, each of which are then 
identified and disaggregated.  Relying heavily upon written academic record and the 
testimony of subject matter experts, Chapter III is qualitative in focus and reflects the 
practical requirement to draw upon those who have “been there” in first approaching an 
emerging and unfamiliar environment.  This structure allows for the characterization of 
opponents, further assessed and refined in the game-theory applications of Chapter IV. 
                                                 
30 These conditions were identified by U.S. Central Command, J-8 Assessments Branch, Tampa, FL, 
in 2006, as issues of interest related to Sudan’s internal instability. They formed the impetus for this thesis.  
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Chapter IV applies a game-theory based Dynamic Conflict Model to the behavior 
of the primary belligerents identified in Chapter III.  A brief review of rational-choice 
and game theory is provided to familiarize the reader with the specific assumptions of 
these approaches.  A generic model is then presented to capture both the internal and 
external constraints faced by opposing actors in Sudan’s internal wars.  Separated into the 
North-South divide and Darfur, the actors are defined and aggregated in relation to each 
side’s minimally obtainable objectives and the limitations of the contested space.  Then, 
the specific strategies and outcomes employed by each side are “gamed” so as to further 
illuminate the underlying nature of conflict in each of the two selected situations.  In 
short, Chapter IV examines the “why” and “how” of Sudan’s internal wars.   
Chapter V then extracts Sudan’s insurgent groups from the model in Chapter IV 
and individually assesses their structure and orientation using Nexus Topography.  In 
effect, this allows for the answering of the “who” and “where” of Sudan’s internal wars.  
Emphasizing socio-organizational rather than individual relationship categories, to 
include tribal, ethnic, and operational affiliations, Chapter V completes the ASC’s final 
stage of granularity in measuring the distinct connections, bonds, and strengths of 
Sudan’s insurgent groups. 
Chapter VI presents the Analytic Correlation of the preceding three chapters.  
This chapter is the key to the iterative nature of this study’s multi-disciplinary approach. 
It utilizes the correlated data from the previous chapters to outline avenues of approach 
toward the formulation of US engagement options toward Sudan.  Two specific areas are 
delineated here: one of general imperatives, in which the interactions of Sudan’s internal 
wars yield insights that may be more broadly applied in analyzing intrastate conflict as a 
whole, and a second of specific avenues of approach, offering means by which external 
involvement in Sudan’s internal wars may bring these conflicts to a stable conclusion.   
In Chapter VII, the thesis conclusion summarizes the experience and result gained 
by the development of the ASC, and provides guidance for future research and 
application.  Thus the thesis ends and returns to its original purpose, the development of 
an adaptive security construct that allows for the iterative assessment and engagement of 
the factors influencing insurgent conflict in Sudan. 
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II. INSURGENCY AND THEORY 
The mere existence of privations is not enough to cause insurrection; if it 
were, the masses would always be in revolt. 
  - Leon Trotsky  31 
A. DEFINING INSURGENCY 
The introductory chapter provided a brief summation of the scope and relevance 
of this thesis.  Since the insurgencies of internal wars were selected as the primary focus 
of effort, it is necessary to first define what is meant by “modern insurgencies.”  The term 
insurgency fosters a number of distinct impressions, from ones of rag-tag rebels to ones 
of immense occupying armies.  This chapter expands on these impressions and 
definitions, and then presents a derived framework within which insurgent conflict in 
internal wars is objectively assessed.  The ensuing chapters, as part of concurrent 
development of the ASC, apply the tenets of this framework to Sudan’s internal wars. 
The portion of a society seeking to rebel against the state authorities in power can 
be broadly called the “counterstate.”  Within that term, conventional literature has 
produced a plethora of related words that both further refine as well as obscure the 
concept at hand.  Though far from all-inclusive, this set of terms includes rebellion, 
insurrection, revolution, civil war, guerrilla war, and insurgency.  It is that last of these 
that will be used for this study.  This chapter then has two purposes: to define 
“insurgency” as a concept by examining its development as an inherently social and 
organizational process, and to establish a model by which insurgencies can be measured 
and addressed in an operational manner. 
As rebellious entities, insurgencies foster negative impressions.  They exist 
outside of the law and are then automatically “illegal”; thus most military thought is 
focused on counter-insurgency, or COIN, instead of insurgencies themselves.32  Defining 
                                                 
31 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Monad Press, 1980 [1932]). 
32 A notable exception to this is the U.S. Army’s identification of Unconventional Warfare (UW) as a 
means of fomenting and supporting rebellious entities within other nations.  See also United States 
Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (JP 3-05) (Washington, D.C: Author, 17 
December 2003). 
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insurgency is problematic; as insurgents exist outside of conventional norms, the term is 
used to refer to any groups or individuals opposed to the government.  The Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms uses the following definitions: 
 
Insurgency – An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. 
Insurgent – Member of a political party who rebels against established 
leadership. 33 
 
These two definitions in and of themselves illustrate the problem of objectively 
evaluating insurgent conflict.  While the DoD definition of insurgency postulates a 
requisite intent to overthrow the government, an insurgent must only seek to rebel against 
that government.  The purest application of these terms would exclude a majority of 
commonly accepted insurgencies, to include many of the opposing factions in Sudan.  
For instance, the opposition groups in Darfur are not necessarily focused on overthrowing 
the Khartoum regime; rather, most efforts intend to establish a greater degree of regional 
representation within the Sudanese regime.34  Do insurgencies always seek to overthrow 
governments?  Do they also exist as a mechanism by which politically marginalized 
groups express dissent in forums that otherwise do not allow for popular expression? 
Further complicating an objective set of definitions is the concept of state 
legitimacy, that the “constituted government” or “established leadership” of a state is 
inherently sovereign.  More often than not, the term insurgency is used to negatively 
characterize the opposition of an incumbent regime, fostering an emotional response as 
opposed to an objective one.  To preclude a bias in perspective it is perhaps useful to 
remember Charles Tilly’s definition of “state legitimacy” as simply an expression of “the 
probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority.”35   
                                                 
33 US Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (JP 1-02) (Washington, D.C: Author, 12 April 2001 as amended through 22 March 2007), 265. 
34 The one rebel faction that signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) thereby theoretically secured 
political positions in the Government of National Unity (GNU).  See Dagne and Congressional Research 
Service, “Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and the Status of the North-South Peace Agreement,” 11. 
35 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, 
eds. P. Evans et al. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 171.  Tilly’s definition is 
perhaps oversimplified, yet it does eliminate the “good” versus “bad” connotations of insurgent conflict. 
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If the incumbent authority is internationally recognized as the state, those factions 
that act out against that authority can be considered the counterstate.  Insurgency then 
exists as an organized political activity that seeks to politically undermine or alter the 
authority of those in power.  Insurgencies challenge the established status quo by violent 
and subversive means, the latter occurring in part as a result of marginalization in the 
established political process.  As insurgencies directly challenge the stability of 
sociopolitical relationships, it is now appropriate to further examine the established 
literature on why and how insurgent movements develop as a method of revolt. 
1. Dissent in Society 
A large body of literature examines the relationship of human society and the 
concept of revolution.  The predominance of such writing uses historical analysis to 
extract generalities from specific instances of social revolt.  Such works juggle a delicate 
balance of universalism and specificity; one need only compare the commonly lauded 
analyses of American involvement in Vietnam in order to view the dangers of 
extrapolating the specific to the general.36  A distinct portion of theoretical literature 
attempts to distill the revolutionary process within empirical analysis.  In dissecting 
notions of Revolutionary Change, Chalmers Johnson refrains from attempting to define a 
specific revolution, nor is the work about “the ‘philosophy’ of revolution in general.”37  
The author asserts that revolution is best examined by creating a synthesis of prevailing 
theories on the subject in order to develop a model that provides insight into a given 
situation within its social context.  Although a revolutionary outcome cannot be 
guaranteed (if such an outcome could be accurately predicted, revolutions would likely 
not occur at all, as the change would simply happen), the factors involved can be actively 
influenced in any number of directions. The outcomes of revolutions and insurgencies 
may not be pre-determined, but they are malleable. 
                                                 
36 In the 1980s, Harry Summers’ On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1982) was considered the authoritative discourse on military action in Vietnam.  Later, 
Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) took an 
opposing view that has been commonly accepted as the “correct” interpretation of U.S. military action in 
the Vietnam conflict.  The issue remains debatable despite the plethora of analysis oriented to the topic. 
37 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982), xi. 
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Johnson’s synopsis of various theories addresses identification of the societal 
system (coercion and value theory) and the associated definitions of societal 
characteristics (i.e., norms, roles, and “disequilibrium”), while providing a reconciliation 
of several descriptive discrepancies (i.e., “rebellion” vs. “revolution”).  A society’s values 
provide its context, and thus form the basis of the ruling party’s legitimate authority.   
Revolution becomes possible when a society’s values no longer coincide with the 
distribution of power and in the absence of other mechanisms for resolving such a 
disagreement peacefully, a situation Johnson calls “disequilibrium.”  The process 
required to equalize “disequilibrium” defines the strategic problem of revolutions: the 
need to legitimize the resort to violence.  The important distinction is that the incumbent 
government is not being deprived of force itself, but rather of their complete control of its 
legitimate application.  Once this occurs, revolution is possible as each faction maneuvers 
to minimize coercion (the required use or threat of physical force) and achieve consensus 
(societal agreement as to the location of legitimate authority).  Revolution should not be 
regarded as a process requiring the rebels “to seize the ‘levers’ of government to achieve 
their objectives.”38  Instead, revolutionary change occurs not upon transfer of the 
instruments of power, but rather when a society’s impression of the seat of legitimate 
authority favors the challenging faction(s).  Popular preferences matter. 
This leads to an assertion that revolution in its essence consists of a struggle 
between the need for physical coercion and the consensual seat of legitimate authority.  
This defines the first conceptual point that underlies this study of insurgent conflict: 
Insurgencies present a coercive struggle for political legitimacy that rests upon the 
consensual perceptions of the populace.  That struggle exists not as a chronological 
process, but rather as a result of the societal context within which it occurs.  Academics 
have debated the extent to which modern insurgent conflict takes place with or without 
any sort of popular legitimacy, and use terms such as “warlord insurgencies” to classify 
revolts that seem to lack a clear ideological motive.39  This thesis considers that argument 
                                                 
38 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 151.  Here again, the term “disequilibrium” suggests that societal 
change occurs at a deeper level than is accomplished by simply swapping out those in the seat of power. 
39 Christopher S. Clapham, ed., African Guerrillas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), and 
Bøås and Dunn, eds., African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine, 3. 
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from a more practical perspective, in that regardless of popular allegiance with an 
insurgent cause, ideological or otherwise, insurgent organizations must develop a 
following that at the very least allows them to recruit the personnel required to carry on 
the fight.  The mere existence of “disequilibrium” does not identify when, or even if, a 
revolution will take place.  Something must occur to catalyze the struggle for control.    
Insurgency exists as an organized manner of insurrection, a means by which an opposing 
faction mobilizes the masses towards the insurgent cause, be that ideological or 
economic.    Insurgent factions inherently rely upon characteristics of the local populace 
in order to advance their own agendas.  The process by which an insurgency comes into 
existence and mobilizes the population is the focus of the next section. 
2. Organization and Mobilization 
Classical perspectives on the organization and process of insurgencies are broadly 
encompassed within two camps.  The first, popularly characterized by the writings of 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, idealizes insurrection as a phenomenon in which the charisma of 
a popular leader serves to instigate the revolt of the masses.  The foco (focus), or rebel 
leadership, itself is the catalyst for revolutionary change and motivates the masses that 
follow.40  A second perspective, fundamentally contained in Maoist thought, presents a 
process of development in which insurgent organizations nurture and foster the 
mobilization of a populace towards an ultimate end of supplanting the incumbent 
authority.  Though premised on differing assumptions, both camps acknowledge that in 
order to succeed, an insurgency must foment the engagement of the populace at large. 
In an examination conducted in the context of the Vietnam conflict (ongoing at 
the time of publication), Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. assert that “insurgencies are 
unique yet have shared features.”41   In analyzing insurgency as a systemic process, the 
authors discuss prevailing and alternative views of insurgency theory.  The fundamental 
                                                 
40 Originally derived in respect to rural uprisings based on the Cuban revolution, the same concept was 
later adapted for urban guerrilla conflict. See also Carlos Marighella, “Minimanual do guerrilheiro urbano,” 
translated by Robert Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare; with an Appendix: Minimanual of the Urban 
Guerrilla, Adelphi Papers, no. 79 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971). 
41 Nathan C. Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts, Rand Corporation R-462 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1970), 2. 
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point of their position against prevailing theory argues that a successful insurgency does 
not require the allegiance of a majority of the population.  Instead, the insurgency only 
requires enough support to enable the skilled manipulation of popular choices.42  In 
essence, through deliberate control of available opportunities, the insurgency can 
“volunteer” people to enable the insurgent cause.  This then is the crux of how an 
insurgent minority can get out of its disadvantaged starting block; it does not require the 
active support of the majority, only a tacit acceptance of the movement’s existence. 
Due to a perceived bias regarding the terms insurgency and counterinsurgency, 
Leites and Wolf instead use the words rebellion—an organized and armed resistance, and 
authority—a legitimized right and capacity to command.  The essay “is an attempt to 
identify and assess the characteristics and operational modes of rebellion and authority 
under conditions of stress.”43  The pervasive view of insurgency—the hearts and minds 
approach—defines rebellion as a primarily political endeavor.  The authors argue a 
limitation of this theory in that it overstates the requirements of popular majority 
allegiance to the rebellion, and that historically this has not always been the case.  They 
equate this theory with a demand-pull economic inference, summarized as follows:44 
 
An emphasis on popular support based on hard work and likes or dislikes, 
also termed pure preferences. 
A primacy of internal grievances and influence while discounting external 
support/influence. 
An emergent strength of the rebellion directly correlated to level of 
economic deprivation & inequality. 
The progress of insurgents and regime reflect the affiliation of a 
significant portion of the population. 
 
Leites and Wolf go on to present an alternative view of insurgency—a systems 
approach.  In this view, the authors essentially redefine popular support as the 
                                                 
42 Recent quantitative literature has also questions the notion of a correlation between ethnic minority 
regimes and a propensity for civil strife.  See Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin, “Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil 
War Onset.” 
43 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 4. 
44 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 24. 
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“nondenunciation” of the insurgency.  All that is required for insurgents to exist is that 
the population doesn’t fight them or turn them in to the regime.  The emphasis is on the 
population as rational actors.45  Individuals are not motivated as much by preferences 
(likes and dislikes) as they are by opportunity (cost-benefit analysis).  This alternative 
theory can be equated to cost-push economics, with the following characteristics:46 
 
Success (progress) of the rebellion depends not only on popular 
“demand”, but also on “supply” of choices provided by the insurgents 
which in turn affect the population’s assisted preferences. 
Though a minimum level of internal demand may exist, to a large extent it 
can be balanced and even supplanted by external resources in creating and 
sustaining an insurgency. 
Economic improvements cannot be assumed to benefit either side; rather it 
is the balance of factors contributing to the improvement that will 
determine the benefactor. 
The progress of both sides influences popular allegiances as much as it is 
influenced by them. 
 
Fundamental to both views of insurgent development is the premise that an 
insurgency is essentially a war of production, in which both sides struggle for control of 
inputs (people, food, materiel, information) and how those inputs are applied to the 
existing social and political structure.  The concept of insurgency as a production effort, 
regardless of the relevance of a purely economic analogy, inherently suggests an 
organizational aspect to the development of an insurgency, as well as the counter-
insurgent efforts of the regime.   Reliant upon the population base, both sides strive to 
expand, or alternatively, maintain, their control from a localized to a national level, 
through the use of both internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous) resources.  The 
actions of both rebels and the regime correspond to each level of the insurgent system, 
which can be visually expressed as follows in Figure 3 below, and corresponds to the 
following sequential actions on the part of the insurgency: 
                                                 
45 This notion imposes several limitations on the derived theoretical framework, to include an implied 
assumption of unitary behavior.  That limitation is further addressed in the model development to follow. 
46 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 150-151. 
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Sources of inputs and their costs: Insurgency struggles to acquire them 
while the regime impedes their availability. 
Conversion of inputs into activities (outputs): The insurgency 
indoctrinates, trains, and equips operations while the government applies 
counterforce to destroy the forces produced by the insurgents. 
Application of outputs: Insurgents target activities against the existing 
structure while the government attempts to build the structure in such a 
manner as to envelop and persevere over their opponents. 
 
 
Figure 3. Insurgency as a Systemic Approach 47 
 
This alternative framework is fundamentally easier to quantify (and thus evaluate) 
than the “hearts-and-minds” approach.  It is simpler to measure a cost-versus-benefits 
analysis of a population than it is to attempt to assess their individual preferences and 
motivations.  However, the underlying presumption that the population is essentially 
                                                 
47 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 35.  Dotted lines are additions to the original figure and 
illustrate the iterative effect of production output (activities) on external inputs to the insurgent system.   
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composed of rational actors is perhaps overextended.  It fails to account for the influences 
of societal structure itself (family, religious, and moral implications) and minimizes 
ideological compulsions of the minorities (extremes).  The focus remains on aggregate 
individuals and separate identities, and fails to account for a communal identity and an 
accompanying sense of self-worth.48  Though contemporary literature suggests that there 
is little if any correlation between ethnic minority regimes and civil war, there is evidence 
to support the assertion that “specific ethnonationalist configurations are more prone to 
generate violence in civil wars.”49  The ethnic composition of a given population plays a 
significant role in the development of insurgent warfare, a premise that underlies the root 
conditions of the conflicts examined in this study (see also Chapter III to follow). 
A second limitation of the systems approach of insurgency is that it fails to 
account for the importance of time as an indicator of success for either side of the 
struggle.  Insurgents are most vulnerable during the initial struggle to acquire resources, 
while the government has already largely lost when trying to directly engage insurgent 
forces.  The insurgency seeks to utilize an advantage in information to create sufficient 
forces to challenge the regime.  At the same time the government attempts to develop the 
intelligence necessary to allow effective employment of its force advantage.  In short, the 
winner is the side that negates the other’s advantage first.  Time plays an important role 
in the dynamics of the insurgency process, a role that has asymmetric implications for 
both sides in the intrastate game.  The key role of the populace as a foundation for the 
development of the insurgent system has been identified.  A second conceptual point of 
insurgent conflict is evident: Insurgent organizations mobilize and grow through the 
manipulation of the population base and its corresponding adjusted preferences. Having 
conceptually defined insurgent conflict as an organized process, it is now appropriate to 
further discuss the dynamics by which insurgencies relate within the overall arena of 
                                                 
48 The integration of individual selective incentives and communal goods has been expanded upon in 
Samuel L. Popkin, “Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam,” Rationality and 
Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).  It has also found renewed 
interest in contemporary studies of the psychology of suicide terrorism, as a mechanism by which an 
instilled allegiance to a collective sense of self allows individuals to forgo their own continued existence. 
49 Cederman and Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist 
Insurgencies,” 173.  The authors suggest it is not the actual percentage of populace that matters, but rather a 
marginalized population. 
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internal wars.  The next section will identify a framework within which the actors of 
internal wars operate in relation to one another. 
B. DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY 
The previous section defined “modern insurgencies” as counterstate entities that 
seek to politically undermine or alter the authority of those in power.  It is now necessary 
to characterize the organizations that are in power, the “state,” as well as the internal and 
external actors that are integral to the inherent oppositional framework of insurgent 
conflict.  In this section, internal wars are framed within the interaction of state, 
counterstate, population, and external actors.  The relationships between these “players” 
form the essence of intrastate conflict.  Prior to addressing this essence, it is first 
necessary to discuss prevalent notions of causality in internal wars.  This removes a 
tendency towards mono-causal explanations of conflict, and eliminates the bias of an 
oversimplified two-sided approach to an assessment of internal wars. 
1. Causes and Contests 
Governments and academics attempt to assign wars mono-causal explanations 
that in turn present diametrically opposed sides.  An infamous example of this trend is 
Samuel Huntington’s 1993 argument, considered prescient in the minds of many, of “The 
Clash of Civilizations” between societies today and tomorrow.50  Yet one author has 
suggested that such an argument disregards local specifics in trying to postulate universal 
truths; it attempts “to analyse international politics without discussing real politics. . . . It 
is international relations with politics taken out.”51  Yes, rebels and regimes also foster an 
image of fundamental opposition amongst their followers; defining an “us versus them” 
enables mobilization and collective action.  Yet these actions, which serve to further 
internally entrench a conflict, may also mislead an external perspective.  When outside 
observers characterize wars in general, and internal wars in particular, as being composed 
of two distinct sides fighting over a specific set of disagreements, they often miss the 
                                                 
50 Samuel P. Huntington, “The clash of civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49. 
51 Ervand Abrahamian, “The US Media, Huntington and September 11,” Third World Quarterly 24, 
no. 3 (2003): 535. 
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point entirely.  Wars may start over one thing or another, but what “causes” them to 
continue may be someone and something different altogether.   
Causal explanations of war are based on an assumption that wars can be solved, 
thereby implying that all wars are problems to begin with.  Two fundamental perspectives 
envelop these causal explanations of conflict.  The first is a general liberal presumption 
that all wars are negative.  When they occur in developing countries, they do so as a 
result of barbarity and irrationality.  From this perspective, war is perceived as an 
aberration, that peace is a norm from which wars deviate.  Instead it seems hardly 
refutable, especially in light of even the briefest snapshot of history, that wars are perhaps 
more of a norm than is peace.  Still, analytic explanations for the causes of war tend to 
fall into several common categorical asymmetries, of which one is the “culture clash” 
idea already mentioned.  Other causalities include, though this list is far from complete, 
ethnicity, political inequality, and resource scarcity (or alternatively, resource 
abundance).  Each causal theory attempts to pin down a single “problem” of war.52 
If general liberalism identifies war as a problem, neo-classical economics appears 
determined to offer a “solution.”  Comprising the second fundamental perspective on 
war, neo-classical economics hypothesizes violence as a set of independent variables, or 
causes, that lead to a dependent result, namely war.  Such a perspective can be overly 
simplifying and misleading:   
 
For now, the main point is that this kind of explanation of violent conflict 
can only deal in certain types of evidence: quantifiable evidence that can 
be assumed to ‘mean’ similar things across different contexts, in different 
countries and over a given span of time captured in the dataset that is 
matched to the model.  Theoretical debates about violent conflict are as 
much about what evidence may be admitted as about substantive claims.53 
 
When the causalities presented by the two prevailing perspectives on violence are 
taken in total, two broad themes emerge: politics and economics.  It is not the 
                                                 
52 Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries, 7, 114-124. The author examines war as integral to a 
process of societal transition, as opposed to occurring as a result of that transition. 
53 Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries, 8-9. 
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appropriateness of these themes that is problematic as much as is an over-reliance on 
their singular explanatory power.  In fact, such explanations stand in marked contrast to 
more subjective and anthropological definitions of traditional warfare, “fought for a host 
of social-psychological purposes and desires, which included conquest, prestige, ego-
expansion, honor, glory, revenge, vengeance, and vendetta—motivations that could be 
remote in time and place and to the Western observer could appear obscure, 
idiosyncratic.”54  Mono-causal explanations of internal wars are just as if not more likely 
to miss the mark as they are to attain it. 
The level of analysis employed for any attempt at an explanatory endeavor of 
internal wars is also subject to misapplication.  “Micro-level theories of war, or what 
could be called individualist, rational choice explanations of war, regard the poor as 
prone to violence simply as a function of cost-benefit decisions.”55  On the other side of 
the spectrum, a state-centric level of analysis irresponsibly defaults to defining countries 
as monolithic actors, engaged in a scripted game of global billiards, where each country’s 
interactions composes a predictable set of angles and outcomes.  In between these 
extremes, conflict origins are blurred within competing analyses of social constructs, of 
which ethnicity currently appears to be the most popular.  More appropriate is a holistic 
picture that both accommodates and mitigates systemic preferences across various levels 
of analysis.  For example, “it is not sufficient to simply claim that long-standing ethnic 
animosities explain the post-Cold War upsurge in ethnic conflict, but we must also 
consider how that hostility affects political and economic realities.”56  The glue that binds 
such a comprehensive analysis together is not a postulation of presupposed causality, but 
rather a detailed exploration of the particular and locally specific characteristics of the 
conflict itself.   
                                                 
54 Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), 6.  The anthropological work on “traditional warfare” referenced in this 
source is Harry Turney-High, Primitive Warfare (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949). 
55 Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries, 75. 
56 Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, 33.  Despite this engaging insight, the authors 
also assert: “Internal wars are the result of political conflicts over the distribution of resources by 
competing elites” (emphasis in original). Through this assertion, the authors end up applying the very 
explanatory oversimplification they so astutely critiqued in their earlier point. 
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This thesis argues that while quantifiable evidence does have a distinct role in 
examining internal wars, and will be utilized in this project, it must be used in concert 
with a holistic perspective that seeks to primarily understand rather than simply solve an 
internal war.  As Tolstoy wrote: “The deeper we delve in search of these causes the more 
of them do we discover; and each separate cause or whole series of causes appears to us 
equally valid in itself and equally unsound by its insignificance in comparison with the 
size of the event.”57  It is unproductive to simply search for causes; instead, internal wars 
should be analyzed as having been fostered by an underlying set of conditions that 
interact within a framework of actors and relationships.  In doing so, the outside observer 
gains an illuminating perspective on how the rebels and regimes themselves frame the 
context of conflict toward their own benefit. While the conditions of internal wars are of 
a specific local context, the framework of actors and relationships can be universalized 
and is the focus of the section to follow. 
2. The “Diamond Model” 
Internal wars and the form of insurgent conflicts that characterize them are not 
easily evaluated by conventional military methods.  Quantified variables of military 
strength, such as statistics of materiel production and an enemy order of battle, rarely 
provide an adequate picture of the relative strength of opposition.  The same limitations 
apply to assessing insurgent objectives and strategy: “There are many strategic theories 
related to insurgency and counterinsurgency that, while academically stimulating, cannot 
be applied effectively.  Likewise, there are countless tactical remedies for dealing with 
insurgent warfare that are not strategically grounded.”58  As stated before, bridging the 
gap between theory and local context requires a perspective that is flexible enough to 
accommodate local specifics while retaining the rigidity required of a universal construct.  
The first step of that construct’s ability to assess an internal war is a means by which the 
specifics of an “emergent” situation can be objectively identified.  
                                                 
57 Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy, War and Peace (London: Penguin, 1982), Book Nine: 1812–Ch. 1. 
58 Eric. P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare 18, no. 2 (September, 
2005): 2. 
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The “Diamond Model,” developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, provides a valuable framework for such an assessment.  The model, 
outlined in Figure 4 below, presents an objective lens for the analysis of internal wars by 




Figure 4. The "Diamond Model" 59 
 
A key to the relationships depicted in Figure 4 above is the premise already 
identified in previous sections of this chapter, that both the government and insurgent 
forces (or “authority” and “rebel,” to use Leites and Wolf’s terminology) rely upon the 
population at large to execute their own comparative advantages.  On one level, this is 
expressed by Chalmers Johnson’s definition of legitimacy, that the government remains 
in power either by the consensus of its constituents or by its ability to coerce them into 
                                                 
59 Figure adapted from authors’ course notes, SO3802: Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare (Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, summer, 2006).  See also, Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 6. 
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compliance.60  The insurgency faces the same challenge in its attempt to gain power.  
This effectively summarizes the strategic objectives of both the state and counterstate.  
On another level, the relationship to the population also characterizes each side’s tactical 
approaches in engaging the other.  Stated briefly, the government inherently relies upon 
the population to identify where the insurgents are, while the insurgency depends upon 
the population to shield it from the government.  This trifocal relationship, in addition to 
each side’s relationships with external sponsors or opponents, defines the “Diamond.” 
The “Diamond” is composed of four cornerpoints, broadly encompassing the 
“State” and the “Counterstate” as the primary antagonists, with the “Population” and 
“External Actors” existing as both foundational and supporting relatives.  The “Legs” 
between cornerpoints, in addition to defining the tactical approaches employed by each 
side, also define a set of relationships between the actors of internal wars.  A key 
underlying premise here is that the government possesses an advantage in force at the 
outset of conflict, while the insurgency possesses an advantage in information.  This 
defines the “asymmetry” of insurgent conflicts, a relationship that changes as each side 
maneuvers to minimize its disadvantage while applying its superior capabilities.61  For 
example, in order for the government to apply its force advantage, it must first be able to 
identify the opposition, which is likely hidden amongst the populace, or at the very least 
shielded by its covert nature.  Next, the government must engage the insurgency’s 
connection to the population at large, undercutting its legitimacy and support structure.  
Only then can it resort to direct action against insurgent forces, in what should then be a 
final assurance of regime victory.  On the other side, the insurgency follows much the 
same progression, in first engaging the population to establish its own credibility, then 
undermining the government’s legitimacy with the people, and finally engaging the 
government directly.  In a simplified mirror-image, the same progression of legs 
underlies each side’s connection with international or non-governmental external actors.  
Opposing belligerents require internal and external support in order to engage each other. 
                                                 
60 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 151. 
61 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” paper presented to the 
Insurgency Board of Experts (Naval Postgraduate School: Department of Defense Analysis, June 2002):17. 
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The process of assessing insurgencies along the approaches outlined in this 
insurgency model then returns to the previous discussion of the organization and 
mobilization efforts of the insurgent forces.  In having a force disadvantage, the 
insurgency’s ability to coerce popular “support” is limited.  The insurgents must foster 
popular consensus by fostering “popular expectations” of a successful conflict outcome: 
 
Popular expectations concerning which side is likely to win, in this 
respect, will have a key influence over each side’s level of popular 
support.  Expectations, in turn, are shaped by the size of the opposition, 
which is used as a means of measuring its future prospects given the 
historical power of the state.62 
 
It becomes clear that internal wars are not simply a matter of force-on-force 
contests of material advantage, but instead are inherently political endeavors in which 
each side seeks to optimize its own particular advantages while negating that of the 
opposition.63  These advantages are operationally realized through the proactive shaping 
of expected utilities to both the combatants and population at large.  These utilities will 
play a fundamental role in Chapter IV, where the relational dynamics of internal wars are 
further explored.  Chapter III, the Qualitative Situation Estimate, sets the stage for that 
exploration by examining Sudan’s internal wars through the actor-based relationships of 
the Diamond Model.  This framework objectively identifies the primary players involved 
in Sudan’s internal wars, while refraining from an attempt to exclusively “shoe-horn” 
them into one definition or another. “Alternative conceptual frameworks are important 
not only for further insights into neglected dimensions of the underlying phenomenon.  
They are essential as a reminder of the distortions and limitations of whatever conceptual 
framework one employs.”64  Chapter III provides a conceptual foundation from which 
Sudan’s insurgencies are “extracted” and further analyzed in the chapters that follow. 
                                                 
62 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together, symbolic violence and 
guerrilla mobilization,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 299. 
63 The idea of maximizing relative advantages in warfare is, of course, not a recent development.  
Nonetheless, the identification of the primarily political relationships within internal wars is an oftentimes 
understated perspective.  For a particularly insightful illumination of the frailty of a “conventional” military 
perspective, see Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters (December, 1983). 
64 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 8. 
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III. SITUATION ESTIMATE 
Allah laughed when he created the Sudan. 
    - Arab proverb 
 
Allah wept when he created the Sudan. 
 -  Another Arab proverb 65 
A. POPULATION 
Chapter II delved into the definition and dynamics of insurgency.  To understand 
the context within which Sudan’s civil wars occur today, it is necessary to examine both 
their contemporary expression and the history from which they emerged.  Chapter III 
utilizes the insurgency theory outlined in the previous chapter to dissect the specific 
characteristics of “the” Sudan that define its internal wars.  The intent here is to present 
more than a chronology of history.  Rather, it is to identify conditions prevalent 
throughout Sudanese history that today form the underpinnings of intrastate conflict.  
Writ large, those conditions are encompassed by issues of resource allocation and 
political marginalization, realms of contestation that are further entrenched by religious 
agendas, ethnic polarization, and the continued deterioration of ecological conditions in 
Sudan (and much of the Horn of Africa).  The explanatory power of these conditions 
provides grounds for further analysis: “Whatever the level of detail, explanation seeks to 
identify causes that account for the difference between what actually happened, on the 
one hand, and some specified or assumed alternative states of the world, on the other.”66 
Sudan occupies a unique position in African and Middle Eastern regional affairs. 
As a member of both the Arab League and the African Union, Sudan is the largest nation 
on the African continent and borders seven sub-Saharan countries, while also having an 
853-km coastline on the Red Sea, and bordering Libya and Egypt.  Sudan is comparable 
in size to the United States east of the Mississippi.  Physical distances have profound 
implications for Sudan; the centralized regime in Khartoum is inherently challenged in 
                                                 
65 O’Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972, 16; 32. 
66 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 388.  In this case the search for “causes” allows for the 
exploration of alternate explanations, rather than a limitation to single or limited perspectives. 
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extending its rule within a marginal and often neglected infrastructure, in which the 
country is administratively divided into 26 states and 133 districts (see Figure 1 on page 
6).  The geographic borders of contemporary Sudan were defined at the forefront of 
African post-colonialism.  The country has been historically divided into northern and 
southern regions, with a physical separation delineated by people not terrain, and a 
political declaration of semi-autonomy that both preceded independence and was 
institutionalized by a Line of Demarcation on January 1, 1956.67  The population in the 
south is mainly African Christian and Animist. The majority Arab population of northern 
and central Sudan is Muslim, while a predominantly African Muslim population lives in 
the western Darfur region.  Religious affiliations are further divided into ethnic divisions, 
thereby exacerbating “the difficulty of achieving a consensus within the Sudan 
concerning its national identity.”68  This difficulty as encountered today is an expression 
of a long and dynamic Sudanese history.  
1. History 
As with much of Africa, Sudan’s current geographic borders were drawn with the 
departure of colonialism and the onset of independence in the aftermath of World War II.  
The territorial borders of Sudan have remained largely unchanged in over a half-decade 
of continued internal conflict, with the exception of two politically contested 
administrative boundaries, one with Egypt and the other with Ethiopia (see also Figure 1, 
page 6).  Yet Sudan as a unified political entity has never been a foregone conclusion.  
Located at a nexus of trade-routes linking the Middle East with the caravans of the Trans-
Sahel, the provinces of Sudan have been subject to a rich and diverse history that is 
anything but self-contained.  Beginning in the 16th century, governments were largely 
involved in the administrative regulation of trade, as exemplified by the Sennar and Keira 
                                                 
67 The “Closed District Act” of 1935 barred movement between northern and southern Sudan and 
predated independence by over two decades.  The separation of peoples and tribes was encouraged by the 
divide-and-conquer policies of Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule.  For an expanded discussion of the 
development of Sudanese nationalism during the interwar period (1918-1942), see Tim Niblock, Class and 
Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985 (Albany, NY:  State University of New 
York Press, 1987). 
68 Ann M. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1998), 3. 
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sultanates.  The emergence of a merchant class fostered by the involvement of foreign 
trade ultimately weakened these administrative authorities; Turko-Egyptian forces under 
Muhammed Ali conquered the disintegrating Sennar sultanate in 1821, yet were in turn 
overthrown by Mahdist forces in 1885.  The Mahdist regime was defeated at the Battle of 
Omdurman in 1898, and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in Sudan was established.69 
Colonialism to Independence (1898-1956) 
British rule in the Sudan was not characteristic of the Empire’s colonies as a 
whole.  International tensions were significant; Egypt then and today has considered the 
origins of the Nile waters of critical interest, and the English had little desire to subsidize 
yet another colony.  The solution was the “Condominium,” a system of co-domini by 
which “the British had effective control over the Sudan without cost to the British 
taxpayer; Egyptian grounds for complaint had been minimized; and no other powers had 
acquired any rights at all.”70  The political changes in the Middle East following World 
War I, during which the Sudanese government re-conquered the Sultanate of Darfur, 
fostered nationalist movements in both Egypt and Sudan.  While Britain unilaterally 
accorded independence to Egypt, Sudan’s nationalist movement was judged to be 
fragmented and largely urban-based in the north.  This resulted in a distinct schism in 
British colonial policies.  The British considered the south a fractured appendage to the 
largely unitary north, with no recognizable system of local governance.  Instead of 
fostering a nativist government as they did in the north, the British became intricately 
involved in ruling the south.  Political separation between north and south was thus 
formalized by default.  When a transition to independence for a unified Sudan was 
outlined in 1953, distrust of the new authority was immediate.  E. H. Nightingale, a 
Governor of Equatoria, offered a prescient warning: “The shock of discovering that the 
British propose to withdraw and abandon them within the next three years to other 
administrators who are distrusted and even hated by the majority of the population will, I 
                                                 
69 Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan, 1-11. 
70 Peter Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 2.  
Authority of the condominium was vested in the appointment of a governor-general, appointed by the 
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believe, leave them bewildered and resentful.”71  Those words were to be a perhaps 
typically British understatement of the discord to come.     
The First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) 
The first fourteen years of independence were tumultuous, exemplified by 
alternating periods of parliamentary (1956-58, 1964-68) and military rule (1959-1964).  
Throughout this period, “political influence and authority rested with those social 
groupings which had benefited from the distribution of resources under the 
Condominium.”72 This separation of interests had distinct repercussions regarding the 
concept of social identity in the Sudanese population: “[T]he creation of Sudanese 
consciousness developed only once outsiders had defined the country’s territorial 
boundaries for it.  Similarly the growth of regional consciousness amongst the 
heterogeneous peoples of the south resulted in part from the British policy of seeking to 
develop it in a way which would retain, and indeed accentuate, its differences from the 
north.”73  Southern Sudanese were excluded from the formal political process; southern 
political parties were outlawed in 1958 and civil strife escalated for the next ten years, a 
period during which the southern opposition was ill-organized and largely ineffective, 
(with the exception of the Anya-Nya rebels, who were later supplanted by the SPLM). 
Exacerbating the informal separation of north and south were the policies of 
nationalization embarked upon by the Nimiery regime after 1969.  Also apparent were 
implications for Sudan’s international relations: “The attempt to pursue a development 
policy geared towards greater self-sufficiency and a more egalitarian distribution of 
rewards required, so it was believed, a re-orientation of foreign trade.”74  Ironically, and 
perhaps suggestive of possible arbitrative solutions in the present conflict, Nimiery’s 
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72 Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan, 204. 
73 Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism, 181-2. 
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desire to foster external support required concessions towards the south.  Initial 
negotiations toward a cooperative outcome and federal autonomy for Southern Sudan 
began in 1969.  Still, the revolutionary agenda that Nimiery initially professed based 
upon “an ideological attachment to the nebulous concept of ‘Arab socialism’ and a 
flirtation with the Soviet Union” was supplanted by a decade-long period “of ‘neo-
conservatism’ or so-called ‘pragmatic’ orientation,” both domestically and abroad.75 
A Decade of Peace? (1972-1983) 
“Nimiery was hoisted to power by a Free Officers Movement patterned on the 
organization within the Egyptian Army that had brought [Nasser] to power.”76  Though 
claiming to be a revolutionary movement, the new regime found that a cohesive reform 
agenda was easier claimed than achieved.  In attempting to provide a social platform for 
everyone, the Sudan Socialist Union became “a tatterdemalion collection of 
miscellaneous supporters [that seemed] to exist only in the rhetoric of its leaders.”77  The 
appearance of a “strong” military government was belied by its hollow character; a state 
unable to effectively project its policies in either political breadth or depth.  This 
underlying lesson remains consistent in Sudanese history, and led to the beginning of 
Sudan’s second civil war in 1983: “a society fragmented in social control affects the 
character of the state, which, in turn, reinforces the fragmentation of society.”78 
The intensive development attempted during the mid-1970s following the 
discovery of oil reserves could not have occurred without peace, thus allowing for the 
allocation of domestic resources and international confidence in monetary loans.  Yet as 
one author suggests, “the most critical factors which made settlement possible were to be 
found not in the regime’s high regard for ‘national unity’ but in changes within the 
southern opposition; the regional autonomy arrangement implemented by the regime . . . 
                                                 
75 Dunstan M. Wai, “The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimiery,” African 
Affairs 78, no. 312 (July, 1979): 297. 
76 Dunstan M. Wai, “Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 17, no. 1 (March, 1979): 76. 
77 Wai, “Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan,” 89. 
78 Joel Migdal, State in society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
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proved workable in the short-term and constituted an effective instrument through which 
civil order was re-established, but it was ultimately undermined by the regime’s wider 
policies.”79  These policies ultimately emerged as a centralizing Islamist agenda in 1983, 
yet traditional means of local governance decayed long before then. 
2. Sudan’s People 
The historical events as they have been described so far present a chronology of 
Sudanese history increasingly characterized by the influence of Arab migration into the 
Sudan over the last millennium, and a legacy of pre- and post-colonial foreign 
intervention.  The format has thus yielded a decidedly state-centric perspective, one that 
ended with the resurgence of civil war in 1983.  Today’s context arose from that period, 
which resulted in the current regime and its opposition groups, and will be the focus of 
the “State” and “Counterstate” sections of this chapter.  So far there has been little 
discussion of the Sudanese people themselves, and this mirrors contemporary reality: 
Due to the difficulties of doing field work in Sudan, many recent political 
studies lack a deeper understanding of the regional societies. . . . This type 
of analyses can prove useful to understand the general national and 
international context but they often cannot assess the complex reality of 
the local ground. . . . [F]ocused anthropological studies appear to be of the 
utmost importance in areas where ethnic conflicts are often fueled by 
ideological distortion of a complex historical reality.80 
This subsection will identify additional characteristics of the Sudanese population that 
must be considered part of the interaction between intrastate power centers.  These 
include a discussion of ethnic and linguistic composition, thus attempting to provide a 
level of objective measure to what is in essence a sort of social construct.  Differences 
between people are important in Sudan, and relative perceptions are all the more so. 
                                                 
79 Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan, 279. 
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The Nimiery regime, in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to mobilize Sudanese 
society at large, took unprecedented steps to formalize measures of land reform and class 
status in direct relation to tribes, ethnicity, and regional demographics.  The results of 
these efforts, in conjunction with a period of widespread drought and ecological strain 
throughout much of the African Sahel, identify three additional factors relevant to 
Sudan’s population today: language, religion, and ethnicity.  
Language and Religion 
The line of demarcation between north and south Sudan as drawn on January 1, 
1956, obscures further cultural splits in Sudanese society: language and religion.  Table 1 
below presents a representative delineation of Sudan’s population by linguistic groups.  
 
Southern Peoples (34%): 
1. Nilotic groups: Dinka (10%), Nuer (5%), Shilluk (1%), Anouak, Acholi, Bor Belanda, Jur, Shilluk 
Lwo, Pari 
2. Nilo-Hamitic groups: Bari-speaking (Bari, Kuku, Pojulu, Kakwa, Nyangwara, Mundari; 2%), 
Nyepo, Lokoyo, Luluba, Latuko, Logit, Lango, Toposa, Domjiro, Jiye, Mourle Group 
3. Sudanic groups: Azande (2%), Muru (1%), Ndogo, Sere Mundo, Biri (Balanda/Fertit), Madi, 
Bongo (Fertit), Baka, Feroge 
Arabized Peoples of Northern Sudan (40%): 
1. Ja’aliyin Arab: Danagla Arabs, Hassaniya, Kawahla, Gima, Husainat 
2. Juhayna Arab: Jamala (Kababish, Shukriya), Baqqara (Silaim, Hawazma, Misiriya, Humr, 
Rizaiqat, Ta’aisha, Bani Rashid, Rashaid, Habaniya) 
3. Gezira Arab: Mesellimiya, Halawin, Rufa’a 
4. Zibaidiya Arab 
5. Hawawir Arab (Berber stock): Hawawit, Jellaba, Hawara, Korobat 
6. Mixed Arab-Nubian: Shaiqiya, Manasir, Rubatab, Mirifab 
7. Christian Arab: Copt, Syrian Orthodox 
Non-Arabized Peoples of Northern Sudan (26%): 
1. Beja (6%): Beni Amer, Amarar, Bisharin, Hadendowa 
2. Dar Fur: Fur (2%), Daju, Beigo, Zaghawa, Berti, Masalit, Gimr, Tama 
3. Nuba (5%): over 50 groups, including Nyimang, Temein, Katla, Tima, Tegali, Koalib-Moro 
(Heiban, Shwai, Otoro, Tira, Moro), Daju, Tulishi, Keiga, Miri, Kadugli, Korongo. 
4. Nubian (3%) 
5. West African (fallata) (6%): Fulani, Hausa, Kanuri, Songhai (Zabarma) 
Table 1. Diversity in Sudanese Peoples 81 
                                                 
81 Adapted from Lesch, The Sudan, 17.  The author quotes multiple sources, including Wai (1981), 
Miller (1977), and Duku (1996).  Sources span nearly two decades, and can further be assumed to have 
changed significantly in the interim ten year period since Lesch’s work was published.  The point of 
diversity and heterogeneity thus remains all the more pertinent.  
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Just over fifty percent of the Sudanese population speaks Arabic as a native 
tongue, and in the north Arabic is the principal language of education, commerce, 
government, and in the home.  This contrasts starkly with Southern Sudan, where over a 
hundred languages are spoken and English is the preferred language of the educated elite.  
Additionally, “approximately 70 percent of the Sudanese people are Muslim, 25% follow 
indigenous beliefs, and 5 percent are Christian.”82  The combination of majority Arab and 
Muslim identities has a profound impact on Sudan’s political culture, yet that impact can 
not be simply distilled to an all-inclusive North-South divide or a divided pie chart.    
Ethnicity and Ideology 
The representation of linguistic diversity in Table 1 above, presents only a partial 
picture of the complexity of language, religion, and ethnicity in Sudan.  Common 
conceptions regarding a crisis in Darfur and the question of autonomy for northern and 
southern Sudan tend to overshadow the actual intermixing and co-habitation of ethnic 
groups.  A comparison of Sudan’s political map (Figure 1) and Figure 5 below, yields a 
more comprehensive picture. 
Kinship helps to form a political arena, but does not capture the essence of 
competition: the language of kinship, rather, provides a ready made 
ideology through which combatants stigmatize the enemy (especially in 
oral poetry), ascribe unthinkable violence to the other side, and in turn 
justify their own atrocities, while claiming to uphold the social values of 
clan solidarity.83 
Contemporary literature tends to view ethnic centrality in conflict as a result 
rather than a cause of conflict in Sudan.  The preceding quote forms the basis for 
conceptualizing the term “ethnic polarization.”  Within the overwhelmingly Muslim 
north, “groups are potentially subject to competing claims of their own ethnic identities, 
(non-Arabs but Muslim) on the one hand, and the high value accorded to Arabism and the  
                                                 
82 Lesch, The Sudan, 20. 
83 Daniel Compagnon, “Somali Armed Movements,” in C. Clapham, ed., African Guerrillas (Oxford: 
James Currey, 1998), 60. See also, Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, 92. 
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Figure 5. Sudan's Ethnic and Linguistic Groups 84 
                                                 
84 Overlays adapted from Lesch, The Sudan, 16.  The author cites original source as: Marc Lavergne, 
ed. Le Soudan Contemporain (Paris: Lermoc/Karthala, 1989).  Map from UN Cartographic section.  
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Arabic language in Sudanese society and in Islam on the other.”85  In Darfur and the 
openly contested south, questions of ethnic identity define the essence of internal war. 
The extent to which ethnicity plays a role in conflict in Sudan is only briefly 
introduced here.  This concept will be further explored in Chapter V, which explores the 
relationship of ethnicity and resource constraints to network dynamics. In this chapter, 
the artificially constructed relationship between ethnicity, that which defines the “we are” 
of society, and ideology, that which defines the “we believe” of society, presents a 
convenient transition to the role of the state in Sudanese society.   
B. STATE 
In assessing Sudanese governance prior to 1985, Peter Woodward remarked: 
“Ideology, to be successful, requires consensus and/or institutional enforcement, and it 
was not only the former that was lacking in the Sudan; all institutions were weak as 
well.”86  The labeling of “strong” and “weak” states often obscures the practical 
capacities of their regimes.  Prudent caution also suggests that an increase in state 
capacity is by no means a guarantee of regime stability.  The fostering of state capacity 
through social mobilization, “conveying to people that the routines, symbols, and ways of 
behaving represented by the state leadership are essential to their well-being,” can itself 
serve to create competing power interests within the state.87 A state’s ability to 
implement its agenda or to allow state agencies a significant degree of autonomy in 
response to competing power centers is constrained.  If internal and “international 
dangers can be countered through building agencies of the state . . . , strengthening those 
state institutions may at the same time hold out its own perils for state leaders.”88  
This presents the dilemma of attempting to advance a social agenda while both 
empowering and limiting state agencies.  As a regime maneuvers to realize the agenda 
                                                 
85 John Morton, “Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea Province, Sudan,” African Affairs 88, no. 350 
(January, 1989): 64. 
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that brought it to power, state institutions “transforming” society also become power 
centers that themselves challenge the regime’s security.  As indicated in the introduction 
to this thesis, in such cases, state legitimacy can be considered simply an expression of 
“the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given 
authority.”89 The regime must decide whether to steadfastly pursue its agenda in an 
attempt to thrive, or resort to the internal appeasement of competing factions in order to 
survive.  Writing about Sudan in 1979, Dunstan M. Wai, a Southern Sudanese, observed 
such a “survivalist” agenda in the characteristics of the Nimiery regime from 1969-1985: 
 
In the Sudan where influences of the traditional order still exist, there is 
the persistent survival of a political network that is largely determined by 
social and personal relations, with the inevitable consequence that 
competition for power tends to revolve around issues of prestige, status, 
influence, and personality, and not primarily around questions of 
alternative courses of policy.90 
 
The inability of the Nimiery regime in Sudan to coalesce social mobilization 
within the implementation of a state agenda, as demonstrated in neighboring state 
regimes as well, most notably Egypt to the immediate north, resulted in pragmatic 
courses of action that also played out on the international scene.  “Domestic pressures 
and conflicting priorities . . . produced a zigzag in Sudan’s foreign policy,” while the 
Nimiery regime “willingly rejected earlier ideological positions when doing so procure[d] 
material benefits for the country.”91  Regime survival trumped any sort of social agenda. 
 
Paradoxically, rulers of the institutionally weakest states, which face the 
most severe threats from strongmen and the most intense pressures from 
outsiders, are the most consistent and thorough in destroying remaining 
formal state institutions—the very tools advocates of reform regard as the 
key to regime capabilities.92 
                                                 
89 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 171.  The reader will recall that the 
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91 Wai, “The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimiery,” 308. 
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To solve this paradox, Nimiery attempted to follow an Islamist model in order to 
coalesce the populace under Arab rule and curtail local tribal mechanisms of governance.  
Instead, both the southern population and disgruntled African tribes in the west began to 
formally reorganize rebel groups, and Sudan’s second civil war began.  The Nimiery 
regime was ousted internally in 1985, and a succession of interim coups finally brought 
the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the al-Bashir regime to power in 1989. 
1. Governments 
While there were two periods of parliamentary rule in the first decade of 
Sudanese independence, and an ambiguous period of governance between 1985 and 
1989, by in large, military leadership in Sudan has had a continuous role in Sudanese 
government.  The present regime headed by President Omar al-Bashir is effectively 
contained within a single ruling party, the Popular National Congress (PNC) that evolved 
from the National Islamic Front (NIF), formerly headed by the supposed founder of the 
JEM insurgent faction, Hassan al-Turabi.  “All other parties are formally or effectively or 
periodically banned and marginalized”; to the extent that government exists outside of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU), it resides within the Inqaz, the “military 
government of ‘salvation’.”93  The local interests of this group are ones of commerce and 
military coercive power, encapsulated within the proclamation of an Islamic state.  The 
result of this power division is a true regime of the “center,” in which political power and 
coercive authority rest exclusively with the elite in Khartoum.  Prior to the signing of the 
CPA, the central government was usually referred to outside of Sudan as the Government 
of Sudan (GoS), since then, it has been formally renamed the GNU, to allow for its 
supposed joint nature with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS).   
Administered by the GoSS under the provisions of the CPA, Southern Sudan 
consists of ten states, formerly composing the provinces of Equatoria (Central Equatoria, 
East Equatoria, and West Equatoria), Bahr el Ghazal (North Bahr al Ghazal, West Bahr al 
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Ghazal, Lakes, and Warab), and Upper Nile (Junqali, Wahdah, and Upper Nile).94  
Allegations of corruption persist regarding the newly formed Government of South 
Sudan, and the new authority has faced challenges in establishing a functioning 
administration; neither military nor civil servants are paid in a regular fashion. The SPLM 
leadership there is perceived as having been co-opted by the regime in Khartoum, despite 
the formalized inclusion of southern representation in Sudan’s Government of National 
Unity.  CPA provisions regarding political representation allows the SPLM 70% of the 
seats in the GoSS, while the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has 10%.95 This 
contrasts the apportionment of the GNU, in which the NCP has 52% of the appointed 
positions, while the SPLM there has 28%.  This places the SPLM in the compromising 
position of having a predominant share of the leadership in the nascent southern 
government, while remaining committed to a minority position in the overall and north-
dominated central regime in Khartoum.  In pursuing a cooperative process towards 
independence, the SPLM, now formally included in the national-level government, today 
faces accusations of treason within its own constituency.96 
2. Tribes and Proxies 
The central regime in Khartoum has historically lacked an apparatus by which to 
effectively extend its influence and policies throughout all of Sudan.  Sudan’s armed 
forces have also experienced limitations in operating throughout the country, due to 
infrastructural constraints as well as the ethnic composition of its troops.  A 
predominance of Fur-tribe members among the army’s foot soldiers has created 
difficulties in employing them in repressive activities in their own homeland, Darfur, 
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literally “Land of the Fur.”  Khartoum’s inability to penetrate Sudanese society at the 
local level has led to alternate strategies.  William Reno has referenced Jean-Francois 
Bayart’s concept of “elite accommodation” in his study of Warlord Politics in African 
States. The term specifically suggests that to sustain a meaningful semblance of 
sovereignty—the exclusive control over territory and people—rulers needed to cut 
informal deals with individuals who exercised power in their own right.”97  
To a certain extent, tribal relationships in Sudan sufficed for local governance in 
the first twenty years of Sudanese independence. They presented a capable means of 
conflict resolution between competing clans, contesting economic or social resources, 
particularly in times of drought.  Common throughout the Horn of Africa, and indeed 
much of the continent as a whole, these “formal kinship systems are not straightjackets . . 
. they offer a flexible series of opportunities for people to choose how to deal with others.  
They also provide multiple social vectors along which relations of alliance, association, 
mutual support, opposition, and hatred may develop.”98  The flexibility of this system 
was tested, and ultimately overburdened, by the combination of failed land reform 
policies and ecological disaster during the early to mid-1980s. 
Particularly in Darfur, the adverse effects of environmental conditions were 
compounded by a period of Arabization that was fostered by the central government of 
Sudan.  Arab supremacist attitudes in Darfur can be traced in part to the efforts of Libyan 
leader Muammar Qaddafi, who proposed Arab expansion into northern Africa in the 
1970s and 1980s.99  Political events in Sudan also began to formalize Arabization, when 
in 1983 the Nimiery government began a shift away from a secularist agenda towards 
implementing Islamic political governance.  The polarization of violence in Darfur was 
not limited to African tribes, but also occurred among the nomadic and primarily Arab 
communities: “the new government’s radical Islamism suited (at least in theory) the 
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nomadic people, and the NIF regime saw them as useful allies and proxy soldiers. . . . 
The Sudanese government increasingly sided with Arab groups against African 
agriculturalists in local disputes.”100  
The resulting Arab militias have been grouped under the term “Janjaweed,” a 
somewhat derogatory term that was historically used to categorize bandit and criminal 
groups in Darfur.  Janjaweed leaders seem to be primarily tribal chiefs “with the ability to 
exploit loyalty to tribal structures in persuading young men to join”; furthermore, the 
“main difference between the Janjawiid attacks of the 1980s and those taking place since 
the late 1990s is that now the militias operated under direction from the regional and 
national government and with the assumption of impunity”101  The most notorious of the 
Janjaweed leaders is Musa Hillal, a tribal chieftan in Northern Darfur. He is currently 
being investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the basis of his alleged 
involvement in human rights abuses in Darfur. 
The use of Janjaweed forces as part of the regime’s counterinsurgency strategy is 
of questionable and perhaps contrarian value: “the Janjawiid attacks and the central 
government’s involvement initially helped the rebels to gain the moral high ground: their 
own attacks on noncombatants were, until quite recently, negligible in comparison to the 
havoc caused by the Janjawiid and the Sudanese Armed Forces.”102  Furthermore, 
employing the Janjaweed may serve to limit the regime’s options in any prospective 
return to the negotiating table.  Having armed the Janjaweed to offset a lacking military 
capacity in Darfur, it will be exceedingly difficult to disarm them as part of a peace 
process.  The unilateral interests of the Janjaweed themselves will have to be taken into 
account in any sort of negotiated outcome, thus suggesting a net decrease in the 
government’s number of possible compromise positions. 
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C. COUNTERSTATE 
Insurgencies have existed in Sudan in one form or another since independence 
more than a half century ago.  As the primary level of analysis in this thesis, the 
dynamics of insurgent development were introduced in Chapter II and will be further 
applied to Sudanese insurgent groups in Chapters IV and V.  In introducing Sudan’s 
insurgencies here, the list is not all inclusive; numerous regions of insurgent activity exist 
within the political boundaries of Sudan.  One, the Beja Congress, operating in eastern 
Sudan and nominally supported by the Eritrean government, only recently agreed to 
abide by the provisions of the CPA.  Nevertheless, the conflicts along the North-South 
divide and in Darfur are the most significant internal wars in Sudan, and thus they form 
the main focus of this study.  The fundamental difference between insurgent groups in the 
south and those in Darfur is that the former fight for a secessionist cause, while the latter 
profess to struggle for what they consider their rightful “share of the pie.” 
1. Southern Insurgents 
A deep-rooted resentment of northern domination has long been a characteristic 
of southern opposition, especially in view of northern lip-service to the federal autonomy 
granted the south by the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement.  Still, a unified opposition proved 
difficult to achieve in the south. One of the first organized southern resistance movements 
was the Anya-Nya of the 1960s, yet their activities were mostly sporadic, characterized 
by limited numbers and a lack of modern weaponry.103  Southern rebels eventually found 
enough reason to organize when the Nimiery regime announced on September 8, 1983, 
that Sudan's civil laws had been revised to bring them into conformity with Shari’a, or 
Islamic Law.  The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) arose as a 
dominating insurgent faction in Sudan, though the SPLM/A was nonetheless subject to 
repeated internal schisms and competition with other Southern Sudanese insurgent groups 
such as the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM).104   
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Under the leadership of John Garang, factionalism within the SPLA was 
nominally contained.  The organization steadfastly advocated and fought for complete 
independence for a Southern Sudan throughout the 1990s.105  The Sudanese regime 
fought extensive military campaigns against the SPLA, to include large-scale 
conventional operations and the employment of surrogate irregular forces from 
neighboring Uganda.  Despite their active support of Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) groups operating against the SPLA within Southern Sudan, government forces 
were unable to establish full control, particularly as a lack of infrastructure and 
transportation means worked in favor of the “bush-fighting” insurgents.106  Conventional 
operations grew increasingly costly, and following the continued inability of either side 
to attain a real measure of stability in the south, Khartoum agreed to “return” limited 
autonomy to the southern region in the Naivasha Agreement, more commonly known as 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January, 2005. 
The southern insurgent movement, politically represented by the SPLM in the 
GNU while still militarily active via both autonomous SPLA units and as integrated 
elements of the Sudanese military as directed by the CPA, has long envisioned three 
possible outcomes to conflict in the North-South divide, presented as models in Table 2 
below.  In Model 1, the SPLA views Sudan since independence in 1956, characterized by 
an agenda of Islamization and Arabization of the south by the north. While this 
arrangement was formally institutionalized as a federated Sudan by the Addis Ababa 
accords of 1972, it has today been characterized as a form of “colonial war” that reflects 
northern interference with a southern right of “self-determination.”107  Model 2 was been 
presented as the SPLM’s proposal leading up to the CPA negotiations.  It represents a 
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confederation of two sovereign states, with cooperation in common areas such as water 
rights to the Nile and oil exploitation.  This contrasts with Model 3, two completely 
independent, and likely hostile, states.  The SPLA has insisted that Model 3 will result 
from years of continued violence if the north rejects Model 2 and insists on Model 1.108 
 
        
Table 2. Strategy Outcomes of the SPLM/A109 
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of the CPA reflect one model over the others, particularly as perceived by opposing sides. 
109 Adapted from Lesch, The Sudan, 176.  The presentation of models is as per the original author, 
colors have been added here to coincide with “state” and “counterstate” as outlined in Figure 4. 
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2. Darfur’s Rebels 
Though the population in Darfur is primarily Muslim, practices vary widely 
between pastoralist and farming cultures.  The farmers, who typically identify themselves 
as African, are more liberal in their practices and customs, and are often looked upon as 
being “less Muslim” than the Arabic tribes.  The combination of marginalization and 
tribal fighting fostered ethnic polarization in Darfurian society as the tribes began to 
identify themselves as either distinctly African or Arab.  Deteriorating ecological 
conditions have also contributed to the escalation of conflict in Darfur. 
Beginning in the 1980s, Darfur’s tribes began to form militias as a coping 
mechanism for the increasing violence in the region.  The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) 
emerged from these groups.  The foundation for the SLA was laid by the leaders of the 
mainly Fur-tribe self-defense militias that formed in 1988 and went underground in 
1989.110  These leaders, disgruntled with the GoS’ lack of action in preventing attacks in 
the Darfur region, combined with Zaghawa tribal leaders in the late 1990s and formed the 
Darfur Liberation Front (DLF).111  This group later changed its name to the Sudan 
Liberation Movement and Army (SLM/A) after it conducted initial attacks against the 
GoS in February, 2003.  The general claim by the SLM/A is that it is not fighting for 
independence but only for a legitimate share of the political process.112  The SLA has 
found several external sponsors, which adds a transnational dimension to the term 
“internal war.”  Eritrea has long supplied the resistance elements in Darfur with weapons 
and political support while Chad has provided passive support in allowing the SLA to 
operate from Chadian territory.113  The SPLM/A provided training support to the SLA in 
2003 and continued to profess political support throughout early peace process attempts. 
                                                 
110 Dagne and Congressional Research Service, “Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and the Status of the 
North-South Peace Agreement.”  African self-defense militias during this time period were also allegedly 
trained by SPLM/A forces. 
111 Julie Flint, A. De Waal, and the International African Institute. Darfur: A Short History of a Long 
War (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 80. 
112 Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), Political Declaration, March 14, 2005: http://www. 
sudan.net/news/press/postedr/214.shtml (accessed August 13, 2007).   
113 Marc Lacy, “World Briefing Africa: Sudan: U.N. Accuses Neighbors Of Arming Darfur Rebels,” 
New York Times, February 10, 2006, A10. 
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The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is the second largest of the original 
rebel groups fighting in Darfur.  The JEM was formed by political followers of al-Turabi, 
the former Sudanese Speaker of the Parliament.  After the 1989 coup, President al-Bashir 
began to purge the government of non-Arab members.  This caused public protests, 
resulting in further government repression of non-Arabs.  The JEM, formed after these 
crackdowns, has as its goal the fair representation of non-Arab Sudanese within the GoS, 
yet also supports the implementation of Shari’a law.114  With a leadership composed of 
former regime members and politicians, the JEM’s political sophistication attracted 
secularists in Darfur that found little appeal in the seemingly unorganized and tribal-
based SLA.  Unlike the SLA, the JEM’s political leadership initially operated outside of 
Sudan, with administrative offices in Paris and Asmara.  The military forces of the JEM 
are drawn primarily from the Zaghawa Kobe tribe.  Foreign support came from some of 
the same sources as the SLA, particularly Eritrea and Chad. 115  The southern-based 
SPLM/A, a primarily non-Muslim organization, appears to have much less affiliation 
with the Islamic-oriented JEM than it does with the SLA. 
In February 2003, these newly organized rebel groups openly began to target 
Government of Sudan security forces and Arab militias in Darfur.  In April, 2003, a 
combined rebel force attacked the GoS base at the Al Fasher airport, humiliating the 
central regime and demonstrating the extent to which the insurgency was organized and 
possessed military capabilities.  Instead of reinforcing Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) 
units in the area, Khartoum pursued what has been called “counterinsurgency on the 
cheap.”116  The government formalized and expanded Arab tribal militias in Darfur, the 
Janjaweed.117  The counterinsurgency strategy rapidly formalized into various 
combinations of Janjaweed and Sudanese Armed Forces raids and air strikes that were 
typically directed solely at African villages throughout Darfur. 
                                                 
114 Flint et al, Darfur, 93. 
115 Sam Dealy, “Sudan: The Widening Gyre. Darfur's Janjaweed Militia Aren't the Only Ones Sowing 
Chaos and Death. Meet the Two Rebel Factions Threatening Yet Another Civil War,” Time International, 
Nov. 8, 2006, 36. 
116 Flint et al, Darfur, 24. 
117 Oliver Read, “Sudan’s Janjaweed Militia,” Online Newshour, April 7, 2006, available online at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/africa/darfur/militia.html (accessed August 13, 2007). 
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D. EXTERNAL ACTORS 
Peter Woodward’s 1972 assessment of Sudan’s role in regional politics remains 
eminently valid today:  
 
The Sudan’s attitude towards the Middle East and Africa was not only a 
question of foreign relations, but involved the more difficult problem of 
her own self-identity.  The possibility of union with Egypt [in 1953] had 
encouraged the country’s awareness of its attachment to the Arab world.  
This in itself concerned southerners, but when in the post-independence 
period they faced a policy of Islamisation and, as they saw it, 
subordination to the Arab north, it produced open conflict.118 
 
It is an illusion to assume that such conflicts remain constrained by geographic 
borders.  Sudan’s role as a boundary-state between the Arabic states of northern Africa 
and sub-Saharan Africa fosters a dynamic and volatile set of transnational relationships.  
The Sudanese government has consistently maintained active relationships with its 
neighbors, oftentimes as a means of leverage against frequent international allegations of 
domestic misconduct.  In many ways, the “external” legs of the Diamond model present a 
much more engaging picture of Sudan’s internal wars than does the domestic triangle that 
connects with the country’s population at large.  The following two sections further 
amplify this notion.  
1. Regional Actors   
Only two countries in Africa border nine other nations.  The Democratic Republic 
of the Congo accesses the Atlantic to the west, while Sudan serves as a border between 
northern Africa, the near East, and the remainder of the African continent.  The clear 
delineations of boundaries depicted on a political map belie the porous nature of these 
“walls”: thousands of Sudanese are refugees in neighboring lands, while thousands of 
foreigners have also fled to Sudan (see Figure 6 below).  In addition, the Nile River, 
critical to the existence of many east African states, runs the length of Sudan.  The Blue 
and White Nile converge in Khartoum, underscoring the cities role as the “center” of both 
Sudanese politics and regional relations as a whole. The following paragraphs will briefly  
                                                 
118 Woodward, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism, 181. 
 54
 
Figure 6. Sudan's Affected Populations: Internally Displaced and Refugees 119 
                                                 
119 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Sudan’s Affected Populations” 
Regional Support Office, Nairobi: OCHA, August, 2002. Available online at:  http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/ 
fullMaps_Af.nsf/luFullMap/C4D62037954E83CE85256C39007D4F99/$File/sudanafpop0802.pdf?OpenEl
ement (accessed July 3, 2007).  
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outline Sudan’s relationships with its neighbors, starting with Libya to the northwest and 
progressing in a counterclockwise fashion to finish with Egypt to the immediate north.120 
Libya shares 383-kilometers of border with Sudan, and has been extensively 
involved with Sudanese domestic politics.  Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi 
encouraged Arabization amongst tribes in Darfur, many of whom today provide foot-
soldiers for the Janjaweed. 121  It is thus all the more ironic that Libya has at times had 
hostile relationships with Sudan’s Islamic governments; Libya also provides support to 
the opposition SPLA, while Qadhafi had common contacts with John Garang.   In 1984, a 
TU-22 bomber attacked the Omdurman radio station, missing its target but killing five 
Sudanese; the aircraft was supposedly Libyan.122  Tensions persist today, particularly in 
view of Libya’s volatile relations with Chad, Sudan’s immediate neighbor to the west. 
Chad’s 1,360-kilometer border with Sudan lies mainly along Darfur.  Though 
Chad had fairly stable relations with Sudan in the 1990’s, tensions have escalated 
exponentially with the crisis in Darfur.  Janjaweed militias have conducted cross-border 
raids on refugee camps in Chad; Chadian military forces have also allegedly supported 
SLM/A units with safe-areas and military equipment.  Several African tribes in Darfur, 
primarily the Zaghawa, have tribal claims to lands in both countries; Chad’s President 
Idriss Deby is himself a Zaghawa.  A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
enter Darfur through Chad, and have been subject to harassment and attack on both sides 
of the border.  Though policy statements in N’djamena and Khartoum have expressed 
cordial relations, the two capitals could hardly be further separated, in both dialogue and 
geographic distance, from the realities of violence in Darfur. 
The Central African Republic (CAR) shares a 1,165-kilometer border with Sudan 
that is extremely porous.  Though the majority of the area on the Sudanese side is 
                                                 
120 The structure and content of this section borrows heavily from “Sudan and Her Neighbors,” a 
conference paper by Dr. David H. Shinn, February 19, 2003, presented at the Sudan Socio-Cultural 
Modeling and Strategic Multilayer Assessment Workshop (Arlington, VA: Directed Technologies (DTI), 
March 21, 2007).  Dr. Shinn is a 34-year career foreign service officer with multiple postings to Africa, to 
include serving as ambassador to Ethiopia. 
121 Rolandsen, “Sudan: The Janjawiid and Government Militias,” 155.  The Libyan-Sudanese border 
as indicated on maps has no physical delineation in reality. 
122 O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99,134-5. 
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controlled by Sudan’s southern insurgent groups, Sudan sent several military units into 
CAR in early 2002 in the context of a bilateral agreement under the auspices of the 
Community of Sahel-Saharan states.123  Although no Sudanese troops remain in CAR 
today, the Sudanese regime has an interest in fostering a cooperative relationship with 
that country in order to use that territory as a base for future counter-SPLM operations. 
Much of the 628-kilometer border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
is also under the control of the SPLA.  Again, Sudan has sent military forces into the 
DRC, most recently in 1999 to support the government of President Lauren-Desire 
Kabila.  Complicating relations between these countries are refugee camps near the 
DRC/Uganda/Sudan tri-point, which have housed up to 17,000 Southern Sudanese.124  
Uganda has a similar relationship to Sudan as does Chad, the regime in Kampala has lent 
support to the SPLA while Khartoum has provided a safe-haven for members of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), founded in 1988 by self-proclaimed prophet Joseph 
Krony.125  After a period of alternately severing and reestablishing diplomatic ties, Sudan 
allowed Ugandan military units to pursue LRA rebels in to Sudanese territory; an effort 
termed “Operation Iron Fist.”  The mission was largely a failure and did not stop LRA 
attacks.  Relations between Uganda and Sudan continue to be tension-laden; as 
conflicting sub-state level relationships exist between military leaders on both sides, 
interested in both denying and securing support for the opposing rebel groups. 
Kenya’s border with Sudan is fairly small, and relations have been largely stable 
since Kenyan independence in 1963.  Kenya was given the lead in internationally 
monitored negotiations that led to the CPA in 2005; Kenya also has a vested interest in 
maintaining trade with Sudan.  Though both countries share a common border livestock 
market, the Kenyan government halted the purchase of Sudanese petroleum on the basis 
of it aiding the war efforts of the Sudanese regime.  Kenya remains intimately involved in  
 
                                                 
123 Libya and Djibouti also sent forces, deployed in support of stability operations following a failed 
coup attempt against CAR President Ange-Felix Patasse. 
124 Shinn, “Sudan and Her Neighbors,” 6. 
125 Dunn, Kevin C. “Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army,” 131-169.  See also, Prendergast, John. 
“Resolving the Three Headed war from Hell in Southern Sudan, Northern Uganda, and Darfur.” 
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the ongoing monitoring of the CPA process and implementation of its protocols, while 
also serving as a major staging location for NGOs and international aid programs 
operating in Sudan.126 
A second region of tri-border tensions exists between Sudan, Ethiopia, and 
Eritrea.  Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have in the past supported the SPLA in an attempt to 
contain a perceived threat of Islamic expansion from Sudan.  Sudan was also openly 
complicit in the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak by 
an Egyptian terrorist group in Addis Ababa.  Ethiopian support for the SPLA peaked in 
1997 with joint cross-border operations that allowed the SPLA to capture several border 
towns in the Blue Nile region.  Yet when conflict broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
in 1998, Ethiopia moved to normalize relations with Khartoum in regard to a perceived 
common enemy. A large portion of Nile waters originate in the Ethiopian mountains, so 
economic relations between these nations constitute a pivotal point in the final outcome 
of the CPA, as well as in Southern Sudan’s role in the regional geopolitical context. 
Egypt, perhaps Sudan’s most important neighbor has twice had legal sovereignty 
over Sudan, first under Ottoman control from 1820-1885, and then again under the 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium.  While “Egypt continues to think of Sudan as part of its 
backyard . . . [t]he matter is complicated because the Nile, Egypt’s lifeline, flows through 
Sudan before reaching Egypt.”127  Egypt has repeatedly threatened to use full-scale 
military options in the event of a threat to that water supply.  Historically, Egypt has 
supported a unified Sudan, not wanting another country with which to negotiate over Nile 
water rights.  Since the signing of the CPA, Egypt has been quick to engage the GoSS, 
offering to pay much of the cost of resuming work on the Jonglei Canal in south Sudan.  
Egypt’s relationship with the Sudan(s) continues to be a essential factor in any equation 
that might result in a stable peace in Southern Sudan. 
                                                 
126 Shinn, “Sudan and Her Neighbors.”  The author cites Kenyan parliamentarian Wanyiri Kihoro’s 
interview with the East African Standard in the summer of 2002, where the official refers to Sudanese 
“blood oil.” 
127 Shinn, “Sudan and Her Neighbors,” 11. See also, David Shinn, “Preventing a Water War in the 
Nile Basin,” (n.d.), 4.  SPLA units attacked and destroyed the construction headquarters of the Jonglei 
Canal project in 1984.  Construction stopped after 70% of the work had been completed.  The canal is 
supposed to recoup much of the Nile waters lost to the Sudd swamplands in Southern Sudan. 
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2. The International Community 
The role of the international community in resolving Sudan’s internal wars is of 
paramount importance.  As demonstrated so far, internally instigated reform is unlikely, 
as even opposition groups seek to secure or supplant, rather than replace, current modes 
of governance.  These agendas are further encouraged by the use of ethnic affiliation to 
entrench animosities, resulting in a pervasive aura of mistrust between opposing sides.  
External arbitration is a means by which this aura can be bridged.  In the North-South 
divide, the involvement of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as 
well as other international actors to include U.S. efforts in particular, contributed to the 
successful signing of the CPA in 2005.  Spoilers that threatened to derail the peace talks 
in Naivasha have not gone away, and the need for continued international supervision of  
the CPA was recognized prior to its signing.128 Since then, monitoring of compliance and 
accountability has been lacking, in large part overshadowed by the explosive expansion 
of violence in Darfur.129    
Hampered by the domestic constraints of its member nations, AMIS activities 
have been largely ineffective.  AMIS personnel, to include senior leadership, have been 
repeatedly targeted in Darfur. Four incidents in early 2007 involved kidnapping, assault, 
and theft of AMIS vehicles, and several soldiers have been killed.130  UNMIS efforts 
have been marginally more successful, though deployment of the full contingent of 
10,000 security forces agreed upon in the CPA, and recently increased to 26,000 by 
United Nations Resolution 1769 (2007), remains problematic to say the least.131  A 
successful deployment of the newly-termed UNAMID in force could be used as a step in 
advancing the legitimacy of opposition parties in the GNU, thus mitigating the largely 
unilateral power position of President al-Bashir and the NCP. Yet the mission’s charter to  
                                                 
128 ICG, “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead,” 25.  
129 USAID, “Sudan – Complex Emergency: Situation Report #14, Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.” 
130 African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), “AMIS deeply concerned about spate of attacks 
against its personnel,” Press Report, March 5, 2007: http://www.amis-sudan.org/press.html (accessed 
August 5, 2007). 
131 United Nations (UN), “Security Council Authorizes Deployment of United Nations-African Union 
‘Hybrid’ Peace Operation in Bid to Resolve Darfur Conflict,” Security Council SC/9089, July 31, 2007. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/sc9089.doc.htm (accessed August 9, 2007). 
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Figure 7. Oil Concessions in Sudan, 2001 132 
                                                 
132 USAID, Sudan Oil and Gas Concessions holders, Map 8.1.2001.  Accompanying text and map 
link: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/map_oil_text.html  (accessed August 13, 
2007). 
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“keep” the peace of the defunct DPA does not suggest this will be the case, and, 
ultimately, does not bode well for the mission’s success. 
An issue of Sudan’s internal war that has previously been mentioned is one of 
resource allocation.  The African drought of the 1980s exacerbated civil strife in all of 
Sudan, particularly in Darfur.  In Southern Sudan, oil interests play a critical role in the 
relationships of both the GNU and the GoSS with the international community (see 
Figure 7 above). International interests have increased; since 2004, the Chinese National 
Petroleum Corporation has been purchasing oil concessions in Darfur.133  The majority of 
the income and proceeds coming from these oil dealings are funneled directly to 
Khartoum, and are likely being used to purchase arms for the Janjaweed.  
Contemporary Sudan serves to illustrate both the intractability and the dynamic 
nature of internal wars.  While conflict in the south superficially appears to have been 
ended by the CPA, the underlying positions of both sides make the CPA’s potential as a 
permanent solution tenuous.   The conflict in Darfur suggests that an arbitrated solution 
may be possible, yet the strong tendency for both sides to pursue unilateral agendas has 
made cooperation near impossible.  The strategies of both sides may yield an advantage 
from an appearance of cooperation, yet issues of political marginalization and resource 
allocation remain unresolved.  Furthermore, both issues encourage intransigent behavior.  
Ethnic polarization increases the relative political power of opposing factions, who in the 
case of Darfur have become artificially divided despite a long history (albeit an at times 
violent one) of coexistence.  The distribution of resources, domestically contested in 
Darfur and of perceived increasing international relevance in the South, further 
encourages the use of informal mechanisms in local governance and politics, making 
formalized conflict resolution difficult. 
In examining external avenues toward conflict resolution in Sudan, an 
accommodation of local context is critical.  Though US leadership has described the 
systematic targeting of “Africans” in Darfur as “genocide,” there has been little proactive 
                                                 
133 Enver Masud, “Sudan, Oil and Darfur Crisis, The Wisdon Fund,” The Wisdom Fund [online], 
August 7, 2004, http://www.twf.org/News/Y2004/0807-Darfur.html (accessed August 13, 2007). 
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response from the international community.134  It is insufficient to simply insist on 
reform policies based on European models that have little historical relevance in Africa.  
It makes more sense to pursue what Joel Migdal has termed “an anthropology of the 
state,” in which each political actor “is not a fixed ideological entity.  Rather, it reflects 
an ongoing political dynamic, a changing set of goals, as it engages other social 
groups.”135  The model presented thus far allows a foundation for that reflection; both the 
expected and achievable outcomes of internal wars result from the interaction of 
disaggregate opposing actors.  It remains for external actors to apply such a perspective 
in arbitrating an end to Sudan’s conflicts.  The application of broad-brush punitive 
measures such as economic sanctions disregards the specific political context of 
Sudan.136  Ironically, rather than support reform, such policies instead encourage the 
informal mechanisms that reinforce the status quo of political power in Sudan.  While 
this chapter has provided a snapshot estimate of contemporary Sudan within the context 









                                                 
134 Gérard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 
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IV. SUDAN’S INTERNAL GAMES 
Then, the major conflict was a very simple conflict 
 - Thomas Schelling 137 
A. FRAMING STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES 
The previous chapter presented a situation estimate of Sudan’s internal wars 
framed within an outline of four intrastate actors.  The situation estimate suggests several 
distinct lessons based on the actions and strategies of the actors involved.  First, a 
perspective of monolithically opposing actors obscures the complex internal 
characteristics of the parties involved. This has profound implications for negotiated 
outcomes to conflict in Sudan.  The signing of the CPA has so far resulted only in limited 
implementation of the agreement’s protocols.  The DPA, signed by the Sudanese 
government and only one of the insurgent leaders, has failed to produce lasting positive 
results.  The exclusion of several rebel groups from a negotiated outcome has further 
divided insurgent factions in Darfur.  Several additional points can then be derived from 
this first lesson.  In the North-South divide, it is apparently in both sides’ self-proclaimed 
interest to assert the validity of the CPA while using it to work toward fundamentally 
opposed outcomes.  This has led to an artificial and possibly temporary overlap of 
conflicting interests; the long-term implications are not encouraging.  In Darfur the nature 
of the conflict is self-reinforcing; fighting has escalated as expected outcomes yield less 
and less for each side. There is no “going back” to what was before.  Even if local 
mechanisms of tribal negotiations are successfully revived in Darfur, the increase in 
desertification and a lack of arable land will only exacerbate the competition and conflict 
over local resources; while threatening to expand conflict into neighboring countries. 138 
The second lesson learned from Sudan’s internal wars deals with the issue of 
attempting to objectively define actor roles.  Though it presents a useful analytic frame, 
                                                 
137 Thomas Schelling, Nobel Prize winner in Economics and author of The Strategy of Conflict 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), compares the Cold War era to contemporary conflicts.  
138 Lawrence A. Kuznar and Robert Sedlmeyer. “Collective Violence in Darfur: An Agent-based 
Model of Pastoral Nomad/Sedentary Peasant Interaction.” Mathematical Anthropology and Cultural 
Theory: An International Journal 1, no. 4 (October, 2005). 
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the four-actor intrastate situation estimate overly relies on aggregating factions on each 
“side” into a net whole, while the whole itself is oftentimes difficult to define. 
“Conventional distinctions such as those between state and society and public and 
private, which are so central to transformative expectations of African states, are difficult 
to discern in these cases.”139  In the south, the GoSS faces a conflict in identity; its 
majority representatives from the SPLM now possess a legally defined and vested interest 
in the GNU, the former opposition.  In Darfur, the SLM/A and JEM, aligned only in their 
opposition to the regime status quo, work toward conflicting goals that preclude a unified 
insurgency.  At the same time, the Janjaweed, though ostensibly a proxy apparatus of 
Sudan’s central regime, themselves have preferences that make it impossible to disregard 
the role of nomadic tribes as part of any long-term resolution to conflict in Darfur. 
 This chapter attempts to analytically account for the heterogeneous nature of 
opposing players while still illustrating the net effects of their interactions within one 
framework.  Using a game theoretic perspective, it builds upon the lessons of the 
situation estimate to outline the strategies and outcomes of Sudan’s internal wars in a 
manner that provides a dynamic representation of these complex conflicts.  The results 
are demonstrative of Sudan’s internal wars.  The first section of this chapter provides a 
basic review of game theory and illustrates the detailed application of processes involved.  
A second section then offers an expanded model of “nested games” which better 
illuminates the specific characteristics of internal wars.  A final third section applies those 
methods specifically to the conflicts in the North-South divide and Darfur.  In bridging a 
theoretic gap between qualitative and quantitative analysis, this chapter then introduces 
Chapter V, which in assessing the insurgent networks themselves, provides additional 
quantified measures for how the games of this chapter play out in reality. 
1. Game Theory 
Decisions made in conflict are a combination of individual preferences and the 
assessed actions of opponents.  It represents an inherently competitive process in which 
“[s]trategic thinking is the art of outdoing an adversary, knowing that the adversary is 
                                                 
139 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 29. 
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trying to do the same to you.”140  Game theory is a scientific method applied to this art; 
the possible strategies of opposing players are “gamed” to provide a set of possible and 
likely outcomes.  Assessing conflicts in this manner has several advantages.  First, it 
allows for the derivation of each side’s preferences within an internal war.  The extent to 
which these literally “conflict” with each other can illuminate the rationale behind 
internal warfare.  Second, game theory assumes the actors on each side are also aware of 
the opposing side’s preferences; in short, what one side does, it does so in anticipation of 
the opponent’s actions.  Outcomes are achieved by the convergence of actions undertaken 
by each side, while those actions are in turn taken in view of an expected outcome.  This 
apparent tautology is offset by the existence of multiple games and iterative outcomes.  
The value of the outcomes and chosen strategies accorded to each player also affect the 
nature of the game itself.  A purely static conflict setting, where strategies and outcomes 
are foregone conclusions, is unrealistic.  A more likely setting is one in which player 
preferences and options are inherently dynamic and reflect the underlying context and 
conditions of the situation.  Still, the underlying framework within which these 
interactions take place can be held constant; game theory thus provides a useful lens for 
the analysis of internal wars. 
The first step in establishing a game theory matrix involves the identification of 
opposing parties, termed “players.”  Any given conflict will have a minimum of two 
opponents, determined either by using combating individuals as the level of analysis, or, 
alternatively, aggregating opposing factions into single actors.  The second step then 
involves determining the strategies each player employs to conduct the game.  There are 
again a minimum of two strategies per player; each player can either “cooperate” to 
achieve a bilateral outcome, or “defect” in the pursuit of a unilateral objective.  The 
interaction of two players each with two strategies yields four possible outcomes to the 
conflict. 141  These outcomes provide an expected utility to the players, a set of values 
                                                 
140 Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, 
Politics, and Everyday Life (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1991): 1.  The book introduces the 
reader to game theory through the use of demonstrative examples of conflict in everyday life. 
141 This assumes a “one-shot” or single iteration of the game.  Players may also accord strategies and 
expected utilities in one game based on future iterations of the same conflict.  See also Robert Axelrod, The 
Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
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which may be defined in a cardinal manner (i.e., quantitatively, by using a common value 
basis such as monetary amounts), or assessed by an ordinal scale (i.e., by priority, where 
preferences are ordered according to desirability and with no measured interval).  The 
examination of these outcomes and their relationships to the players provides a 
comprehensive picture of how the conflict is conducted.  The generic frame of that 
picture is illustrated in Table 3 below, in which competition between Players A and B 
results in a distinct set of outcomes that can be further qualified. 
 
 
Table 3. Generic Game Matrix 142 
 
The above matrix provides a standard structure for a game of two opponents with 
two strategies each (again, the minimum requirements).  Additional strategies may exist, 
and these can be incorporated into the same matrix structure through the inclusion of 
additional rows, columns, and associated payoffs.  As shown in Table 3, each payoff has 
                                                 
142 The generic framework depicted here is commonly accepted in game theory literature.  Given the 
adapted “nested games” framework to be presented later in this chapter, Section B, for the sake of 
continuity it is here derived from George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics 
(Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), Table 3.1, 61. 
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a unique quality for each player.  The Temptation payoff reflects the attraction of acting 
unilaterally to achieve an outcome where the opponent is attempting to cooperate.  The 
opponent in that case receives a Sucker payoff from cooperating while the other player is 
defecting.  Mutual cooperation yields Reward payoffs, while mutual defection results in 
Punishment payoffs.  The terminology applied to these values is somewhat biased in 
assuming a combating relationship between opponents, but then again that is the 
underlying premise of competition.  What is objectively important is the relationship 
between payoffs, which in turn allows for a graphic representation of the conflict.  For 
example, if Ti > Ri > Pi > Si, a distinct set of four outcome points results.  By applying 
those points to a graphic framework as illustrated in Figure 8 below, the underlying 
characteristics of a conflict become increasingly self-evident to the observer. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Generic Graphic Game Framework 
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Figure 8 visually illustrates the feasible outcome set of values accorded to Table 3 
within the rules: Ti > Ri > Pi > Si.143  According each outcome a value of one to four for 
each player along their respective axes (x-axis for Player A and y-axis for Player B), four 
points depict the limits of the contested space.  While all possible outcomes are assumed 
to provide a positive result to one or both players, only outcomes within the pareto-
optimal outcome boundary are in fact achievable.  For example, in Figure 8, both players 
cannot achieve a (4, 4), the upper-right limit of the game quadrant.  For both sides to 
“win,” concessions must be made.  In the game, as in reality, there are trade-offs inherent 
in a bilateral outcomes of competition.  Each player also has a security level; that value 
achievable by unilateral strategy implementation regardless of what the opponents action.  
Anything less than that level is non-negotiable, no player will bargain over something 
achievable on one’s own.  As illustrated above, any values in excess of the security levels 
define the negotiable space of the game.  Here, a mutually beneficial outcome may be 
achieved that exceeds the likely payoffs of non-cooperative behavior.144 
Contrasting what can be achieved unilaterally and cooperatively assumes that the 
game is in fact solvable.  Game theory is inherently married to the assumptions of 
rational-choice theory: actors or groups, when considered as unitary (or monolithic) 
players, are assumed to calculate and act in a manner that best serves their interests.  This 
is the fundamental proposition of rational-actor models in international relations. It also 
underlies the expected-utility principle, a rule-concept which posits that “actors aim to 
maximize their expected utility by weighting the utility of each possible outcome of a 
given course of action by the probability of its occurrence, summing over all possible 
outcomes for each strategy, and selecting that strategy with the highest expected 
                                                 
143 This rule set defines a “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” a game in which a mutually beneficial cooperative 
outcome is precluded by the tendency of both players to resort to a unilateral defection strategy.  The result 
is the suboptimal outcome in which both players defect.  See Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, 
12-14.  This game is commonly used to explain a Cold War arms-race analogy, where the risk of disarming 
under threat of an armed foe ends with both sides escalating their weapon inventories.   
144 Conversely, it is unrealistic to expect each side to negotiate over something it can readily achieve 
on its own.  Thus, a negotiated outcome is one that inherently exceeds the unilateral capabilities of each 
player, while apportioning to each side the extent of all that can be feasibly gained.  See also, Gordon H. 
McCormick and Guillermo Owen, “Factionalism, Violence, and Bargaining in Civil Wars,” Homo 
Oeconomicus XX, no. 4, (Munich: ACCEDO, 2004): 372. 
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utility.”145  Such a set of assumptions incurs several limitations.  Previously introduced in 
Chapter II, the limitations of a rational-choice approach are now discussed as they apply 
to game theory. 
2. Limitations of Rational-Choice in Game Theory 
Game theory assumes that players act with the full knowledge of both the 
strategic options and assessed outcome-utilities of their opponents.  Bounded rationality 
theorists find that premise to be problematic in two ways.  First, people “never have 
complete knowledge of everything they need to know to behave truly optimally, and few 
decision makers have the computational ability required to maximize complicated 
objective functions”; second, “when individuals know they are dealing with other 
individuals, they become ‘other regarding’ and consider their partner’s intent and the 
fairness of the transaction.”146  Not only do individuals have trouble objectively assessing 
their own preferences; they are also likely to incorrectly assess and confuse their 
opponents’ preferences.  Further complicating these issues is the notion of expected 
versus actual utility.  As highlighted in Chapter II, popular preferences are based not 
simply on immediate gains, but instead on expected outcomes derived from a projected 
point in the future.  It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to give these 
expectations a quantified value.  In applying game theoretic analysis to internal wars, 
initial iterations should justifiably use ordinal values in calculating game utilities, thus 
“bounding” rather than quantifying the payoffs incurred by each player. 
The arguments of bounded rationality theorists identify a shortfall of game theory 
yet they do not invalidate the illustrative gains offered by a game-theoretic assessment of 
internal wars.  Key to such an accepted relevance is the notion that iterative applications 
of the game, both in reality and analysis, will produce trend information that can be used 
to resolve inadequacies of the construct.  As iterative games are played, learning occurs 
on the part of both player and observer as both sides refine their strategies and options 
                                                 
145 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for 
International Conflict,” International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (April, 1996): 180. 
146 Lawrence A. Kuznar, “Rationality Wars and the War on Terror: Explaining Terrorism and Social 
Unrest,” American Anthropologist 109, no. 2 (2007): 320. 
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based on experience.  That gained knowledge may be reintegrated into future iterations of 
this thesis’ overall analytic construct, the ASC.147 
Prospect theory, also addressing the limitation of assigned utilities, presents an 
alternative lens through which to evaluate popular choice.  Prospect theorists argue that 
“people distort probabilities, that people feel the disutility of loss more than the utility of 
gain, and that decisions can be strongly influenced by the manner in which a problem is 
framed.”148  Also referred to as “loss aversion,” prospect theory argues that not only are 
expected outcomes important, it is the expectation of losses or gains that asymmetrically 
drives people and groups to avoid the former.  Prospect theory comes at the limitations of 
game theory from an opposite angle.  Where game theory postulates a set of underlying 
assumptions of rational behavior, prospect theory is instead derived from the observed 
actions of individuals: “Unlike expected-utility theory, which is built on axiomatic 
functions, prospect theory is inductive in its origins.”149 
Prospect theory’s critique of the rational-choice tenets underlying game-theory 
revolves around the definition of value as a conditional rather than subjective variable: 
Value, or utility, functions are not necessarily private valuations over a 
good but, rather, are fundamentally conditioned in relation to the social 
environment, such as the distribution of wealth in a community.  This 
represents a shift from purely private and subjective individual utility 
functions to an understanding of utility that emerges from social 
organization.150   
The premise of prospect theory thus allows for the joining of individual and group levels 
of analysis in defining opposing sides of the games played in this chapter.  For example, 
the utilities of individual insurgents are a reflection and influence of the insurgency as a 
whole, while the same relationship characterizes “the government” as being composed of 
                                                 
147 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. 
148 Kuznar, “Rationality Wars and the War on Terror,” 320. 
149 Jack S. Levy, “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” Synthese 135 (2003): 216. 
150 Kuznar, “Rationality Wars and the War on Terror,” 321.  Such a characterization forms the basis 
for sigmoid-utility theory, in which the social status of an individual has specific implications for their 
choice-making process.  See also Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage, “The Utility Analysis of Choice 
Involving Risk,” Journal of Political Economy 4 (1948): 279-304. 
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several sub-actors.  Though factions within each side will have disparate interests, at the 
very least “each individual player’s utility . . . depends only on the share of the pie (or 
policy value) that is obtained by his or her organization.”151  Internal wars inherently 
reflect a popular socialization of “us versus them.”  In producing collective action, it is 
the portrayal of an antagonistic “them” that can allow for the consolidation of “us.”  
The social aggregation of popular preferences can be addressed in a game 
theoretic assessment of internal wars through the incorporation of a simple perceptual 
assumption: “The notion that the primary carriers of value are changes in assets rather 
than net asset positions is the central analytic assumption of prospect theory.”152  This 
identifies the importance of relative rather than quantified values assigned to opposing 
sides.  Here, the representation of a reference point, the status quo, is crucial in achieving 
a sustainable assessment.  “Expectation levels, aspiration levels, social norms, social 
comparisons, and recent losses can also influence the location of an actor’s reference 
point.”153 Each side may also have different reference points leading to simultaneous 
perceptions of a defensive posture.  “Because each side will see itself as defending the 
status quo, it will therefore have strong incentives to stand firm and—believing the 
adversary sees the situation as the state does—will expect the other side to retreat.”154  
The “irrational” behavior of one player may simply be a perceived reflection of the other. 
Prospect theory thus offers several generalizations that may be applied to a game 
theoretic analysis of internal wars: First, “coercion can more easily maintain the status 
quo than alter it,” an argument that sustains an assumption previously identified by 
bounded-rationality theorists, namely that both actors (and sets of actors), are clearly 
aware of who the attacker is and who the defender is.  This leads to a second implication: 
                                                 
151 McCormick and Owen, “Factionalism, Violence, and Bargaining in Civil Wars,” 369. 
152 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining,” 181. 
153 Levy, “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” 218.  The author also cites a study 
that analyzed a set of 18 American military interventions in which the U.S. President publicly characterized 
the operations as either “promotive” or “protective” of American interests.  Resultant increases in 
presidential popularity were six percentage points greater for interventions framed as protective (i.e. loss-
adverse than those framed as promotive (p. 226). 
154 Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology 13, no. 2, Special 
Issue: Prospect Theory and Political Psychology (June, 1992): 197. 
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“Conflicts and wars are more likely when each side believes it is defending the status 
quo.”155  In an example relevant to Sudan, the government’s continued use of violence in 
both Darfur and the North-South divide is therefore not necessarily suboptimal. 
States should be more often pushed into war by the fear that the alternative 
to fighting is a serious deterioration in their position than pulled in by the 
belief that war can improve the situation that is already satisfactory. . . . 
[E]ven if it leaves a great deal to be desired, the status quo is at least 
tolerable in the sense that the state is willing to live with it rather than 
running the risk of suffering the greater losses than a war might bring.156   
The application of prospect theory in correcting for the assumptions of rational-
choice in game theory is most appropriate in qualifying the results of a “solved” game.  
As an inductive approach, prospect theory alone cannot offer a structure or frame for 
correcting game utilities, while it does provide limited justification in using aggregate 
players to represent opposing factions in an internal war.  Prospect theory remains “a 
theory of individual choice under conditions of risk, not a general theory of politics.”157  
Still, when the theory’s individual assumptions are incorporated into a game theory 
analysis of internal wars, the tenets of prospect theory shed light on some of the 
underlying facets contributing to protracted and entrenched domestic conflict in Sudan.   
B. MULTI-LEVELS AND “NESTED GAMES” 
While concepts of interactive behavior are fundamental to international relations 
theory, less attention has been given to issues of intra-national or internal conflict.  
Robert Putnam has noted that, when applied to complex domestic dynamics, the 
formalized “rules” of nation-state behavior oftentimes seem inappropriate.158  In internal 
wars in particular, insurgents and rebels, as well as the regimes they oppose, may appear 
to act in an irrational manner, thereby obscuring a clear intent on the part of the 
belligerents.   An objective analysis of internal wars requires a familiarity with context 
                                                 
155 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” 192. 
156 Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” 193, 194. 
157 Levy, “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” 233. 
158 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization, 42, no. 3 (Summer, 1988): 427-460. 
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and history as provided in Chapter II.  Game theory now provides an analytic framework 
to “measure” the sides of Sudan’s internal wars.  Rather than quantify the individual 
capabilities of each side, it is just as important to understand the relationships between 
them.  Game theoretic analysis examines when cooperative or unilateral behavior is 
likely to occur.159  Yet how does one determine exactly which game is being played? 
Game theory postulates opposing unitary actors.  The previous section identified 
how rational-choice theory, as an underlying tenet of game-theoretic applications, 
oftentimes fails to account for the apparent suboptimal choices of political actors.160  
Where Putnam applies game theory’s principles in his discussion of a “two-level” game 
in interstate politics, George Tsebelis further refines the concept of multi-level games in 
Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics.  Tsebelis argues that the 
suboptimal choices political actors make are not irrational, but instead are only 
apparently suboptimal.  It is actually not the actor that is mistaken, but rather the 
observer; the outside perspective of the conflict is incomplete.  While the exterior focus is 
only on one game, the actors are actually involved in a network of “nested games.”161  
Nested games include those where actors involved in a game readily apparent to an 
outside observer are themselves constrained by the outcomes and strategies of other sub-
level games.  Thus, the preferences in the observable game actually reflect the constraints 
of other games.  This may result in an apparently suboptimal course of action that in fact 
reflects the most appropriate strategy in relation to a set of underlying (and perhaps 
hidden) conditions that affect the decision-maker.  An apparently irrational action at one 
level may actually be dictated by the limitations and outcomes of another level altogether. 
 
                                                 
159 Of several sources that derive connections between dynamics of cooperative behavior and game 
theory, illustrative is Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation.  For specific correlations between 
rational-choice theory and games across multiple levels of analysis, see Tsebelis, Nested Games, and Elinor 
Ostrom, “Review: Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity,” 
American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (March, 1991): 237-243. 
160 For an initial comparison of the works cited in this paper and their contemporary literature, see 
Elinor Ostrom, “Review: Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity.”  
161 Tsebelis, Nested Games, 7. 
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1. Games of Institutional Design 
Tsebelis identifies two possible types of nested games.  Both types explain 
suboptimal actor choices by providing a framework within which the influences of other 
game-levels affect what is being done in the observed game.  In the first game-type of 
“institutional design,” the actor’s suboptimal choice is in fact an innovative step to 
expand the realm of available options for both players.162  Institutional design involves 
an attempt to change the rules of the game (i.e., an insurgent faction may sue for peace to 
its disadvantage because doing so allows it to gain a legitimate seat in a higher political 
game).  A game of institutional design may enlarge the strategy space under contention; 
the change in rules directly influences that which is being fought over, thereby creating 
negotiable outcomes that did not previously exist.   
Tsebelis’ second nested game-type is one of “multiple arenas,” in which the 
actor’s suboptimal choice in the principal arena, as viewed by an observer, is influenced 
by constrained outcomes in other arenas.  For example, an insurgent group may elect not 
to sign a favorable peace-agreement because dominant factions within the group stand to 
gain from continued conflict.163  The outcomes in such a game remain the same; instead 
the value of outcomes changes: “Games in multiple arenas have variable payoffs, and the 
variations of the payoffs in games in which contingent strategies are permitted produce 
the same outcomes regardless of the nature of the game; the outcomes depend only on 
the size of the payoffs” (emphasis in source).164  Taken in sum, these two game-types 
exhaust the choices available to each player in that actors optimize their goals either by 
changing their methods or by changing the political setting that defines the conflict.165 
                                                 
162 Tsebelis, Nested Games, 8.  The author uses the term “institution” to refer to the “formal rules of a 
recurring political or social game” (p. 94). Hence the term institutional design instead of institutional game. 
163 McCormick and Owen, “Factionalism, Violence, and Bargaining in Civil Wars,” 366-7. 
164 Tsebelis, Nested Games, 72.  In contrast to a game in institutional design, in a game of multiple 
arenas the contested space remains of equal size; it is a shift in the payoff structure that results in a distinct 
advantage for one side or another.   
165 Tsebelis, Nested Games, Chapter 4, 92-118.  Tsebelis introduces the two nested games in the 
opposite order.  The order is reversed here to better align with the pending illustration of Sudan’s North-
South divide and Darfur within the context of these games.  For additional examples, see also George 
Tsebelis, “Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions,” British Journal of Political 
Science 18, no. 2 (1988): 145-170. 
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If the only variants are the payoffs and strategies used to produce outcomes, there 
should be an underlying game structure that holds constant across multiple-levels of 
nested games.  Within the generic game theory framework depicted in Table 3 (page 66), 
an internal war of institutional design retains the strategic options of “cooperate” and 
“defect” while including a third option that expands the feasible set of outcomes. 
 
 
Table 4. An Internal War of Institutional Design 
 
A nested game of institutional design as applied to internal wars is illustrated in 
Table 4 above.  One of the players in this game, the “Government,” has adopted a third 
strategy that allows for an expansion of the feasible outcome set.  This expansion is made 
possible by a prescribed allocation of payoff values as defined at the bottom of the table.  
A “Co-opt” strategy refers to one in which advantageous payoffs are provided to both 
players that though not maximized overall are still preferable to those of unilateral action.  
In effect, where a cooperative outcome was once not practicable, a strategy of 
Cooperate/Co-opt makes a similar result, an Engagement Payoff, possible.  The defection 
tendency is mitigated by the outcome of Defect/Co-opt, which incurs an Undermining 
Payoff that when taken to a stable outcome is less preferable to both sides. 
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Table 4 reflects only one of many possible iterations of institutional design in 
game theory.166  There may be additional strategies utilized by one or both players, but in 
the end they are structured to achieve the same effect: an outcome set that was previously 
non-advantageous to both parties has been expanded to allow additional benefits for both.  
The game of institutional design as presented here contrasts with an alternative game of 
multiple arenas, in which the size of the outcome set remains relatively constant but its 
distribution is skewed in favor of one of the two antagonists.  A game of multiple arenas 
represents a unilateral move to reinforce or improve a status quo position on the part of 
one of the competitors in a given conflict. 
2. Games in Multiple Arenas 
A game of multiple arenas allows an external perspective that includes analytic 
corrections for sub-level games in which the payoffs of “opposing” partners are internally 
influenced.  To maintain continuity between frameworks, the strategic options of 
“cooperate” and “defect” are retained, as is the added third strategy of “co-opt.”  The co-
opt strategy now has a different connotation.  In the game of institutional design it 
reflected an effort to engage the opposition in expanding the possible outcome set and 
thus benefit both players.  In a game of multiple arenas, co-option involves the 
solidifying of one player’s bargaining position through the internal coalescing of 
factional components.  How a side is unified, or how the dissenting voices of an 
organization are addressed internally, creates distinct implications for both that player 
and the opposition.167  Once again characteristic of nested games in general, it may be the 
external implications rather than the internal actions that are apparent outside observer.  
In another expansion of the generic framework depicted in Table 3 (page 66) a game 
representation of an internal war of multiple arenas is depicted below in Table 5. 
                                                 
166 Tsebelis considers these two structures “mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive classes of 
nested games,” Nested Games, 93.  Though such an assertion is admittedly overstated, it in no way 
discredits the application of nested games in a study of internal wars. 
167 The effect of factionalism on both government and insurgent actors, as introduced in Chapter II, 
will be further applied to Sudan’s insurgencies in Chapter V, and is discussed in relation to Sudan’s internal 
games in section C of this chapter.  For an academic discussion of factionalism’s effects on heterogeneous 
bargaining in internal wars, see McCormick and Owen, “Factionalism, Violence, and Bargaining in Civil 
Wars.”   
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Table 5.  An Internal War of Multiple Arenas 
 
Table 5 applies a framework of multiple arenas to a game of internal wars.  
Again, the government has adopted a third strategy that affects the game.  The co-opt 
strategy does not expand or redefine the outcome set.  Rather, it now allows for the 
government to increase the payoffs achieved by unilateral action.  Where a defect 
strategy previously did not result in a clear advantage, co-option now allows the 
government to solidify its own position (via Engagement payoffs), while degrading the 
options of the insurgency (the Undermining payoffs).  A game of multiple arenas benefits 
the payoffs of one actor, harms those of the other, and the outcomes remain the same. 
C. GAMING SUDAN’S INTERNAL WARS 
The first section of this chapter proposed the applicability of game theory in 
analyzing internal wars. The second section further developed existing academic 
endeavors to create an expanded set of game matrices by which internal wars may be 
examined.  The final section of this chapter will apply the game frameworks of 
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institutional design and multiple arenas to case studies of conflict in Sudan.168 
Specifically, the opposing sides of the divide between northern and Southern Sudan will 
be examined within the institutional design framework, while the escalating conflict in 
Darfur will be analyzed from a perspective of multiple arenas.  The selection of these two 
cases is based upon an apparent paradox of Sudan’s internal wars, alluded to by the 
lessons learned from this thesis’ QSE (Chapter II) and the introduction to this chapter.  In 
the North-South divide, a peace agreement has been signed, the CPA, while each side’s 
desire for unilateral sovereignty would appear to preclude a negotiated outcome.  Thus it 
seems that the contested space has been expanded to allow for the reconciliation of both 
parties, a case of institutional design.  In Darfur, a peace agreement, the DPA, has failed 
though the conflict appears reconcilable.  This suggests that one or both actors in Darfur 
have employed strategic options to alter the payoffs of the game while remaining within 
the same contested space: a game of multiple arenas.169 
Each case study follows a simple progression.  First, the context of the case study 
is reintroduced along the lines of information already gleaned from the situation estimate.  
The opposing actors are in each case defined as the “Insurgency” and the “Government.”  
In the case of the North-South divide, the insurgents are primarily represented by the 
SPLM/A, while in Darfur a compilation of SLA, JEM, and factional actors comprise the 
insurgency.  The government is the same de facto sovereign authority in both cases, 
though it may have distinct preferences in each situation.  The second step of the 
progression involves the allocation of preferences.  Each actor is accorded a priority of 
outcomes on an ordinal scale of 1-4 or 1-6 depending on the number of outcomes.  Again, 
the value assigned to each outcome is based on information from the historical record, 
public statements made by the actors involved, and the official language of both the CPA 
                                                 
168 Precedent for the application of nested games in analyzing internal wars exists in academic 
literature.  Christopher Coyne has used the correlated concepts of meta- and sub-level games in 
“Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy,” Foreign Policy 
Analysis, no. 2 (2006):343-360. Coyne’s analysis remains purely qualitative with no attempt to concretely 
game conflict in Somalia.  The present study attempts to move beyond such an effort. 
169 These two case studies are not the only instances of intrastate conflict in Sudan.  Rebel activity has 
also occurred in the Red Sea province and along the eastern borders with Eritrea and Chad.  It would be 
overly ambitious to attempt to discuss all of these conflicts in one academic endeavor.  Hence, they are 
mentioned here as a brief suggestion for possible future studies. 
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and DPA.  In the third and final step of each case study, the results of the allocated 
strategies and preferences are gamed to produce specific results.  These are presented in 
both matrix and graphical formats to better underscore their analytic relevance. 
1. Institutional Design in the North-South Divide 
Over a half century of conflict in Southern Sudan has been primarily about 
autonomy.  Southern opposition groups have repeatedly claimed a right to self-
determination and independence, while successive regimes in Khartoum have asserted 
their sovereignty over the south.170  From the perspective of an outside observer, one 
could argue that conflict in the North-South divide has occurred over issues in which 
resolution involves the unilateral victory of one party or the other; a conflict in which 
only one side can “win.”  In view of the apparent zero and total-sum conflict between 
opposing sides, how is it that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) exists?  And, 
perhaps more importantly, from an engaged policy perspective of the international 
community, what are the actual and future expressions of the CPA likely to entail? 
The entrenched imbalance in development and population demographics between 
northern and Southern Sudan predates independence.  From the outset of Sudan’s 
independence, the “Khartoum, Northern and Kassala provinces were collectively 
obtaining approximately eight times as much private, governmental and public 
corporation investment as the three southern provinces.” 171  Furthermore, in the absence 
of “coherent political organizations through which southern interests could be articulated 
and defended, the views of southerners could easily be disregarded (or deliberately 
overlooked) by the northern political elite.”172  Polarization between north and south 
continued under civilian government from 1956-1969.  In February 1972, after years of 
civil war, a peace agreement incorporated the Regional Self-Government Act for the 
Southern Provinces, based on an underlying principle that the “Sudan could remain one 
                                                 
170 Southern Sudan Civil Society, The Constitution of Southern Sudan: Draft Constitution Framework 
Text, proposal presented in Nairobi, Kenya, February, 2005.   
171 Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan, 144.  These statistics reflect the 1955/56 fiscal year.  A 
detailed chronology and analysis of the transition to Sudanese independence can be found in Woodward, 
Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism. 
172 Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan, 212.   
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country only if the multiplicity of its peoples was recognized and used as the basis on 
which to build [a] political system.”173  To the extent a national Sudanese identity existed 
in the decade of tenuous peace that followed, authoritarian rule under the Nimiery regime 
brought with it a distinct pan-Arabic flavoring that worked to the further exclusion of the 
predominantly Christian and Animist Southern Sudanese populace.  With the discovery 
of potential oil resources in the south in the late 1970s, the regime reversed its previous 
policy and in 1983 abrogated the Addis Ababa accords.  “It was ironic that Numairi, who 
engineered a reconciliation based on respect for the diversity of the Sudanese peoples, 
later espoused a hegemonic religious formula that contradicted those tenets and deepened 
divisions during the renewed civil war.” 174  Those divisions persist today.  Political 
marginalization of the south remains in the interest of the central regime in Khartoum. 
The dispute over oil interests in the south also exacerbates political tensions.  The 
current al-Bashir regime has maintained a monopoly on both the refinement and 
transportation of oil through a single pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.   
Exploitation of oil resources has occurred primarily in south-central Sudan, despite the 
projection of larger reserves in other regions of the country.  The preeminent international 
actor in Sudan’s oil industry is also a major arms supplier to the regime, China.175  
Chinese interests have allowed for significant development and growth in Sudan’s oil 
revenues and industrial infrastructure.  What is more ambiguous is the extent to which 
these improvements have been distributed throughout the population or are maintained 
within the hands of a privileged elite.  In addition to political marginalization, resource 
allocation and economic constraints remain contentious issues in the North-South divide. 
Despite the complexities of the issues involved, the opposing sides in the North-
South divide can be broadly separated into the signatories of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.  These include the Government of Sudan, recently renamed the Government 
of National Unity, or GNU, and the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army 
                                                 
173 Lesch, The Sudan, 51. 
174 Lesch, The Sudan, 52. 
175 Anonymous, “Sudan,” Oxford Economic Country Briefings, February 28, 2007; ABI/INFORM 
Global.  In 2005, China received 65.2% of Sudan’s export goods, primarily oil. 
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(SPLM/A).  Since coming to power in 1989, the regime in Khartoum has faced three 
possible outcomes to conflict in the south: a fully united republic, a federally-autonomous 
south, or a completely independent south (see also Table 2, page 50).  Several steps 
reflected in the CPA, to include the establishment of self-governing provinces “in the 
hope of erasing the rigid north-south demographic division,” suggest Khartoum might 
allow a moderated implementation of the second outcome.176  The southern leadership, 
cognizant of its precarious geographic location, might entertain such an outcome were it 
not for Khartoum’s continued imposition of Shari’a law and an accompanying 
intolerance of non-Muslim religious practices.  Opposition to Islamic influence has long 
underpinned the secessionist movement in the south, despite a lack of southern internal 
unity compounded by SPLA schisms and tribal differences.177  This lack of cohesion can 
also be said to characterize the interim Government of Southern Sudan, composed largely 
of SPLM/A members, and united solely on the basis of opposition to the North. 
The preceding contextual background can be reduced to an objective set of 
priorities.  Having elected to examine conflict within the North-South divide as an 
expression of a game of institutional design, at least six distinct outcomes are possible.  
These are achieved based on the interaction of insurgency strategies of cooperation and 
defection, and government strategies of cooperation, co-option, and defection.  The 
strategic approaches rest upon each player’s penultimate desire for sovereignty.  Each 
player is assigned the basic strategies of game-theory, to either cooperate toward a 
bilateral solution, or defect toward a unilaterally beneficial outcome.  For the insurgency, 
a cooperative strategy correlates to one in which the GoSS works with both legitimate 
and subversive methods to secure political representation for Southern Sudan.  The 
defection strategy reflects open and armed conflict in opposition to the north and in an 
endeavor to achieve southern independence. For the centralized government, the 
cooperative strategy involves a negotiated outcome with southern factions toward a 
compromise that decreases northern claims to sovereignty over the south.  The defection 
                                                 
176 Edgar O’Balance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99, 3.  Successive Sudanese regimes 
have repeatedly suggested the possibility of a semi-autonomous or federated Southern Sudan. 
177 O’Balance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99, 203-206. 
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strategy entails continued armed opposition against the insurgency.  A third co-option 
strategy involves selective negotiation with key members of GoSS-leadership allowing 
for the exploitation of resources in Southern Sudan while awarding side-payments and 
political positions to insurgent leadership.178  These strategies are summarized in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Preferences in Sudan's North-South Divide 
 
To illustrate the dynamic shift in conflict characteristics, player preferences prior 
to the CPA (2005) are initially scaled from one to four without including the co-option 
strategy.  Post-CPA player preferences are also prioritized and distributed in an ordinal 
manner, this time in whole integer intervals from one to six.  The resultant two-by-three 
game illustrates an application of a nested game of institutional design, in which the  
 
 
                                                 
178 See Lupai, “South Sudan needs strong leadership,” and Urban T. Kir, “Zigzagging Paths to the 
Precipitating Demise of CPA and the Post 2011 Era of Armed Struggles in South Sudan.” 
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government has adopted a third strategy since the CPA that in essence amounts to the co-
option of a select leadership within the opposition (see Table 7 below).   
 
 
Table 7. Institutional Design in Sudan's North-South Divide 179 
 
From the perspective of an outside observer, prior to the CPA the conflict in 
Southern Sudan appeared to be a zero-sum conflict where negotiation was impossible.  
Military action was unsuccessful in achieving a “winning” outcome for either side.  From 
a political perspective, the interests of both sides appeared mutually exclusive.  Yet 
politics rely upon a local context, and there are distinct expressions of factionalism that 
allow for player interaction on multiple levels.  As demonstrated by its recent 
engagement policy toward the south, “the regime in Khartoum has succeeded to a large 
extent in co-opting and thus neutralizing many of the local tribal leaders because the 
                                                 
179 This representation of a game matrix illustrates that while neither player has a dominant strategy, 
the government’s strategy of cooperation is dominated by any outcome achieved by the other two 
strategies.  Though a Nash equilibrium (“fair” outcome) appears derivable by the computation of a strategy 
mix, the reader is reminded that no such value can be accurately derived in the absence of cardinal values. 
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latter lack their own economic resources to ensure their influence on their groups and had 
no other choices of political survival.”180 This application of a divide-and-conquer 
approach may be occurring in several ways, of which the presented game illustrates one 
possibility.  Using the model discussed thus far, one player, in this case the government, 
employs a third strategy by which structured mutual outcomes allowed for the partial 
satisfaction of preferences on both sides (a game of institutional design).  This allows for 
an artificial expansion of the contested political space, sufficient to appease the required 
factional components of actors on each side.  As depicted in Figure 9 below, the CPA 
then becomes possible in an environment that originally appeared non-negotiable.  In this 
representation, pre-2005 outcomes remain on a scale of 1-4 (reference Figure 8, p. 67) 
while post-2005 outcomes are overlaid on the depicted scale of 1-6. 
 
 
Figure 9. Institutional Design in Sudan's North-South Divide 
 
It remains to be seen whether the engagement payoffs that comprise the expanded 
outcome boundary will remain stable throughout the interim period until the 2011 
                                                 
180 Miller, “Power, Land and Ethnicity in the Kassala-Gedaref States,” 8.  
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referendum.  The six protocols that comprise the CPA were signed by both the GoS and 
SPLM/A under mediation by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD).181  The specific implementations of protocols on security, wealth, and power-
sharing have thus far failed to materialize.  SPLM/A soldiers, supposedly integrated into 
Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of the GNU, are instead languishing in barracks outside of 
Khartoum.  In November, 2006, “tensions between the former foes erupted into the 
heaviest fighting since the accord . . . killing 150 and injuring hundreds.”182  Though the 
“space” under contention has been expanded to satisfy elements on both sides, so far the 
implementation of the CPA appears to not reflect the geopolitical reality of the Sudan. 
2. Multiple Arenas in Darfur 
In contrast to the civil war in the south, the war in Darfur is not about 
independence, but rather about equality in representation within the national government 
of Sudan.  The population in the Darfur region is predominantly Muslim.  The northern 
part of the Darfur area is inhabited by camel-herding non-Arab and Arab tribes.  The 
eastern and southern zones of Darfur are occupied primarily by the Arab tribes who 
subsist by herding cattle.  The central zone mostly consists of non-Arab tribes who are 
sedentary farmers.183  While the populations in the region have been popularly identified 
ethnically as African or Arab, in actuality, this ethnic identification is much more 
ambiguous.  Years of socioeconomic cooperation and tribal intermarriage have blurred 
the actual delineations between ethnicities.184  
Historically, agrarian communities worked tracts of land at the base of the fertile 
Jebel Marra massif in the center of the Darfur region, while pastoralist tribes seasonally 
moved their herds throughout the region for grazing.  These patterns of movement 
                                                 
181 Full-text access to the six protocols of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of The Sudan and The 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army is available online from the United 
Nations: http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf (accessed August 13, 2007). 
182 Skye Wheeler and Reuters News, “Sudan former north-south foes commit to joint forces,” 
AlertNet.org, January 23, 2007: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L2328540.htm (accessed 
August 13, 2007). 
183 Flint et al, Darfur. 
184 De Waal, “Who are the Darfurians,” 181-205.   
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fostered a social construct of interdependence that facilitated general stability in the 
region.  This social construct was disrupted in the 1970s and 1980s as government-
imposed reform measures exacerbated the effects of a period of widespread drought 
across northern Africa. The drought reduced the grazing land available to the pastoralists, 
in turn forcing them to move into areas occupied by sedentary farmers.  This move 
increased the frequency of violent clashes between the two groups as they fought over 
land access and rights.  Local leaders attempted to resolve these disputes through tribal 
channels, yet these had been greatly curtailed by the political agenda of the Nimiery 
regime.  The situation rapidly outgrew the capability of traditional conflict resolution 
methods in Darfur.185 
The adverse effects of Darfur’s environmental conditions were further 
compounded by a period of Arabization in the region.  Arab supremacist attitudes in 
Darfur can be traced in part to the efforts of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, who 
proposed Arab expansion into northern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s.186  Political events 
in Sudan also began to formalize Arabization in 1983, when the Nimiery government 
began a shift away from a secularist agenda toward implementing Islamic political 
governance.  Though the population in Darfur is primarily Muslim, practices vary widely 
between pastoralist and farming cultures.  The farmers, who typically identify themselves 
as African, are more liberal in their practices and customs, and are often looked upon as 
being “less Muslim” than the Arabic tribes.  The combination of marginalization and 
tribal fighting fostered ethnic polarization in Darfur as tribes began to identify themselves 
as either distinctly African or Arab.  With the degradation of tribal conflict resolution 
methods, distinct and opposing sides became increasingly entrenched in the population. 
Though militia attacks and government military actions occurred throughout the 
1990s, the key event prior to the escalation of the crisis in Darfur was the April 2003 
rebel attack on the GoS base at Al Fasher airport, humiliating the central regime and 
demonstrating the extent to which the insurgency was organized and possessed military 
capabilities.  Prior to 2003, the Sudanese government had supplied sporadic support to 
                                                 
185 Scott Anderson, “How Did Darfur Happen,” New York Times Magazine, October 17, 2004, 56.  
186 Rolandsen, “Sudan: The Janjawiid and Government Militias,” 155. 
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Arab militias in Darfur, aimed primarily at curtailing the emergence of competing power 
bases in outlying regions of the country.  Sudanese military units had until then rarely 
operated in a concerted fashion in Darfur, preoccupied instead with operations against the 
SPLA in the south.  In post-2003 Darfur, instead of reinforcing SAF units in the area, 
Khartoum pursued what has been called “counterinsurgency on the cheap.”187 The 
government formalized and expanded Arab tribal militias, the Janjaweed.188 The 
counterinsurgency strategy rapidly formalized into various combinations of Janjaweed 
and SAF  raids and air strikes that were typically were directed solely at African villages 
throughout the Darfur. 
The polarization of violence in Darfur was not limited to African tribes, but also 
occurred among the nomadic and primarily Arab communities, where “the new 
government’s radical Islamism suited (at least in theory) the nomadic people, and the NIF 
regime saw them as useful allies and proxy soldiers.”189  Using Janjaweed forces as part 
of the regime’s counterinsurgency strategy is of questionable value, as “the Janjawiid 
attacks and the central government’s involvement initially helped the rebels to gain the 
moral high ground.”190  Having armed the Janjaweed to offset a lacking military capacity 
in Darfur, it will be exceedingly difficult to disarm them as part of a peace process.  The 
interests of the Janjaweed themselves will have to be considered in attaining any 
negotiated outcome, thus suggesting a net decrease in the government’s possible 
compromise positions.  However, through the use of proxy militias, the government’s net 
military effectiveness in Darfur has increased. 
As was done in the examination of institutional design in the North-South divide, 
the preceding contextual background of Darfur can be reduced to an objective set of 
priorities.  Again, at least six distinct outcomes are possible, based on the interaction of 
insurgency strategies of cooperation and defection, and government strategies of 
                                                 
187 Flint et al, Darfur, 24. 
188 Oliver Read, “Sudan’s Janjaweed Militia.” 
189 Rolandsen, “Sudan: The Janjawiid and Government Militias,” 157. 
190 Rolandsen, “Sudan: The Janjawiid and Government Militias,” 161, and also Human Rights Watch, 
“Darfuf Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support.”  
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cooperation, co-option, and defection.  For the insurgency, a cooperative strategy is one 
in which rebel factions agree to cease-fire provisions and halt their armed struggle.  The 
defection strategy reflects continued armed conflict against government forces and 
Janjaweed militias.  For the government, the cooperative strategy involves a negotiated 
outcome toward a compromise that allows increased self-determination of local tribes in 
Darfur.  The defection strategy entails continued armed opposition against the 
insurgency.  A third co-option strategy in Darfur involves the recruitment of local Arab 
militias to conduct proxy warfare against the rebels.  This third strategy, though 
employed sporadically over the past two decades, has only become formalized since 
2003.191  In examining player strategies within a game of multiple arenas in Darfur 
before and after 2003, a distinct shift in preferences emerges, shown in Table 8 below.   
 
 
Table 8. Preferences in Sudan's Darfur 
 
                                                 
191 In this case, the use of proxy militias by the Sudanese regime refers specifically to Darfur.  
Government-sponsored militias were also used in Southern Sudan during the 1970s and 1980s.  See 
Rolandsen, “Sudan: The Janjawiid and Government Militias.” 
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Player preferences prior to the first large-scale rebel attacks in 2003 were initially 
scaled from one to four without the co-opt strategy.  Post-2003 player preferences were 
also prioritized and distributed in an ordinal manner, this time in whole integer intervals 
from one to six.  The resultant two-by-three game illustrates an application of a nested 
game of multiple arenas, in which the government has adopted a third strategy since 2003 
that in essence amounts to the internal co-option of Arab militias to advance the 
government agenda in Darfur.  The matrix of this game is presented in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9. Multiple Arenas in Sudan’s Darfur 
 
In the game of multiple arena’s in Darfur, both player’s have dominant strategies.  
The insurgency, representing marginalized groups deprived of any capacity in Sudan’s 
political process, have a dominant strategy to continue armed insurrection.  The 
government, hampered by logistical constraints in projecting military forces, while at the 
same time adamantly opposed to ceding political authority, has a dominant strategy of co-
opting local Arab militias, the Janjaweed, to conduct counter-insurgency operations.  The 
result is an intractable conflict from which a negotiated solution is increasingly unlikely.  
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A graphic portrayal of Darfur’s game of multiple arenas is presented in Figure 10 below 
(again, pre-2003 outcomes are scaled from 1-4 and overlaid with post-2003 outcomes). 
 
 
Figure 10.   Multiple Arenas in Sudan's Darfur. 
 
In comparing Figure 8 (p. 67) with Figure 10 above, it becomes clear that the 
conflict in Darfur, both before and after 2003, is an example of a prisoner’s dilemma.  In 
each time period, a mutually beneficial agreement is possible yet is prevented by the 
threat of unilateral defection by either side.  Neither belligerent is likely to cease fighting 
while the other remains armed.  The addition of a third strategy of co-option has shifted 
the balance of the prisoner’s dilemma in favor of the government.  The accompanying 
negotiable space also shows a relative decrease in the insurgency’s security level, while 
the security level of the government has improved.  Even the verbiage of the DPA plainly 
expresses the pro-government bias reflected in the negotiating space depicted above.192  
The insurgency is presented with a disadvantage that is difficult to mitigate.  
Differing agendas combined with factionalism have prevented any one party from 
                                                 
192 Darfur Peace Agreement.  http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010926.pdf (accessed 
July 31, 2007). 
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forming a dominating coalition to negotiate with the government.193 This has 
disaggregated any possible unitary bargaining position on the part of the insurgent 
groups.  While Minawi was able to form a coalition to negotiate with the government for 
the DPA, that coalition was dominated by spoilers consisting of those parties who refused 
to sign the agreement.  The DPA represents an agreement between signatories that does 
not accurately reflect the contested relationships on the ground.  On the opposing side, 
the use of Janjaweed militias by the regime in Khartoum has added an additional set of 
vested interests to the equation.194  These also have a net effect of increasing the 
subjective minimally acceptable outcome for the Sudanese government. 
 Applying game theory to contemporary Sudan illustrates both the intractability 
and the dynamic nature of internal wars.  While conflict in the south superficially appears 
to have been resolved by the CPA, the underlying positions of both sides make the CPA’s 
potential as a permanent solution tenuous.  The conflict in Darfur suggests that an 
arbitrated solution may be possible, yet the strong tendency for both sides to pursue 
unilateral agendas has made cooperation near impossible.  Thus the apparent paradox of 
Sudan’s internal wars is largely one of perspective.  The application of a framework of 
nested games aids in refocusing that perspective to better illuminate an objective 
examination of these conflicts.  The strategies of both sides may gain an advantage from 
an appearance of cooperation, yet the basic issues of political marginalization and 
resource allocation remain unresolved.  Game theoretic analysis provides a useful 
framework within which to examine the dynamic relationships of the issues and actors 
involved in Sudan’s internal wars.  Though the limitations of rational-choice theory make 
that examination incomplete, it is nonetheless a significant and illuminating step beyond 
the purely qualitative description offered by the QSE.  Having clarified relationships and 
strategies through the gap-bridging lens of game theory, the DCM, the network analysis 
of the NT in Chapter V will be used next to quantify the specific actors involved. 
                                                 
193 Eric Reeves, “Darfur rebel groups: SLA-United/SLA-G19 split from SLA-Nur and joined NRF,” 
August 4, 2006, at: http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2006/08/darfur-rebel-groups-sla-unitedsla-g19.html 
(accessed August 13, 2007). 
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V. NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY 
In one way or another, it is through these networks that small-scale 
interaction becomes translated into large-scale patterns, and that these, in 
turn, feed back into small groups. 
     - Mark Granovetter  195 
 
A. DEFINING THE HUMAN FACTORS OF CONFLICT 
Chapter IV provided a method that analytically accounts for the heterogeneous 
nature of opposing players and served to illustrate the overall net effects of their 
interactions.   Based on game-theory applications, this component is critical as it allows 
the representation of the dynamic nature of the conflict.  The intent of Chapter V is to 
delve deeper into the relationships and interactions of the players within the conflicts 
being fought inside Sudan.  This process will allow a more refined understanding of what 
is shaping the conflicts in Southern Sudan and Darfur, as well as offering insight into 
possible avenues toward implementing solutions to the conflicts. 
Intrastate conflicts, unlike many interstate conflicts, are often facilitated by issues 
embedded within the indigenous population.  Historically, these types of conflicts have 
arisen due to religious, ethnic, and/or political marginalization or differences.  
Additionally, further issues can grow out of prolonged conflict over time as the 
population is affected by ongoing efforts of the warring sides.  Identifying where attitudes 
and perceptions originate comes from an understanding of the human factors of the 
conflict.  Nexus Topography (NT) allows the defining of the human factors in conflict 
regions under study.196  When incorporated into this case-study application of the ASC, 
NT allows for an increased level of granularity, specifically oriented toward assessing the 
social composition, capabilities, and disposition of insurgent groups in Sudan. 
                                                 
195 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology, 78, no. 6 
(May, 1973), 1360. 
196 The name “Nexus Topography” and the concept as applied to mapping social environments was 
first formalized by Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson, Manhunting:  A Methodology for 
Finding Persons of National Interest (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005).  This study seeks 
to expand the concept from use in finding individuals or small groups to broader conflict assessments. 
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Nexus Topography uses a combination of ethnography, social network analysis, 
and geospatial correlation to determine patterns in the social interactions of a defined 
region.  NT seeks to map “social forums or environments that bind people together” in 
order to describe the universe of existing and potential relationships that exist within 
societies.197  This is done through a process of identifying relationships that have 
developed inside specific areas, to include regions and communities, based upon the 
concept of shared identities.  These shared identities can be defined by familial, tribal, 
locality, ethnicity, educational, political, and religious factors among others.  Outside of 
the theoretical, conceptual, and ideological factors, conflict has real and tangible 
components that play out on the ground.  Geospatial integration in the NT process allows 
the visualization of the data on the physical ground which in turn allows for the 
identification and/or correlation of the physical factors that may be casual or 
contributable to the conflict. 
This chapter seeks to define the participants and their relationships at a macro-
strategic level affecting the conflicts in Sudan.  The goal will be to understand what 
factors contribute to trust, influence, and power among the respective conflict 
participants, thereby providing the framework for a network analysis of those 
participants.  This methodology will allow the study and quantifiable assessment of the 
factors influencing insurgent forces and the populations that exist within the conflict 
zones of Sudan.  The information resulting from this analysis will be integrated into 
Chapter VI, which analytically correlates the results from all previous chapters and 
determine imperatives and approaches for the conflicts and process outlined in this thesis.   
1. Social Capital and How It Affects Trust, Power, and Influence 
 The concepts of trust, power, and influence are key underpinnings to human 
relations.198  These concepts exist in all cultures around the world and, typically, only 
vary in what factors define them.  A useful concept in understanding the relationship of 
trust, power, and influence is the idea of social capital.  While views and definitions vary 
                                                 
197 Marks, Meer, and Nilson, Manhunting, 66. 
198 Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (New York, Cambridge University Press: 1999). 
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widely, it is broadly agreed upon that social capital is defined by social norms and 
networks that further define the trust and influence in societies as expressed by the 
following World Health Organization interpretation: 
 It [social capital] refers to the processes between people which 
establish networks, norms and social trust, and facilitate co-ordination and 
co-operation for mutual benefit. Social capital is created from the myriad 
of everyday interactions between people, and is embodied in such 
structures as civic and religious groups, family membership, informal 
community networks, and in norms of voluntarism, altruism and trust. The 
stronger these networks and bonds, the more likely it is that members of a 
community will co-operate for mutual benefit.199 
These social norms are key underpinnings of influence and reciprocity within and 
between groups in societies.  As Francis Fukuyama wrote, “Virtually all forms of 
traditional culture-social groups like tribes, clans, village associations, religious sects, 
etc.- [sic] are based on shared norms and use these norms to achieve cooperative 
ends.”200  The concept of social capital plays an important role in the study of social 
networks as it helps define the interactions that individuals and groups have between one 
another.  It is this concept of social norming at the group and organizational level that 
will be used to form the basis of the level of study used in the second half of this chapter. 
A fundamental tenet of human interaction involves the expression of trust as “the 
crucial strategy for dealing with an uncertain and uncontrollable future”; further defined: 
“Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others.”201  Trust and influence can 
serve to define the relationships between actors.  Insurgency in particular presents a 
useful case study, as the rebel’s disadvantage in force minimizes the use of coercion as a 
means of deemphasizing trust.  The application of sociological trust theory thus becomes 
an appropriate methodology for assessing the networked structure of insurgent factions. 
Trust is grounded within three bases of perception, those means by which individuals 
assess the “trustworthiness” of others: “reputation, performance, and appearance.” These 
                                                 
199 World Health Organization 1998, Health Promotion Glossary (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1998), 19. 
200 Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Civil Society, Paper presented to the International Monetary 
Fund  Conference on Second Generation Reforms, (Washington D.C., November 8-9,1999): ¶8. 
201 Sztompka, Trust, 25. 
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in turn exist within the frame of a “culture of trust,” alternatively referred to as the 
sociological context that is characteristic of a population.  Institutional and individual 
accountability, specifics of a situation, and pre-commitments of actors serve to define this 
context and can be delineated by the following structural conditions:202 
 
 1. Normative coherence 
 2. Stability of social order 
 3. Transparency of the social organization 
 4. Familiarity of the environment 
 5. Accountability of individuals and institutions 
 
Each of these conditions finds specific expressions within insurgent conflict in 
Sudan.  Their expressions shape the perceptions and expectations of the local populace, 
and in turn derive the bases of power within insurgent factions.  Those bases can also be 
further separated into seven categories of power:  reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, 
information, referent, and network.203  The context of social capital in terms of trust, 
power, and influence within conflicts can be expressed as shown in Figure 11 below.  
Understanding theses concepts allows the focusing of further analysis efforts by 
identifying the key components that make up the social capital of a society.  In the case of 
insurgencies, this allows for a better understanding of what factors and components allow 
insurgent elements to be created, develop, be influenced, and ultimately succeed or fail.  
Additionally, it allows for the understanding of the reciprocity that can be expected 
between or within the assessed organizations.   When used within the intended iterative 
framework of the ASC, this allows the formulation of more accurate values for players in 
the game-theoretic assessments of Chapter IV, especially in terms of non-cooperative 
strategies.   
                                                 
202 Sztompka, Trust, 71, 87, and 122-125.  These terms suggest common definitions; one is further 
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203 J. French and B. Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” in D. Cartwright (ed.) Studies in Social 




Figure 11. Social Capital 204 
  
The relationships of power and popular perceptions as outline above can also be 
further detailed to illustrate an iterative process of social interactions.  The identified 
variables serve as inputs to create a dynamic fabric which ultimately leads to a projected 
benefit for the group or individual being examined.  Figure 12 below shows how this 
process plays out in social dilemmas. 
 
  
Figure 12. Feedback in Repeated Social Dilemmas 205 
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It is important to understand that influence does not always require direct 
interaction.  Research on social influence has shown that “influence does not require face 
to face interaction; indeed the only precondition for social influence is information 
(which allows social comparison) about the attitudes or behaviors of other actors.”206  
Ethnographical studies and social network analysis provide researchers the means in 
which to determine the relations that provide the interactions and information/idea flow 
within a society, group, or organization. 
2. Ethnography and Social Network Analysis 
Ethnography is the qualitative and quantitative study of human social interactions 
used in the fields of social and cultural anthropology.  Ethnographical studies attempt to 
provide a holistic understanding of the human social environment.  This contextual 
understanding then provides the basis for analyzing the human social networks that exist 
within societies.  The use of ethnography as a part of and/or combined with network 
theory has a pre-existing basis in the social anthropological field.207 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a research perspective that had its beginning in 
social anthropology studies, and has since grown to being applied in many diverse fields 
of research.    The basic theory behind SNA is the focus on the relationships between 
entities in order to determine a social structure that exists within a society.  These entities, 
known as actors, nodes, and vertices in SNA, can be people, places, groups, 
organizations, etc.  This methodology differs from many other more traditional social 
science applications that focus on the attributes and/or behavior of individual entities.  
Noted SNA researchers Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust describe the underlying 
SNA principles as:208 
 
                                                 
206 Peter Marsden and Noah Friedkin, "Network Studies of Social Influence," in Advances in Social 
Network Analysis, ed. Stanley Wasserman and Joseph Galaskiewicz (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 
Ltd, 1994), 4. 
207 Jeffrey Johnson, "Anthropological Contributions to the Study of Social Networks," in Advances in 
Social Network Analysis, ed. Stanley Wasserman and Joseph Galaskiewicz (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications Ltd, 1994), 113-143. 
208 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. 
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Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than 
independent, autonomous units. 
Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer or 
“flow” of resources (material or nonmaterial). 
Network models focusing on individuals view the network structural 
environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual 
action. 
Network models conceptualize structure (social, economic, political, and 
so forth) as lasting patterns of relations among actors. 
 
Ties define the structure and resultant behavior of the network.  Examples of ties 
are physical connections, associations, information flow, movement, a physical 
connection, formal and informal relations, and biological relations.  Knowledge and 
understanding of these ties can help explain behavior that otherwise would not be 
explainable if the focus was on the entity.  These ties can be quantitatively and 
qualitatively evaluated in terms of direction of the relationship or transaction, strength, 
and weight.  Two general tie strengths will be explored in this paper:  weak and strong.209   
Strong ties are ties in which there is a direct interactive connection between 
actors, such as a relationship between two good friends.  Weak ties are those ties that can 
be roughly described as less formal than direct connections.  An example of a weak tie 
would be the ties between two people who are only acquaintances.  Weak ties are often 
overlooked in SNA as they sometimes do not, on the surface, indicate importance and are 
often harder to identify.  The importance of these ties was identified by Peter Blau: 
 
Intimate relations tend to be confined to small and closed social circles . . . 
they fragment society into small groups.  The integration of these groups 
in the society depends on people’s weak ties, not their strong one, because 
weak social ties extend beyond intimate circles and establish the inter-
group connections on which macro-social integration rests. 210 
 
                                                 
209 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1360-1380. 
210 Peter Blau, “Parameters of Social Structure,” American Sociological Review, no 39, (1974), 623. 
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Weak ties are critical to insurgent group activities.  It is through these ties that insurgent 
groups mobilize support for their activities, especially during periods of expansion.  
Examples of these ties include tribal, clan, regional affiliation, political association, etc.  
SNA facilitates the identification of real and potential power bases within 
organizations.  Centrality is one concept of SNA that allows this determination.  The 
various methods of centrality assessment seek to establish the prominence of an entity 
within its network by examining the number, strength, and/or direction of the ties that the 
entity has in comparison to other entities within the network.  The power of the concept 
of centrality within organizations was substantiated by Joseph Galaskiewicz, who found 
that organizational resources “on hand” do not necessarily determine the power base of 
the organization, but the level of resources that could be mobilized through social 
relations; or in other words, the network.211  Central actors, because of their ties, are 
more capable of mobilizing resources.  Another important characteristic that can be 
identified with SNA is the role of cliques within an organization.  A clique is “a subset of 
points in which every possible pair of points is directly connected by a line [defined as a 
relationship in a sociogram] and the clique is not contained in any other clique.”212  More 
simply put, a clique exists when everyone has a relationship to the others in the group and 
is the densest parts a network.  Researchers have shown that:  
 
People’s informal social relations tie them into cohesive sub-groupings 
[cliques] which have their own norms, values, orientations and sub-
cultures, and which may run counter to the ‘official’ or formal social 
structures.  The cliques were, they held, among the most important sources  
of a person’s identity and sense of belonging, and their existence was 
widely recognized in the everyday terms . . . that people used to describe 
their social world.213 
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A similar but no less important concept to cliques is that of factions.  Whereas 
cliques are defined by each actor having the same relationships with each other, factions 
have similar relationships and are thereby looser groupings of actors than cliques.  As 
previous chapters have outlined, factions in intrastate conflict can play a critical role in 
the negotiation and settlement process either are participants or spoilers.  Identification of 
factions allows for more focused engagement of actors who are either operating or 
potentially operating together.  Factons can be identified through a process called 
blockmodeling.  Blockmodeling is a SNA concept that allows for the detection of 
structures and cohesion within a network by grouping actors into clusters and analyzing 
the relationships of these clusters to one another. 
B. STRATEGIC NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY IN SUDAN 
The preceding sections of this chapter identify the utility of Nexus Topography in 
analyzing the social and geographical structures of groups and organizations.  This 
section will apply NT to the two case studies of conflict in Sudan.214  As stated in 
previous chapters, one of the primary components in intrastate conflict is the interaction 
and/or control of the population.  The NT process will allow the defining of these 
interactions. 
1. Geography of Sudan 
As described in Chapter III, Sudan is a nation rich in diversity.  Two major factors 
influence the cultures that have developed in Sudan:  terrain and religion.  The division of 
religions in Sudan has had profound influence toward creating the divide between 
Southern Sudan and the rest of Sudan.  The dyadic nature of religion in Sudan was 
created when the rapid expansion of Islam through North Africa in the early First Century 
turned south and the native populace resisted this perceived Arab invasion for about a 
century until the divide of religions eventually stabilized along the zone that now defines 
Southern Sudan from northern Sudan.  Later British conquest and subsequent colonial 
rule helped formalize this perceived “border”.  In part, this dyadic relationship helped 
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solidify the population of Southern Sudan generally identifying themselves as Africans, 
their struggle as African against Arab, and Christian/Animist against Muslim.215  This is 
in stark contrast to the Darfur region where the majority of the population is Muslim. 
The second component that has shaped societies and their relations in Sudan is the 
terrain and climate.  As Africa’s largest country, the terrain and climate encompasses 
virtually every geographical feature that exits on the African continent, from the barren 
deserts of the north to the tropic rain forests in the south.216  Generally, Sudan is a large 
plain bounded on three sides by mountains and cut by the Nile River system and can be 
divided into six semi-distinct areas:  northern Sudan, eastern Sudan, the central clay 
plains, the southern clay plains, western Sudan, and the Jebel Hadid Plateau. 
The northern part of the country lying between the Egyptian border and Khartoum 
is generally an open expansive desert divided into two parts by the Nile River Valley.  
The two deserts, the Nubian and the Libyan, receive little rainfall and are occupied by 
very small populations of nomads.  The narrow Nile River valley provides the only 
sustainable land and is host to almost all the population of this region.  Eastern Sudan is 
divided between desert and semi-desert and spans from the Red Sea to near the city of 
Kassala. The Red Sea Hills in the north of this section are low dry mountains that stretch 
into Egypt and are the home to the Beja people.  The land south of the Red Sea Hills 
provides good seasonal grazing for livestock and progressively becomes more fecund as 
you move south where streams and rivers feed into the Nile River Valley.  The central 
clay plains stretch from Khartoum south to the Nuba Mountains and east to Ethiopia and 
are defined by the Blue and White Nile Rivers as they flow to their confluence at 
Khartoum.  The area is characterized by the gentle rolling hills and fertile lands of the 
Nile River basin flood plain that provide a backbone to Sudan’s agricultural economy.  
The most drastic change in terrain and climate occurs in the area of Southern 
Sudan and, in part, has helped develop its isolation from the remainder of Sudan.  The 
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southern clay plains stretch in a band from the Central African Republic across to the 
southeast border of Sudan.  Many large permanent lakes and the Sudd, one of the world’s 
largest swamps, historically provided a natural boundary to expansion.  This area also 
contains a large portion of the oil reserves of Sudan (see Figure 7 in Chapter III).  This 
expanse of land then gives way to an area known as the Jabal Hadid Plateau.  This 
plateau rises to the southeast and southwest from the Nile River basin and changes the 
terrain from desert and plains to tropical rain forests that extend into the neighboring 
countries to the south.  Most of the Southern Sudanese population lives in this area. 
Darfur and Kurdufan make up western Sudan.  Kurdufan, geographically situated 
in the center of the country, rises out of the western Sudan plain and is composed of a 
region of dome shaped hills giving way to rolling plains to the east and the Nuba 
Mountains in the south.  The land changes seasonally, from fertile during the rainy 
season, to arid and dry during the remainder of the year.  This area is noted for the 
production of Gum Arabic, a substantial revenue generating crop for the Sudanese 
government.  This area then gives way to Darfur which occupies the western edge of 
Sudan and is approximately the size of Texas or France.  The area is centrally dominated 
by the Jebel Marra volcanic massif and can be divided into three distinct eco-zones, each 
of which defines the lifestyle of the population.  Northern and eastern Darfur are 
relatively flat semi-desert regions that have little to no perennial surface water sources.  
The central area of Darfur west of the Jebel Marra is the dominant area of the region.  
Seasonal rains and the drainage system off of the Jebel Marra have historically provided 
for good grazing conditions in the lower elevations and crop farming along the higher 
elevations.  The southern region of Darfur is a rolling plain that has more water sources 
available than other portions of Darfur, which has historically made it suitable for 
pastoralist activities. 
2. Detailing Darfur 
Relationships within Darfur are patrilineal in nature and are by in large tribally 
based.217  The term tribe in Darfur has both a personal identification and political 
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connotation attached to it.  As Douglas Johnson writes, “most Sudanese, both Southern 
and Northern, recognize the existence of tribes and willingly assert their membership to 
them.”218  While estimates vary depending upon studies and definitions, there are 
between 200 to 300 tribes in Sudan with up to 600 sub-tribes.219  The lives and existence 
of the tribes in Darfur are defined by the terrain and climate.  The northern part of the 
Darfur area is inhabited by the non-Arab Zaghawa and Bideyat tribes, and the Arab 
Rezeigat, Mahariya, Irayqat, Mahamid, and Beni Hussein tribes.  All of these tribes are 
primarily camel-herding nomads who historically make their living moving livestock 
along ancient camel trading and grazing routes.  The central zone mostly consists of non-
Arab Bargu, Bergid, Berti, Fur, Masalit, Tama, and Tunjur tribes, who are sedentary 
farmers. The Fur tribe is the most prominent tribe in the area.  The eastern and southern 
zones of Darfur are occupied primarily by the Arab Beni, Habbaniya, Halba, Maaliya, 
Rezeigat, and Taaisha tribes who subsist by herding cattle. 220 
The livelihood of the rural population in Darfur is focused on two types of 
farming and two types of herding.  In the north and south of Darfur, farming is focused 
on small plots grown in wadis (66.1% of the population) whereas farming in the Jebel 
Marra region is focused on larger plots (7.2% of the population).  The African Zaghawa 
tribe and Arab Rezaigat tribes in the north typically are nomadic camel herders (5.7% of 
the population).  The southern Arab tribes such as the Rezeigat are typically cattle and 
goat herders who have significant migratory patterns as they move their herds north 
during the rainy season in search of grazing fields (8.6% of the population). 221   
One of the main interactions of Darfur’s social structures is based on land tenure 
usage.  Historically, the rights to land were held at a communal level where local leaders 
determined and mediated land usage agreements between the agricultural groups and the 
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nomadic elements.222  These historic land usage rights were unbalanced with the 1970 
Unregistered Land Act (ULA) which declared state ownership of almost all land not 
formally registered with the government.  The act itself effected the usurping of the local 
populace and putting control of the land from into the hand of governmental elites and 
their proxies.223  Permanent and temporary population movements as a result of drought 
and other social events “developed into permanent residence[s], leading to conflicts, the 
legitimatization of the administrative system eroded and left no-one in control.”224   
Tribal relations in the area were historically defined by the changes of the seasons 
and the movement of the herding tribes.  Arab camel nomads moved their herds north and 
south as the seasons changed, while cattle herders worked with local farmers for grazing 
rights.  Increased desertification of the area changed these patterns and heightened 
tensions in the region as traditional nomad grazing lands were reduced, forcing these 
nomads to find new grazing lands that today infringe upon the traditional territory of the 
central farmers.  This encroachment caused clashes that split down tribal and ethnic lines, 
occurring at a time during which the Khartoum regime was unofficially endorsing the 
“Arabization” of Sudan.  The initial conflicts in the region were amongst the Zaghawa, 
Rezeigat, and the Beni Halba nomadic camel tribes as they fought between themselves 
for land usage rights.  As the drought persisted in the 1980s, the traditional land owners 
in the Jebel Marra region began to stop sharing their resources with the nomadic tribes.  
The outcome was predictable in light of the chaos created by the ULA.  The Rezeigat 
tribes began to make direct land grab attempts predominately from the sedentary Fur 
populace, arguing that the Rezeigat peoples, under the ULA declaration, had equal rights 
to the land.  These efforts quickly escalated into larger scale violence as the “Arab” tribes 
had been heavily armed by both sides in the Chadian/Libyan war in the 1980s.  The 
government also had a history of turning to militias during times of conflict, a notable 
example being the GoS sponsored militia effort to curtail the expansion of the Southern 
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Sudanese rebels into the Kurdufan and Darfur regions after the failed SPLA incursion in 
1992.225  The combination of the prevalence of weapons and tacit government support 
laid the groundwork for the  violence to follow. 
The tribes in the Jebel Marra area began to form local tribal and regional self 
defense forces for protection beginning in the 1980s in response to the attacks from the 
Arab militias and government forces,   As the frequency and intensity of the attacks 
increased, the groups began to loosely cooperate in the later half of the 1990s to actively 
fight against the government and its proxy forces.226  Initially, the rebel forces were 
mainly composed of the Fur under the loose command of Abdul Wahid Nur, a Fur 
lawyer.  Abdul Wahid Nur was successful in uniting with Zaghawa groups in July 2001 
and Masalit groups in November 2001 forming what became known as the Darfur 
Liberation Front (DLF).227  The group shortly afterwards renamed themselves the Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in early 2002, with a public declaration calling for 
creation of a new Sudan that was based on equality, complete restructuring and 
devolution of power, even development, cultural and political pluralism and moral and 
material prosperity for all Sudanese.228  The group began to grow as various other tribal 
self defense forces joined the alliance and subsequently formed a politically oriented 
opposition group, the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). 
The SLA initially operated as a loose federation of rebel factions and was 
nominally led by Adbul Wahid Nur with Minni Minawi, a Zaghawa, as a deputy.  This 
arrangement held until the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), when the alliance 
cracked under differences of opinion on the terms of the DPA.  Minni Mannawi signed 
the DPA and his forces, the SLA-MM, engaged in a reticent process of cooperation with 
the government. A small faction made up of Tunjur, Masalit, Zaghawa, Berti, and 
Rezeigat tribes formed the SLA-Free Will (SLA-FW).  Another small group composed of 
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mainly Arab tribes formed the SLA-Peace Wing (SLA-PW).  A group of 19 commanders 
from Abdul Wahid Nur’s forces split from him and formed the Group of 19 (G-19).  This 
group is composed of multiple tribes and has grown quickly since it’s founding and later 
changed its name to the SLA-Unity Command (SLA-UC) or SLA-Unity.  Abdul Wahid 
Nur and his remaining forces, the SLA-Adbul Wahid Nur (SLA-AWN), continued their 
struggle unabated by the DPA. 229 
Splits among the SLA factions have continued as leaders and their supporters 
disagree politically and militarily.  In August 2006, several Fur leaders left the SLA-
AWN and formed a group under the leadership of Adbul Abdesh-Shafi, the SLA-AS, 
sometimes known as the SLA-Classic (SLA-C).  In early 2007, the SLA-UC (formerly 
the G-19) began to fragment with Khamis Abdullah Abubaker, a Masalit, and Jar al-Neby 
Abdel-Karim, a Zaghawa, splitting away and forming their own commands, the SLA-
KAC and SLA-JN, respectively.  In February 2007, a group known as the Greater SLM 
(GSLM), led by Mahjub Husayn, formed from break away elements from Minawi’s 
faction, due to the perceived failure of the DPA.230 
A second rebel group emerging in Darfur in 2001 was the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM).  The JEM was formed from followers of Hassan al Turabi, the former 
vice-President of Sudan, and is led today by Khalil Ibrahim.  Unlike the SLA, the JEM 
was initially composed mainly of one sub-tribe, the Zaghawa Kobe, and had a robust 
political structure without a large number of fighters in the field.  The JEM and SLA 
factions have had a tumultuous relationship due to the JEM’s ambiguous religious 
overtones, relationship to previous NIF members, and narrowly focused tribal makeup.  
These factors initially limited the growth of the JEM beyond its narrow tribal base.  As 
the JEM expanded their affiliations, their base of support also grew until it compared in 
size and power to many of the SLA factions. 
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Like the SLA, the JEM has fractioned due to differing agendas, personalities and 
tribal relations.  The first division came as several field commanders split from the 
political leadership to form the National Movement for Reform and Development 
(NMRD) in the spring of 2004.  This element has drawn from mainly Chadian influenced 
tribes and remains relatively heavily controlled by Chad.231  A second JEM split occurred 
when a small element of non-Zaghawa tribal members formed the JEM-Peace Wing 
(JEM-PW) in ideological support of the DPA.  In July 2007 another small non-Zaghawa 
faction broke from the JEM to form the JEM-Eastern Command (JEM-EC) due to 
announced leadership differences.232 
The commonly held perception that the struggle is in terms of African versus 
Arab identity groups is only partially correct.  As discussed before, the true ethnic 
makeup of the tribes of Darfur has been blurred and cannot be anthropologically 
considered distinctly as either African or Arab.  Studies have shown that traumatic 
events, such as the violence, can lead to polarizing ethnic self-identification within 
societies such as what is being seen in Darfur.233  This is especially true in cases where 
leaders use ethnic identity to mobilize the population for a cause, as illustrated by 
opposing factions in Darfur.  Various “Arab” tribes have supported the rebel factions in 
Darfur, increasingly so as the conflict has progressed and the rebels have gained more 
power and influence.234  Also, Arab tribes have formed their own groups to fight the 
government forces as the conflict progressed through 2006 and 2007, the most notable 
group being the Progressive Front Forces (PFF) who are also know as the Revolutionary 
Democratic Front Forces (RDFF). 235 
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Coalition forming among the rebel groups in Sudan has been a common 
occurrence in the conflict in Darfur and Sudan in general.  The earliest coalition that the 
Darfur rebel groups joined was the National Defense Alliance (NDA) which was a 
coalition of opposition groups to the Bashir regime.  The JEM and SLA elements formed 
the Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of Western Sudan (ARFWS) in January 2006.236  
The JEM joined the Eastern Front coalition that included the Free Lions and Beja 
Congress fighting in eastern Sudan in February 2004.  The next major coalition, and most 
powerful by many reports, was the National Redemption Front (NRF) which was formed 
by non-signatory rebel groups after the DPA in June 2006.237  In late 2006, several SLA 
factions formed a weak coalition known as the Non-Signatory Factions.238  The United 
Front for Liberation and Development (UFLD), formed from smaller but broad based 
rebel factions, was founded in Eritrea in July 2007.239   
3. Detailing South Sudan 
The Southern Sudanese population is estimated to be about 11 million people 
where mainly indigenous and traditional Animist beliefs are practiced, although many 
Christian faiths are also practiced, particularly Catholicism and the Assemblies of God.  
These practices stand in stark contrast to the remainder of Sudan, which is predominantly 
Muslim.  The south also contains a large number of tribal groups and has many more 
languages than are used in the north.  The Dinka are a group of African tribes of Southern 
Sudan, inhabiting the swamplands of the Bahr-el-Ghazal region of the Nile basin, 
Jonglei, and parts of southern Kurdufan and Upper Nile regions.  They are mainly agro-
pastoral people, relying on cattle herding at riverside camps in the dry season, and 
growing millet in fixed settlements during the rainy season.  They number around 4.5 
million people, constituting about 12% of the population of the entire country, as well as 
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being the largest ethnic tribe in Southern Sudan.240   The eastern states of Southern Sudan 
contain other tribes considered to be Lake Nilotes (agro-pastoral peoples of East Africa 
who speak Nilotic languages); those are the Shilluk, the Nuer, and the Masai. The 
Azande, and Jo Luo are Sudanic tribes in the west, and the Acholi and Lotuhu tribes live 
in the extreme south, extending into Uganda.241 
It was clear from early on in the history of modern Sudan that the Arab north had 
little intention of sharing power with the African south.  Civil war between the north and 
south broke out in 1955, prior to independence, when a military unit made up of Southern 
Sudanese mutinied and fled to hide in the country’s south.  The nascent government of 
Sudan wanted to unify the country and attempts to do so through use of arms continued 
after Sudan became an independent nation in 1956.  By 1970, both the rebel group Anya 
Nya and the GoS were receiving external support in military arms, ammunition and 
training, thereby escalating the fighting.  In 1971, Joseph Lagu, the leader of southern 
forces opposed to Khartoum, created the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).  
Anya Nya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians supported 
the SSLM.  Although the SSLM created a governing infrastructure throughout many 
areas of Southern Sudan, real power remained with Anya Nya, with Lagu at its head.   
 When reserves of strategic minerals and petroleum were discovered in the south 
during the early 1970’s, the president of Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiry, thought he had found the 
solution to Sudan's troubles.  But before he could exploit these new sources of wealth, he 
had to unify the country under central authority.  By the early 1980s, strikes, riots, and 
shortages of goods and services had paralyzed the nation.  To rally support from the 
northern parties, President Nimeiry announced on September 8, 1983, that Sudan's civil 
laws had been revised to bring them into conformity with Shari’a, or Islamic Law.  The 
people of Southern Sudan, most of them non-Muslim, took offense to this.  With backing 
from Ethiopia and deserted Sudanese army forces, they formed the Sudan People’s 
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Liberation Army (SPLA) which was heavily dominated by the Dinka tribe.242  In 1991, 
the SPLA split into factions and was virtually destroyed by the infighting that followed.  
The SPLA was able to rebuild itself and continue its armed struggle while the factions 
signed a peace accord with the government in 1997. 
The peace accord in 1997 led to factional fighting among the Nuer who were part 
of both the SPLA and the government militias.  In response, many western Nuer and 
some Dinka banded together to form the South Sudan Liberation Movement in alliance 
with the SPLA.243  Like the SPLA, the SSLM has a goal of self determination under a 
federalist Sudan.  Seven protocols concerning wealth and power sharing, conflict 
resolution, and governance were tied together and signed as the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005.  This agreement appealed to many groups in the 
south as it mandated national elections in 2009 and a referendum for southern 
independence in 2011.  This agreement has mitigated a majority of the fighting but has 
led to the upwelling of underlying tensions within the Government of Southern Sudan.  
Pending elections, seats in both the Southern Sudan Assembly and the Government of the 
Southern Sudan are to be divided in a fixed proportion between the SPLM, the NCP, and 
"other Southern political forces.”244  The concentration of Dinka leadership in the SPLM 
and in the political arena has led to a neglect of the concerns of many other tribes in the 
south.  Thus, an underlying feeling of racism against the Dinka has grown, especially in 
cities such as Yei, which has a majority Kakuah population.   
Many in Southern Sudan considered former president (and first vice president of 
Sudan) John Garang their leader because of his efforts in the fighting and for 
independence.  Garang, however, died and was succeeded by Salva Kiir Mayardit, who 
was sworn in as first vice president of Sudan on 11 August 2005.245  Mayardit does not 
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hold the same level of public support as Garang did.  The natural resource revenue 
provided by the CPA has been controversial in amounts provided by the GoS as well as 
its allocation and use by Mayardit and the GoSS.   The lack of ability to govern  
effectively, stem corruption, and its failure to improve the economic conditions in 
Southern Sudan to date has led many among the Dinka, Nuer, and other southern tribes to 
lose faith in the GoSS. 
The SPLA is the military arm of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.  
In many areas of Southern Sudan, they continue to clash with the GoS for territorial 
control over natural resources.  The formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), mandated 
by the CPA and consisting of Sudanse Armed Forces and SPLA members has stagnated, 
resulting in lapses in security for many areas. The resultant internal tension in non-Dinka 
areas of Southern Sudan has forced the SPLA to act as an occupation force to keep the 
peace and deter support for GoS-sponsored militias such as the Ugandan Lord’s 
Resistance Army. 
4. Social Network Analysis 
The ethnographic studies outlined in the previous section serve to form the basis 
for the initial iteration of SNA.246  The ethnological study shown in the previous section 
points to the importance of tribe and clan in Sudan, as these ties can cut across and 
override political goals and ambitions.  It is important to note that when we talk of tribe, 
we are not talking solely about tribal leadership structure, but common identification 
within a social structure.  The qualitative contextual study of the situation in Darfur 
allows the formation of a hypothesis that the rebel groups are formed along tribal and 
clan lines.  This study uses SNA both to validate this hypothesis and as an exploratory 
tool to determine how it compares to, contrasts with, or substantiates other relationships 
of the rebel organizations. 
The methodology used in this chapter sets the rebel organizations as the nodal 
level of analysis; i.e. the organizations are the actors (nodes) in the network.  The analysis 
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examines the following relationships:  1) Group objectives, 2) Declared coalitions, 3) 
Tribal relations, and 4) Operational relations.  Additionally, the analysis will look at 
multiplex relations consisting of combinations of the above relationships.  The Group 
objectives are defined as the publicly stated end state objectives of the organization, 
conveyed through either official proclamations or public declarations.  Announced 
coalitions are officially stated coalitions between rebel groups which, for the purpose of 
this paper, are a defined set of actors that have officially announced cooperation for a 
common cause.  The tribal relations show relationships of the rebel organizations to the 
tribes in the region.  Operational ties indicate whether organizations have conducted 
combat operations focusing on the same targeted objectives together.  
Different insurgent factions within a conflict zone can have differing desired 
objectives for the outcome of their struggles.247  Broadly speaking, the rebel groups in 
Sudan have three stated objectives that serve as the underlying rationale for their 
struggles: regime change, self determination, and equal representation.  Regime change is 
the most drastic and entails removal of the leadership and or government structure that 
exists within Sudan.  In the case of Sudan, self-determination is the right to exist as a 
federalist state in the context a greater Sudan as was outlined in Chapter III.  It is 
important to note that this is not separation which, though is a common stated goal of the 
southern Sudanese population, is not a stated goal of any rebel group currently (late 
summer 2007) in Sudan.  The final objective is equal representation.  This goal can be 
viewed as an end to marginalization and the right and ability to actively participate and 
be represented within the government.  Figure 13 below shows the rebel groups with their 
declared objectives.  The rebel factions are represented by the round nodes in the 
sociogram and the tribes are represented by red square nodes.  The colors match the 
ethnicity that respective groups have either publicly stated or are popularly (within the 
regions of conflict) perceived as such, while the size of the rebel group node reflects the 
comparative sizes of the groups to each other.   
 
                                                 
247 The method of declaring group objectives by the various factions ranges from formal political 
statements to media interviews and press releases by group leaders.  Typically, the larger and more 
established organizations have formal stated political objectives. 
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Figure 13. Rebel Group Objectives 248 
 
Figure 14 below shows the tribal relationship of the rebel organizations.249  It 
should be noted that the declared ethnic identification of a rebel group does not always 
match the identification of the tribal makeup of the organizations, especially in the case 
of the northern based commonly “African” labeled SLA elements such as SLA-MM, 
SLA-FW, and the SLA-UC.  These rebel groups contain Arab Rezeigat tribal members in 
addition to African tribe members.  Finally, it is critical to note that there are tribal ties 
between elements of the northern based SLA factions and elements of the Janjaweed 
supported by the government.  This point is important, as it was these northern factions 
who took part in the DPA negotiations in part or in whole, whereas the other groups such 
as the JEM factions and the SLA-AWN did not.  Northern tribal relations may have 
influenced the rebels that did come to the DPA negotiating table to negotiate with the 
government, whereas the lack of these ties may have played, or more importantly, failed 
to play a role in these other elements participation in the DPA negotiations. 
                                                 
248 All social network analysis was conducted using the SNA program UCINET for Windows.  S. P. 
Borgatti, M.G. Everett, and L.C. Freeman. 2002. UCINET 6 for Windows:  Software for Social Network 
Analysis. Harvard: Analytic Technologies. 
249 Sub-tribe unit of analysis is one level below the major tribe.  For example, the Zaghawa is the 
major tribe and the Kobe is the sub-tribe.  The levels of analysis in this study will not explorer lower sub-
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Figure 14. Rebel Group Tribal Associations 
 
Coalition-forming is an action aimed at increasing an organization’s capabilities, 
and is especially important for organizations that are weaker than their opponents or 
peers in terms of power and influence.  By unifying through the formation of coalitions, 
these groups potentially increase their combat power against the government and its 
proxies, gain increased influence over the relative population base, and increase their 
bargaining power in both local and international negotiations.   
Figure 15 below shows the rebel group membership in Sudan distributed along 
the lines of declared coalitions.  The majority of the rebel groups belong to at least one 
announced coalition.  Five belong to more than one and six belong to none.  The 
networked portrayal of these groups appears to indicate that their respective ethnicities do 
not seem to influence the formation or composition of the coalitions themselves.  
Coalitions are perhaps instead formed as a matter of political convenience, rather than 
existing due to the strength of personal associations, protracted objectives,  or a general 
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Figure 15. Declared Rebel Coalitions 
 
Aggregation of relationships forms multiplex relationships in SNA.  Multiplex 
relationships allow us to compare, identify, and understand important ties and central 
nodes with the overall network.  Figure 16 below provides a baseline positional 
representation for the rebel groups and is provided to be used as a reference for 
comparison of the following multiplex relationships. 
 
      





Arab and African 
Arab and Other 
Coalition Group 
 117
A reasonable assumption from a rational unitary actor approach would be that the 
rebel groups in Sudan would form coalitions with other rebel groups who have the same 
or similar objectives to present an aggregated side in their opposition to the government.  
Figure 17 below shows a comparison of the objective ties and coalition ties of the rebel 
groups.  It is immediately apparent from the diagrams that rebel coalitions are not being 
formed to support common objectives, suggesting that there are other reasons that define 
the coalitions or, possibly, that coalitions are being used for boundary-spanning purposes.   
 
 
Figure 17. Objective (left) and Coalition (right) Ties 
 
A second assumption to be tested is whether the rebel operational cooperation, 
irrespective of coalition forming, has been in support of overall rebel group objectives.  
Figure 18 below shows that operational ties between groups are not reflective of common 
objective ties, while Figure 19 shows that coalition ties are more reflective of operational 
ties, though the overall commonality of ties in the two networks is still less than 50%. 
 
 





Figure 19. Coalition (left) and Operational (right) Ties 
 
Figure 20 below shows the operational and tribal ties.  A key point is that the 
tribal ties are inclusive of a significant portion of the operational ties with the major 
exceptions being the operational ties with geographically displaced rebel groups (an 
example of such a boundary-spanning role would be the JEM in western Sudan forming 
an alliance with the Beja Congress and Free Lions in eastern Sudan).  A comparison of 
the coalition and tribal ties in Figure 21 below shows that in a significant portion of the 
ties of the coalitions are not based upon tribal relationships.  This lends validation to the 








Figure 21. Coalition (left) and Tribal (right) Ties 
 
The above analysis indicates that the rebel groups within Darfur are operating 
along tribal lines.  This understanding is critical in the case of Darfur as many Western 
analysts and negotiators deal with the rebel organizations in a manner more suited to 
dealing with national level organizational bodies.  It is not surprising that these 
approaches have met with failure and frustration as agreement after agreement has failed 
as the groups have fractioned along tribal lines between those who agree and disagree 
with the terms of the settlements.  The degree of importance of tribal ties in Southern 
Sudan is not apparent in this level of analysis.  This analysis reinforces the idea that the 
coalition ties seem to mainly provide a weak binding mechanism to tie geographically 
diverse groups together.  Contextual analysis conducted based on these results seems to 
indicate that these coalitions are used to provide a unified external (to Sudan) “political” 
opposition front to the GoS than any other reason. 
SNA mathematical analysis of the operational network gives the ability to 
determine sub-groups (cliques) within the network.  This analysis, conducted using the 
UCINET SNA program and the rebel group tribal affiliation data determined that there 
were nine operational cliques: 
  
1.  SLA/AWN, SLA/UC (G19), SLA/AS, JEM 
 2.  SLA/AWN, JEM, SFDA 
 3.  SLA/KAC, SLA/UC (G19), SLA/AS, JEM 
    4.  JEM, BC, FL 
    5.  SLA/KAC, SLA/UC, (G19), SLA/JN, SLA/AS 
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    6.  SLA/AWN, SLA/UC (G19), SLA/AS, NMRD 
    7.  SLA/AWN, NMRD, SFDA 
   8.  SLA/KAC, SLA/UC (G19), SLA/AS, NMRD 
    9.  BC, FL, SPLA 
 
A notable point is that none of these operational cliques found in the analysis 
align with declared coalitions.  This information helps to validate the initial assessment 
that the coalitions play less of a factor in the rebel activities in Darfur than are commonly 
perceived.  Two centrality measurements were conducted on this same dataset.  The first, 
degree centrality, shows the centrality based upon direct tribal relationships and results in 
the following in order of centrality:  SLA-UC, SLA-FW, SLA-MM, JEM, the Janjaweed, 
NMRD, RDFF, SFDA, JEM-PW, SLA-KAC, SLA-AWN, GSLM, SLA-AS, SLA-JN, 
SSLM, SPLA, JEM-EC, BC, and the FL.   The second, eigenvector centrality, measures 
the centrality based upon not only direct ties of the actor, but of the ties of the other 
actors in the network that the actor under analysis is connected to.  This centrality 
measurement provides the following results in order of centrality:  SLA-MM, SLA-
AWN, SLA-KAC, SLA-UC, SLA-JN, SLA-FW, SLA-AS, GSLM, JEM,  JEM-PW, 
JEM-EC, NMRD, BC, FL, SFDA, RDFF, SPLA, SSLM, and the Janjaweed.   
The first measurement reflects importance of an actor based upon their ability to 
mobilize resources (personnel, supplies, etc.) and influence situations through direct 
tribal ties.  The second measurement shows an actors importance for potential to mobilize 
resources through not only its ties, but the ties of others that it is connected to. Current 
operational patterns determine the immediate influence and impact on the population.  
Degree centrality analysis gives us the ability to determine the central organizations 
based upon operational ties.250  This analysis reveals the following rebel organizations in 
order of operational centrality ranking:  JEM, SLA/UC, SPLA, SLA/AWN, SLA/AS, 
SLA/KAC, NMRD, SFDA, SAF, FL, BC, SLA/JN, JEM/PW, SLA/MM, SLA/FW, 
RDFF, SSLM, JEM/EC, GSLM.   
                                                 
250 Note that this only reflects operations ties between the groups and does not represent the size, 
number, or effectiveness of the operations which would require further research and analysis. 
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What is critical to note is the analysis validates perceptions of who are the current 
operationally key players (such as the JEM, SLA/UC, and SLA/AWN) and shows that 
others who are often thought of be key players (SLA/MM and the GSLM) are less so.  In 
total, each of these measures using the appropriate data allows the determination of 
current, future, and potential key actors within the network or networks. 
Blockmodeling analysis was conducted on the same rebel group tribal affiliation 
data reveals the following factions which matches long term cooperation patterns:251 
      
1.  RDFF 
     2.  SLA/FW, JEM/PW 
    3.  SLA/JN 
     4.  SFDA 
     5.  GSLM 
     6.  JEM/EC 
     7.  Janjaweed 
     8.  SSLM 
     9.  SLA/MM 
    10.  BC, FL, SPLA 
    11.  SLA/AWN, SLA/KAC, SLA/UC (G19), SLA/AS, JEM, NMRD 
 
The results shown above match actual rebel group operational cooperation patterns.  This 
information allows the identification of “true operational coalitions” vice the declared 
coalitions and allows for the focusing of engagement on specific sets of actors. 
Blockmodeling can also provide insight into possible coalitions that can form or split 
(due to existence of binding ties) within the network by adjusting the block numbers used 
to model factions within SNA modeling programs. 
Figure 22 below shows the geospatial relationship of the rebel groups in Darfur 
overlaid on the ethnic map shown in whole in Figure 5 (Chapter III).  As can be seen in 
                                                 
251 The results shown were compiled using a block number of 11.  The block number can be changed 
to determine best fits of data. 
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the overlay, the rebel groups are generally operating within their tribally affiliated 
territories.  This provides a terciary measure by which to verify the salient factor in rebel 
operations, namely that they are tribally based.  The underlying importance of this factor 
must play a distinct role in any engagement options aimed at either coalescing or dividing 
insurgent groups, and will be further addressed in Chapter VI.  The importance of the 
networked relationships in Sudan is also apparently reflected in the current status of the 
DPA in Darfur, the failure of which suggests that a rebel groups willingness to attend or 
sign a peace agreement may not be nearly as important as who they are related to. 
 
 
Figure 22. General Darfur Rebel Organization Operational Areas 252 
 
Nexus Topography analysis offers insights into the complexity of the situation in 
Sudan while at the same time providing a clearer understanding of the relationships 
involved.  While this initial assessment was broad but not deep in terms of information 
                                                 
252 Data for map compiled from reporting on rebel home base areas and reports (news, UN, and 












and analysis, NT suggests that the route to influencing the conflict in Sudan is through 
the tribal elements and their various affiliations.  This runs counter to conventional 
conflict resolution thinking which seeks to engage the conflict participants as political 
entities where social capital (and hence trust, power, and influence) is defined by 
organizational structure and western social norms.  Published accounts at the time of the 
writing of this paper suggest that the approaches being used in both Darfur and Southern 
Sudan are mainly based upon these conventional approaches.  Problems arise, then, when 
trust, power, and influence are rooted in concepts such as tribal and clan affiliation that 
are foreign to outside mediators or intervention agencies.  It should be apparent from this 
analysis that the situations in Sudan are in fact based upon these types of relationships 
and, therefore, come as no surprise that the attempts to negotiate long term stable 
solutions to the conflicts have generally failed. 
NT analysis can continue using the imperatives learned in the initial run to focus 
further data collection and analysis to substantiate or deny initial perceptions and to 
further refine the concept of social capital for the players.  Additionally, this chapter 
focused mainly on the rebel organizations and their interaction with the population.  
Further analysis using this methodology can and should be used to examine the 
interactions of the other cornerpoints in the Diamond Model; namely the state and 
external actors.  The observations that result from this NT analysis can be fed back into 
the Dynamic Conflict Model to adjust values for the players for subsequent iterations, as 
well as being useful for a more specific framing of the situation estimate.  This process of 
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VI. ANALYTIC CORRELATION 
Occurrences in this domain are beyond the reach of exact prediction because 
of the variety of factors in operation, not because of any lack of order in 
nature. 
     - Albert Einstein 253 
 
A. THE FRAMEWORK OF CORRELATION 
Internal wars and intrastate conflict defy quantification by classical methods of 
conflict study.  Traditional metrics do not accurately describe the nature of the players, 
their motives, or their capabilities.  Attempting to utilize these methods leads to an 
inaccurate understanding of the conflict and can lead to misguided attempts to influence 
the outcome.  Internal wars are complex, and are influenced by factors that are not 
contained in the traditional analysis of interstate conflict.  These internal struggles create 
a situation that presents itself as irrational, with unexplainable actions that are 
inconsistent with western patterns of behavior.  If the proper lens is applied, these elusive 
factors reveal themselves, making the same actions not only rational and explainable, but 
also consistent with local and regional societal patterns of behavior.  The ASC provides a 
framework through which these factors can be identified in order to gain a clearer 
understanding of the conflict.  In doing so, general imperatives and specific approaches to 
engagement can be formulated, and their outcomes can be more accurately anticipated. 
As a concept, correlation is commonly used in research to identify a mutual or 
causal relationship between two sets of variables.  Here, the products of multiple, distinct 
analytic lenses are considered for their relationships to each other and how they apply 
within the context of the situation.  Analytically, the resultant products of each analytic 
lens are correlated and classified toward their application as imperatives applicable to the 
broad scope of internal wars, or, alternatively, situation specific approaches.  
                                                 
253 Albert Einstein, “Science and Religion,” presented at The Conference on Science, Philosophy and 
Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., New York, 1941: http://www.davidson. 
edu/academic/anthropology/erlozada/classes/03spr/ant261/einstein.pdf (accessed October 12, 2007) 
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The Analytic Correlation (AC) portion of the construct evaluates and organizes 
lessons derived from the three analytic lenses.  The Qualitative Situation Estimate 
provides a base understanding of the environment.  It is a cumulative picture based on the 
level of knowledge prior to the inception of the study and what has been accrued through 
the process of research and data gathering.  It is critical because it lays the groundwork 
for the cognitive filter through which the analysis takes place.  The Dynamic Conflict 
Model reveals the nature of the conflict from a two-player game theory perspective. It 
identifies the type of game being played, the presence of nested games, and whether or 
not a negotiable space exists.  Possible co-option strategies that have been or could be 
used to create such a space become apparent and any current agreements are evaluated 
for validity and maintainability.  The third input, Nexus Topography, exposes the existing 
bonds of trust and reciprocity that are influencing the behavior of the actors in the 
conflict.  Why coalitions form, what common interests are most influential, and why 
organizations fracture into sub groups, are among the products from this lens. 
The correlation process (depicted in Figure 23) begins by listing the lessons 
derived from each of the three analytical lenses: the Qualitative Situation Estimate 
(QSE), the Dynamic Conflict Model (DCM), and the Nexus Topography (NT).  The 
lessons are then defined as each concept is derived from a particular lens that has been 
evaluated through the cognitive filter of insurgency theory (Chapter II).  These lessons 
are in no particular order; some arise from a single analytical lens, while others may be 
echoed or mutually supported in multiple lenses.  The lessons are categorized within a 
framework that captures the entire range of means or effects for achieving national goals.  
The framework is selected by the construct user based on the decision maker’s intent. 
 
Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, Economic, Financial, Information, Law 
Enforcement (DIMEFIL) is used to designate a space of actions or 
options.  Political, Military, Economic, Social, Intelligence, and 
Infrastructure (PMESII) is used to describe a range of effects to be 
considered. Both stress the factors that contribute to and define the entire 
socio-cultural environment surrounding the conflict.254 
                                                 
254 National Research Council, “Defense, Modeling, and Simulation Analysis”, The National 
Academies Press, Washington, DC (2006): 12.  
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For the purposes of this case study, the most inclusive framework of means and 
effects to achieve national goals, PMESII is used. Expertise in each of these areas is 
necessary in evaluating the validity and applicability of the lessons for each area.  The 
lessons that may apply outside of the specific conflict of study are grounded historically, 
and, being supported by established theory, become imperatives.  Those imperatives are 
then applied back to the specific area of conflict and evaluated for their feasibility and 
likelihood of producing a desired effect.  Those that meet the criteria become possible 
approaches to influence the outcome of events. 
 
 
Figure 23. Analytic Correlation Process 255 
                                                 
255 (*) Political, Military, Economic, Social, Intelligence, Infrastructure (PMESII). Additional models 
of means for achieving national goals such as DIME, or DIMEFIL cans be selected by the ASC user. 
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 To be properly conducted, analytic correlation requires in-depth knowledge in 
multiple areas of expertise to act as cognitive filters for the derived outputs. An 
understanding of insurgency theory is required, as the construct is designed to focus on 
the security situation and the conflict between the state and sub-state actors.  Insurgency 
theory serves as the basis by which the factors that influence the conflict under study 
must be evaluated.  Knowledge of how and why insurgencies begin, how they sustain 
themselves, and how they end, provides an understanding of the specific conflict in 
regard to previously studied internal wars.  It also allows for the interpretation of events 
and actions with respect to how insurgencies progress and attempt to achieve their goals. 
Finally, it provides insight into how the conflict may be evolving, and fosters the ability 
to anticipate the effects of attempts to influence the situation.  In order to understand 
these effects, and to generate feasible imperatives and approaches, an understanding of 
international diplomacy, military capabilities, economics, social functions, and 
information operations is necessary.  This understanding will greatly enhance the 
effectiveness of using methodologies such as PMESII.  
How much diplomatic influence one nation may have in regards to a conflict 
within another sovereign nation is only possible if the capabilities and methods of 
diplomatic engagement are known.  Knowledge of economic theory, coupled with and 
understanding of the local economy in the conflict area, can help explain the success or 
failure of sanctions, or determine the type of assistance necessary to afford one side a 
quantified advantage.  An understanding of military capabilities, strategy and tactics is 
critical to assessing the types of operations the actors are capable of and the effects 
military intervention might have.  Expertise in these areas can also help to interpret the 
way the actors in the conflict interact with each other along those lines, as well as 
determine what options are available for third-party attempts to influence the conflict via 
one or a combination of these means.  There are certainly some approaches that may be 
optimal for effect, however they are not always feasible based on the resources available 
and the capability to bring those resources to bear.  The analytical correlation therefore 
lends itself to the use of subject matter experts in each of these fields.  Available experts 
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can review the lessons derived from each of the three frameworks, interpret them, and 
assist in their correlation into imperatives and approaches. 
The analytic correlation yields two major outputs.  These are classified as general 
imperatives and specific approaches.  These outputs are the product of a single iteration 
of the construct, and also serve as inputs for subsequent iterations of the construct within 
a feedback loop.  The imperatives derived are concepts that should hold true throughout 
future iterations of the construct as it progresses to a more detailed level.  These 
imperatives may also hold true if the construct is utilized for the evaluation of a different 
instance of intrastate conflict.  Thus, they are maintained as imperatives until it is 
demonstrated that they no longer apply. Specific approaches become options for 
engagement nuanced to the conflict being studied and are applicable only down to the 
level of examination.  The final output is identified informational gaps to fill in further 
research.  Once the gaps are filled, the approaches should be tested for anticipated 
outcomes through the conduct of a follow on iteration prior to employment. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED AND DERIVED IMPERATIVES 
The lessons learned are listed in order of the analytical lens they are derived from, 
and are stated in the context of the conflict in Sudan.  Examples that demonstrate these 
lessons, and the analysis that supports them, are found in the respective preceding 
chapters of this thesis.  The lessons are sometimes derived from a single lens but often 
are products of output from multiple lenses of analysis.  The imperatives listed in the end 
of each of the following sections are a synopsis of the lessons, stated in objective terms, 
and organized along the lines of the PMESII framework. 
1. Qualitative Situation Estimate Lessons and Imperatives 
Conventional diplomatic efforts have been limited in their ability to assuage 
intrastate conflict within Sudan.  Diplomatic engagement unilaterally and through 
international organizations such as the United Nations is a commonly used method for 




efforts to engage the Bashir-led GNU have been difficult from the start, hamstrung by 
efforts to delegitimize the Sudanese regime while not offending the greater community of 
Islamic states as a whole.   
The QSE provides examples of attempts by the United States Government and 
other nations to influence actors within Sudan, to include the GoSS, the GNU, and the 
Darfur rebel groups. The continuation of conflict within the Darfur region, and the 
reluctance of the GNU to take any action to reduce the fighting and displacement of 
civilians are examples of the failure of these efforts. The CPA is often used as an 
example of successful diplomatic efforts, however, as the QSE and the DCM show, this 
agreement was made possible mainly through the coercive consolidation of power in the 
south by the SPLM/A, the introduction of resource and governmental position sharing, 
and the promise of a transparent election and referendum for succession in 2009 and 2011 
respectively.  The true effect of the CPA will not be known until the outcome of these 
votes is seen, if they ever take place, and if tensions do not once again rise to the level of 
violence preceding the CPA signing.  The civil war in Southern Sudan has had short 
periods of relative peace and it is still unclear whether or not the current situation is the 
beginning of a peaceful era, or just another tensioned pause between conflicts. 
Conventional economic means of influence have not produced the intended 
effects on the GNU or the mitigation of the humanitarian crisis.  In some cases they have 
exacerbated micro-conflicts within the larger conflict they were meant to resolve.  The 
United States and other nations have often relied on economic sanctions in support of 
their diplomatic efforts to influence the actions of unruly nations.  This has seen success 
in many cases and therefore remains a viable and commonly used method for 
international bodies such as the United Nations.  Humanitarian assistance has become a 
large scale global tool for well-off nations to assist in humanitarian crises resulting from 
natural disasters and conflict.  The effort following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 
was an example of this.256  Aid also comes in the form of non-lethal and lethal items  
 
                                                 
256 Eva-Lotta Hedman, “The Politics of Disaster Response,” Forced Migration Review, Tsunami: 
Learning from the Humanitarian Response, Special Issue, (July 2005): 4. 
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provided to a country in order to bolster its ability to conduct internal defense such as 
Plan Colombia, the United States’ assistance to Colombia to facilitate counter-narcotic 
production and trafficking.257   
The QSE identified two major reasons why conventional sanctions are near pre-
destined to have little effectiveness with regard to Sudan.  First, through sanctioning of 
the GNU, both the government and insurgent groups feel the effect. The civilian 
population is included and affected under both those groups.  By sanctioning the GNU, 
the GoSS, which is trying to develop sorely needed economic infrastructure in the south, 
is hampered in its efforts.  Without improvements the southern populace will continue to 
lose faith in what is already considered a corrupt and ineffective governing body. Second, 
Sudan’s primary resource export is petroleum, which the U.S. has already divested from 
and consequently has little influence on the companies and nations that buy the product. 
Without resolution, or at least a reduction of violence in Darfur, the humanitarian 
assistance organizations will continue to be frustrated in attempts to help the displaced 
refugees and civilians within Darfur.258  In Sudan, where most participant sides of the 
internal conflict are suspected of human rights abuses, non-lethal humanitarian aid may 
serve only to reward actors for improper behavior.  In the case of Southern Sudan, the 
United States for years maintained a policy to provide food aid to Southern Sudan 
through the SPLM even though their strong-arm tactics to consolidate power in the south 
were often brutal in nature.259  This included non-lethal military assistance to the SPLM 
which, while assisting them in their fight against the Khartoum regime, further facilitated 
their ability to forcibly coerce opposing tribal factions throughout the diverse Southern 
Sudan region.260 
                                                 
257 S. Johnson, “Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency,” 
The Heritage Foundation (April 26, 2001) available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/ 
BG1435.cfm (accessed September 21, 2007). 
258 Scott Baldouf, “Darfur’s Aid Lifeline in Danger”, Christian Science Monitor (July 11, 2007), 
http:// www.csmonitor.com/2007/0611/p01s04-woaf.html (accessed September 25, 2007). 
259 Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights watch, “Food aid and Human Rights Abuses in 
Sudan,” Letter to United States Secretary of State (December 10, 1999). 
260 Catherine Bond, “Sudan Worn Down by Years of War”, Cable News Network (September 22, 
1999), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9909/22/sudan.conflict/index.html (accessed September 25, 
2007).  
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The ecological, religious, ethnic, and tribal reasons that are the initial underlying 
conditions for the conflicts within Sudan do not continue to exist as the operative causal 
reasons for continued fighting.  Simply put, the reasons fighting began are no longer the 
sole reasons the fighting continues.  As noted in the QSE, competition for arable land 
between farmers and nomadic herders in the Darfur region led to inevitable conflict as 
desertification spread.  Political marginalization of some of the western tribes sparked a 
call for better representation within the newly formed GNU.  The introduction of proxy 
militias as a control measure as noted by the DCM, and the influx of massive amounts of 
modern arms to rebel groups through Chad pushed these conflicts beyond the means of 
traditional tribal resolution.  As the NT analytic lens points out, the effects of prolonged 
conflict, fresh in the memory of the populace, propagated the violence and caused further 
fractioning amongst rebel groups along tribal and clan lines. 
The GNU, dominated the National Congress Party (NCP), enjoys de facto 
sovereignty regardless of the method by which it came to or maintains its power. Once 
recognized by legitimate international bodies such as the United Nations, other states are 
forced to work with and through it to affect the conflict and humanitarian crises within its 
borders.261 The NCP, which itself relies on informal patrimonial governance as seen in 
the QSE, becomes not only an obstacle for outsiders, but entrenches political 
marginalization of its opposition within the country.  The GNU has consistently 
hampered the timeliness and effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) and the deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers in accordance with Security 
Council Resolution 1706.262 The ability for international state intervention and for 
marginalized groups within the state to effect change is hence controlled by the sovereign 
regime. Placing its own goals first in priority, the GNU has been able to extend the 
conflict in Darfur.  It has forced the rebel groups to rely on violence and therefore has 
reduced their legitimacy in the eyes of the world. 
                                                 
261 Adam Lebor, “With Sudan a Member, the UN is Pointless”, The Times (October 24, 2006), http:// 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article610761.ece (accessed September 
26, 2007).  
262 Amnesty International “Sudan: Human rights situation deteriorating in Darfur five months after 
peace agreement,” News Service No. 257 (October 5, 2006) and United Nations, Security Council 
Resolution 1706, (31 August, 2006). 
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The Khartoum regime and the GNU do not rely on popular consensus to maintain 
state strength.  Instead, they rely on sponsored coercive measures and centralized 
resource control to accomplish this.  In the majority of democracies, popular consensus is 
the balancing factor that forces a governing body to create and follow policies consistent 
with the populace’s views.  In the case of Sudan, the government maintains and controls 
an army and enlists proxy forces to suppress and coerce opposition groups such as the 
western tribes in Darfur.  Because the authority for resource allocation is centralized, they 
also withhold necessary rule of law and essential food supplies to areas within the 
country that are lacking.263  The combination of military force, and the lack of necessary 
resources provided to a section of the populace leads to what some have referred to as 
genocide.  Nations with democratic forms of government recognize that popular support 
is necessary to maintain power.  History has shown however, that oppressive, autocratic 
regimes have been able to achieve and maintain power through harsh coercive measures 
such as the removal or killing of an entire segment of the population.  The use of these 
coercive means and the centralized control of national resources have enabled the 
Khartoum regime to maintain power while suffering little in the international arena. 
These lessons learned, stated objectively and reframed outside the context of 
Sudan, are possible imperatives that may hold true in the evaluation of other intrastate 
conflicts.  Organized along the lines of PMESII, the imperatives derived from the 
Qualitative Situation Estimate are listed in Table 10.  It is important to note that these 
imperatives were generated from a first-run iteration of the ASC, in many ways they are 
intended to both address the case-study conflict analysis of the Sudan, as well as possible 
assessment methods for conflicts in general.  The ASC, along with the imperatives 
derived from its application, is designed to be applied in an iterative manner.  The 
imperatives of the QSE provide serve both to feed the other lenses of the ASC and to 
stand-alone in the absence of further (or timely) data.  Nothing is certain until it is 
substantiated by reality, nor can effective engagement options be undertaken in hindsight 
(though many a political leader may wish otherwise). The imperatives of the QSE serve 
as an adaptive guide. 
                                                 
263 Prunier, Darfur, 97.  
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Table 10. Qualitative Situation Estimate Imperatives 
 
2. Dynamic Conflict Model Lessons and Imperatives 
The DCM provides a two player perspective of conflict and highlights the need 
for a distinct perspective of intrastate conflicts.  The paradox of Sudan’s internal wars 
becomes apparent from analysis within the DCM.  The North-South divide and Darfur 
each represent different types of games.  Nested game theory describes and identifies the 
types of conflicts in each area.  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), when 
signed on 9 January 2005, addressed but did not completely resolve long term issues seen 
as critical by the insurgent groups (mainly the SPLM/A).  Instead, the agreement 
introduced an artificial expansion of the contested space, creating enough justification for 
the government and the SPLM/A leadership to sign, but not providing long term 
guarantees that the promises will be ever be implemented.  In this sense, the document, 
and the political pressure to sign it, was enough to attain an agreement but is likely not 
enough to maintain that agreement over time.  The focus of the agreement is in three 
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areas: power sharing, wealth sharing, and conflict resolution.264  The strategy of co-
opting the newly formed Government of South Sudan by providing petroleum revenue, 
positions within the GNU, and the integration of SPLA forces and the Sudanese Armed 
Forces is described in the DCM as a game of institutional design.  
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed on 5 May, 2006, was an attempt by 
the parties to codify an agreement that appeared possible but was doomed to failure.  The 
product simply formalized a shift in conflict advantage toward the regime but did not 
meet the insurgency’s minimum requirements.  The focus of the document, similar to the 
CPA was on power sharing, wealth sharing, and conflict resolution.265  The rebel groups 
in Darfur did maintain a loose coalition until the signing of the DPA, where in fact only 
northern tribal factions participated, with only one, the SLA-MM, being a signatory, as 
pointed out by the NT analysis.  The “game” between Darfur rebel groups and the GNU 
through analysis is one of a prisoner’s dilemma.  The introduction of a proxy force to 
fight the Darfur rebels simply shifted the advantage of the prisoner’s dilemma to benefit 
the government. This is pointed to in the DCM as a game of multiple arenas. 
The key to an effective analysis with the DCM are accurate player strategies and 
preferences.  Since the Sudan is not easily accessed, and the organizations involved in the 
conflict are even less so, the DCM relies on the two other lenses for this data.  As the 
construct is reapplied in future iterations, all new research data gathered for either lens 
builds a more thorough Qualitative Situation Estimate.  It is critical therefore to take 
insights from other lenses and update the estimate continually.  An example of this is the 
discovery through the NT lens that the main rebel groups in Darfur, the SLA and the 
JEM, were fractioning due to differing agendas and that this fractioning took place 
mainly along tribal lines.  This information yielded a more accurate assessment of the 
player preferences, allowing the DCM to better describe the nature of the prisoner’s 
dilemma taking place in Darfur. 
                                                 
264 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (2005). 
265 Darfur Peace Agreement (2006). 
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Identifying the nature of the game in Darfur as a prisoner’s dilemma allows the 
analyst to research possible solution venues pre-described in the relevant literature.  
Game theory is a well-established area of study, and each type of game has a field of 
work already conducted that discusses possible solutions to those types of games.  This is 
a powerful tool that can offer a decision maker options on how to approach a conflict, 
using established strategies to resolve games of the type identified.  This field is one most 
commonly used for economics; however, there are strategies that can be assessed for use 
in the context of the conflict under assessment.  This allows analysts and planners to 
focus research in a direction that may address the situation more appropriately.  
In Darfur, through development of player preferences in the DCM, it became 
clear that the interests of the Government of Sudan did not align with the interests of the 
rebel groups.  It also became evident that the interests of the various fractioned rebel 
groups were not universal.  In the south, the interests represented by the SPLM/A were 
the only ones accounted for, because as seen in the QSE, the SPLM/A had marginalized 
all opposing factions in the south prior to the time of the agreement.  During the DPA 
process, it became evident that interests of different rebel groups were not represented, 
resulting in a failed agreement.  In terms used in the DCM, this can be accounted for as 
one side exhibiting loss-aversion as was the case for many rebel groups in Darfur.  The 
government on the other hand, came to the table seeking to maximize possible gains.  
This is explained through the government’s introduction of proxy forces to the Darfur 
region.  The rebel groups, faced with an armed opponent were more inclined to maintain 
their security level, and stay armed to fight. The risk in disarming, as demonstrated by 
previous acts of the government in support of the proxy Janjaweed forces would have 
been a total loss. The majority of rebel factions refused to sign. The government had little 
to lose by offering to disarm the Janjaweed.  With a successful agreement, they could 
reduce international pressure and possibly have sanctions lifted on their economy. 
Experience taught the rebel groups that the government would not disarm proxy militias; 
instead, they were transformed into border security forces and Popular Defense Forces. 
This has only reinforced the rebel decision to fight. The DPA and the Sudanese 
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Government’s decisions have only made the future possibility of a successful agreement 
more difficult.  Table 11 lists the imperatives derived from the Dynamic Conflict Model. 
 
 
Table 11. Dynamic Conflict Model Imperatives 
 
3. Nexus Topography Lessons and Imperatives 
The Nexus Topography (NT) analytical lens provides insight through social 
network analysis focused on organizations using geospatial orientation.  By analysis of 
the ecological, tribal, ethnic, and religious background of a conflict, coupled with the 
stated coalitions, stated objectives, and operational actions of the actors, a number of 
insights can be made into an intrastate conflict.  These lines of research and type of 
analysis produce lessons not apparent through other contemporary methods of analysis. 
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Conflict in a region comprised of social structures such as those present in Darfur 
will likely divide along tribal and clan lines rather than along lines defined by coalitions 
or even stated objectives.  This phenomenon serves to create and reinforce ethnic and/or 
racial identification.  The NT chapter highlights that in Darfur, an area of prolonged, 
brutal conflict, the basic building block of society becomes the default position.  The 
government’s continuous military and economic pressure, exacerbated by the 
introduction of proxy militias such as the Janjaweed, is perceived by the rebel groups as a 
threat to their existence.  When the tribes are forced to choose between members of a 
coalition, or the interests and, therefore, survival of their tribe, they break from the 
coalition.  This is clearly represented in the signing of the DPA and has been echoed by 
further fractioning at an astounding rate in the months since.  As demonstrated in Figures 
17 - 21 of the NT chapter, the tribal and ethnic differences are fractional junctures that 
supersede objective and/or ideological allegiances. 
NT analysis of the Darfur conflict in particular helps to sort the many factions into 
groups that are central players, and therefore must be engaged, and spoiler groups that 
can be marginalized without threatening conflict resolution.  The analysis identifies that 
grouping factions by objectives, announced coalitions, and tribal affiliations does not 
reveal which groups are more important players in the area of conflict.  Figure 15 in the 
NT chapter (page 116) identifies that even the ethnicity of a group does not significantly 
influence the coalitions that an organization joins.  In fact there is some tribal association 
between opposing groups, to include identified Janjaweed elements and SLA factions.  
This can be accounted for in age-old disputes between sub-tribe and clan elements that 
continue to manifest themselves.  The answer to the key centrality measure with regard to 
conflict abatement and impact on the population is found in operational centrality.  The 
organizations, listed by operationally centrality ranking as noted in NT identifies the key 
organization such as the JEM, SLA/U, and the SLA/AWN.  Even more revealing is that it 
identifies organizations that are thought to be key but are much less so, such as the 
SLA/MM and the GSLM.  In a dynamic conflict with so many organizations that 
continues to see further fractioning, this knowledge can help focus the efforts of a third 
party to address the interests of the true key players to more effectively influence the 
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situation.  A common approach of identifying operational affiliations by announced 
coalitions can be seen here as an avenue to readjust failed policy. 
The NT analysis not only identifies the lines along which various groups fraction 
over time and under pressure.  It also provides lines along which, if the conditions are set 
properly, cooperation may be produced.  Factors such as common goals and interests may 
not be as critical as tribal affiliation for cooperation, but it is shown here that they are 
more important than announced coalitions.  Once key players are identified through 
operational analysis, and their ethnic association is considered, offering an agreement that 
focuses on themes of common interests and goals, where previous trust bonds existed can 
determine main tenets for successful coalition building.  Once again the reliance on 
announced coalition ties may result in policy failure.  The NT analysis reinforces the 
concept that announced coalitions in Darfur and in South Sudan are formed for pragmatic 
purposes.  They may serve to link geographically separated groups and serve “boundary 
spanning” purposes such as the appearance of a unified front to appeal to foreign actors, 
international organizations, and the government of Sudan, their opponent.  The endurance 
of these coalitions is as fluid as the dynamic conditions that foster them. 
The conduct of NT as an analytic lens forces researchers to gather data on the 
social structure and the values of trust, influence, and power that shape the human 
environment.  Most methods of conventional analysis do not require the acquisition of 
this level of knowledge, resulting in the mirror imaging of Western ideas and values on 
the players under analysis.  A similar pitfall is illustrated in the tendency to generalize 
conflict in one region of a country to other areas, even though such “wars” are oftentimes 
inherently defined by the very local context within which they exist.  The conditions of 
internal wars will vary from conflict to conflict, to include two regions of conflict within 
the same country, such as is the case in Sudan.  NT analysis of Darfur, built upon the 
preceding QSE and DCM, each of which enables further levels of granularity in data 
resolution, reveals the true nature of this human terrain, which in turn serves to guide the 
development of strategies and policies towards the different players. These imperatives, 
as derived from the NT lens, are listed in Table 12. 
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Table 12. Nexus Topography Imperatives 
 
C. SPECIFIC APPROACHES AND INFORMATION GAPS 
The imperatives are finally applied back to the specific area of conflict in order to 
develop possible approaches.  For an approach to be effective it cannot be planned for or 
executed in a vacuum.  It is the synergistic effect of multiple approaches, executed 
multilaterally that provides the best opportunity for success.  Hence, the approaches are 
no longer specific to the particular lens that they were derived from; instead, they are 
correlated along the same PMESII lines as the context of the particular conflict they are 
meant to influence.  They are lines of operation that based on the Adaptive Security 
Construct iteration lead to the intended outcome based on the policy action selected.  The 
development of approaches will generate information “gaps” that should be addressed 
prior to the execution of any approach.  The final step of analytic correlation is the 
identification of these gaps that will be critical in the further consideration of and 
refinement of the identified approaches.  The gaps are incorporated into the 
recommendation for a further iteration and provide a focus for research resources, 
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allowing for a more refined set of approaches to be developed.  For correlation purposes, 
the gaps are stated as questions and listed along with the specific approach from which 
they are derived. 
1. Approaches and Information Gaps of the North-South Divide 
During his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly on September 19, 
2006, President Bush appointed a Special Envoy to Sudan, Andrew S. Natsios.  
Following his travel throughout Sudan, the Special Envoy held a press conference in 
Khartoum.  In reference to the North-South conflict and the CPA, he commented: 
The reason for focus on the South is that we are deeply concerned with the 
health of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Important deadlines have 
been missed, and key issues like Abyei have not been resolved, and trust is 
slowly being lost and tensions – especially along the border areas where 
armed units of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the SPLA confront each 
other – are rising. This, we believe is very dangerous.266 
The ASC is a dynamic construct and its strength relies on current information.  
Key tenets of a specific approach are that they must be feasible, reasonably achievable, 
and fall within current US policy.  The above-quoted example of a policy statement 
guides the creation of approaches to the North-South conflict.  Having an understanding 
of current policy allows for the filtering of approaches that do not fit these criteria and are 
no longer suitable for consideration.  The imperatives that drive that approach are still 
maintained as they may have application to different areas of conflict towards which the 
US has differing policies.  While approaches cannot provide generic solutions to internal 
wars as a whole, nor even to all areas of intrastate conflict in Sudan, they do integrate 
local specifics into a contextual approach to conflict resolution in regard to each of 
Sudan’s internal wars.  The same specifics also serve to highlight information gaps to be 
addressed in future ASC iterations.  Table 13 lists the specific approaches and their 
associated information gaps as applied to Sudan’s North-South divide. 
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2. Approaches and Information Gaps of the Darfur Conflict 
The derived specific approaches regarding Sudan’s North-South divide, as 
presented in the preceding section, do not apply in the same manner in Darfur.  Though 
there are commonalities, specific actions must once again be tailored to a situational 
context, as also recognized in US policy statements regarding the region.  Special Envoy 
Natsios made the following comments regarding the conflict in Darfur:  
On Darfur, we are focused on preparations for the Darfur peace Talks in 
Libya. We strongly condemn the criminal act attacking the Nigerian 
peacekeepers in Haskanita. This underscores the need for a robust, 
powerful peacekeeping force immediately – one that can defend itself and 
provide security for innocent civilians. We also know that the Darfur talks 
have to be as inclusive as possible – with the rebel movements, IDPs, civil 
society, women, and traditional chiefs, and marginalized Arab tribes 
somehow represented and their voices heard. We are calling and pressing 
for all rebel movement, all rebel movements, to attend the Libya talks on 
Darfur if they are invited.267  
Factoring in this policy statement, and other current policy tenets, specific 
approaches for the Darfur conflict can be developed from the correlation along PMESII 
lines the imperatives and a contextual understanding of Darfur.  The intractable nature of 
violence in Darfur remains self-sustaining due to the inherent mistrust of opposing sides.  
This inherently suggests a requirement for external arbitration in both gaining, and 
subsequently maintaining, a lasting peace in the region.  International efforts in this 
regard have thus far fallen woefully short, a trend likely to continue unless either a peace-
keeping force operates independently of current Sudanese government interference, or, 
alternatively, a strong “push” is made in favor of one side or the other (with a 
corresponding likelihood of increased violence in the short-term).  In either option, 
successful intervention ultimately resides in an acknowledgement that both sides are 
composed of disaggregate rather than unitary factions.  Table 14 provides a listing of 
these approaches and information gaps. 
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D. CORRELATION SUMMARY 
The analytic correlation presented in this chapter is two-fold in purpose.  First, it 
is the culmination of a first iteration of the Adaptive Security Construct conducted with 
respect to internal conflict within Sudan.  Second, it is an example of a methodological 
protocol for executing this same step during future iterations, or when applying the ASC 
to other cases of internal conflict. 
Of note, the ASC is a conflict-focused construct, yet when the correlation is 
conducted along the lines of PMESII, only one approach is military in nature.  PMESII is 
a set of identified means a nation possesses to achieve its goals.  It is a testament to the 
validity of this construct that it has the ability to produce a broad range of approaches and 
imperatives, not ones solely focused on traditional military approaches.  This is not to 
imply that when used to analyze other instances of internal conflict or emerging violent 
crises, military approaches will not be produced.  In the case of Sudan and its internal 
conflicts, however, it is clear that successful approaches will be a synchronized effort of 
predominantly political, social, and economic means. 
Ultimately, the analytic correlation of the assessment lenses used in the ASC 
relies upon a human-interface to produce accurate results.  The modular nature of the 
chapters of this thesis provides a grounded conceptual method for each of the analytic 
lenses utilized.  These, in turn, can achieve further levels of granularity through the use of 
available commercial software and computational tools that can better incorporate the 
vast amount of data available in country studies of this magnitude (i.e. simulation 
programs that can “game” several hundred players in the DCM).  Yet at the outset of this 
first iteration of the ASC, the human user must be familiar with the conceptual 
foundation of the assessment methodology prior to relying on computational analysis.  In 
the inherently local focus of intrastate conflict, accuracy occurs as a result of contextual 
familiarity, not as a result of statistical details.  The importance of the human element in 
understanding and assessing internal wars cannot be overstated.  Familiarity matters, all 
the more so in situations where external actors seek to influence the domestic affairs of 
others.  The final chapter of this thesis will review the important facets inherent in this 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The universe is wider than our views of it. 
- Henry David Thoreau 268 
 
A. ASSESSING THE ADAPTIVE SECURITY CONSTRUCT  
The introduction to this thesis defined its purpose as the development of a 
construct that allows for the iterative assessment and engagement of the factors 
influencing insurgent conflict in Sudan.  Two assumptions supported that purpose: first, 
an interpretation of internal wars as a distinct form of conflict, and second, an 
acknowledgement that the perceptions of external actors are markedly different from the 
domestic views of intrastate combatants.  In concert, these two assumptions exemplify 
the need for an objective process and perspective of assessing internal wars, presented in 
this thesis as the Adaptive Security Construct.  As a process, the ASC allows for an 
adaptive and iterative analysis of internal conflict; it defines a method of assessment.  As 
a perspective, the construct relies upon a familiarity with the history and contemporary 
relevance of the internal war being examined; it defines the context of assessment.  Using 
insurgent conflict in Sudan case study, this thesis has formalized the ASC through a first-
run iteration of a multi-disciplinary framework that allows for the comprehensive and 
objective engagement of emergent security environments of concern. 
The development of the ASC took place in conjunction with the integration of 
three analytic lenses: the Qualitative Situation Estimate (Chapter III), the Dynamic 
Conflict Model (Chapter IV), and Nexus Topography (Chapter V).  These allowed for the 
integration of both qualitative and quantitative methods in generating a comprehensive 
assessment.  Chapter VI encompassed an Analytic Correlation of that assessment, 
identifying lessons learned for both the continuing evolution of both Sudan’s internal 
wars and for the ASC itself.  Building on that correlation, the present chapter brings this 
thesis full circle in two sections.  First, the current state of the ASC is critiqued to suggest 
                                                 
268 Henry David Thoreau, “Walden” in The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, vol. 2 (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1906), 352. 
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possible future iterations of the construct.  Second, and reliant upon the ASC’s inherent 
nature as a contextually based framework, the possible futures of Sudan are expanded 
upon to further guide engagement options.  This comprehensive evaluation of both Sudan 
and the ASC should serve as a reminder that if “we are dealing with a system, the whole 
is different from, not greater than, the sum of its parts.”269  The Sudan and the ASC 
suggest interactive rather than additive relationships in both the conduct and assessment 
of internal wars.  Neither Sudan’s problems nor any proposed solutions can be defined by 
cumulative measures; they instead require a relational understanding of dynamic Sudan. 
1. Critique of the Assessment Process 
As an attempt to bridge academic theory with practical (or operational) 
applications, the ASC, much like any analytic product, requires the progressive 
structuring of information.  Rather than rely on universalistic (and Western) notions of 
broadly applicable frameworks, the ASC proceeds from local context to general 
conclusions.  Based on the probable and limited amount of data available in an emergent 
region of concern, the ASC at the outset relies upon subject matter expertise and readily 
available literature to bound the scope of the issue at hand, in this case Sudan.  The 
importance of establishing scope rests upon an appreciation of time and space, an 
inclusion of history and a geospatial representation, both of which provide continuous 
threads throughout the ASC.  Here, “history also confirms that features often neglected in 
explanations of contemporary war do matter: features like a country’s specific long-run 
history, its patterns of production and class formation, the political effects of economic 
policy and the play of contingency.”270  Inherently qualitative in its description of the 
environment, the situation estimate then iteratively feeds the remaining analytic lenses. 
The Dynamic Conflict Model relies upon the assumed aggregation of opposing 
actors within a game-theoretic matrix, while Nexus Topography extracts a more precise 
composition and structure of the specific actors involved.  Though presented sequentially 
                                                 
269 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 12 (emphasis in original). 
270 Cramer, Violence in Developing Countries, 199. 
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in this thesis, they are intended to operationally complement one another.  While game 
theory identifies which actors should be examined, network analysis defines how 
important those actors are, in turn supplying the conflict model with refined value 
determinations.  As to whether game theory or network analysis should come first, to 
crudely quote Robert McNamara, “there is a kind of chicken-and-the-egg debate going on 
about which [is] preeminent.  To me that is like trying to argue about which blade of the 
scissors cut[s] the paper.”271  Both lenses are required for each to individually succeed. 
The Dynamic Conflict Model is inherently based on an assumption of value-
maximizing behavior: each side will act to secure its best outcome.  There are limitations 
to such a premise: “Because rational-choice models are tautological, they have two 
distinctive characteristics.  The first is that if a rational-choice model leads to predictions 
that turn out to be false, the assumptions have to be modified. . . . The second . . . is that 
they permit the cumulation of knowledge.”272  Within the overall process of the ASC, 
these characteristics serve as advantages.  First, when predictions are false, they are so 
not because the modeling process is faulty, but because the assigned valuation of 
outcomes is inaccurate.  Thus, the process may be iteratively repeated to both establish a 
more realistic model output, and to observe trend behavior over time that serves to 
anticipate future occurrences.  That leads to the second advantage, in which “cumulation” 
of observed behavior in and of itself provides an information source that can be further 
applied in the ASC.  This, “points to the conclusion that political context matters in ways 
that are predictable because they influence different actor’s payoffs in nested games, and 
these payoffs influence the choice of strategies.”273  The strategies are oftentimes 
apparent in the progression of actions themselves; it is the quantification of actor payoffs 
that requires a third analytic lens. 
The Nexus Topography lens is network analysis based rather than decision based; 
it is intended to further quantify actor behavior rather than suggest what it should be.  “It 
                                                 
271 As quoted in Allison and Zelikow, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” 129.  The U.S. Secretary of 
Defense was discussing the relationship of nuclear and conventional forces as part of a deterrence posture. 
272 Tsebelis, Nested Games, 43. 
273 Tsebelis, Nested Games, 246. 
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is then a mistake to apply a decision-theoretic rather than a game-theoretic framework to 
cases in which the actors’ behavior is based on their expectations of what others will do.  
That is, we cannot look at one side while holding the other side constant because even to 
explain one side’s decisions, we need to capture its estimate of the other side’s likely 
response, which in turn is influenced by what it thinks the other thinks the state will 
do.”274  Network analysis, especially when enfolded within both abstract and map-based 
visual representations, allows the observer an effective perspective of assessing not only 
who the “players” in an internal war are, but more importantly, how significant they are. 
The correlation of the three analytic lenses, dependant on a human-interface, 
provides the ASC an internal validation mechanism by which to identify both important 
and discrepant pieces of information.  Here again, the idea of situation context is critical, 
which lens becomes most important will vary by both the specific situation and the time 
available for completing an assessment.  The accommodation of this spectrum of 
operational necessity speaks to how strategic assessments of conflict are conducted in 
general: “There are two main ways to study the problem of causes in war: to develop 
individual case studies and to extract and compare categorized features of a large number 
of wars, generating statistical analyses.”275  The former is often criticized as a “cherry-
picking” approach, while the latter attempts to shoe-horn local specifics into artificial 
compartments.  More useful is an integrated approach reliant upon situational context to 
refine and adapt a universal methodology.  The ASC provides such an approach. 
2. Future Iterations of the ASC 
The end-state of this thesis provides the first iteration of an ASC-application.  The 
general imperatives and specific approaches offered in Chapter VI serve to respectively 
guide future ASC-iterations and operational engagement options.  Concluding comments 
regarding the latter are provided in section B of this chapter, it is now appropriate to 
highlight the “way forward” for the ASC itself.  Adaptability and an iterative application 
of the construct are an imperative, as when “elements interact it is difficult to apportion 
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the responsibility among them as the extent and even the direction of the impact of each 
depends on the status of the others.”276  The ASC is internally complementary between 
lenses, and that same perspective must be continued through future iterations of the 
construct as a whole: “Additive and linear operations cannot capture what happens 
because the impact of one variable or strategy depends on others as actors both shape and 
are shaped by their environments.”277  Accurately identifying variables of intrastate 
conflict requires an integrated approach that fundamentally relies upon defining exactly 
who is fighting and over what.  Identifying various “forms of collective identity . . . is 
instrumental in bridging the gap between many reasons for political conflict and the brute 
facts of violence,” particularly as what “matters to how a given source of collective 
identity works on individuals and to how deftly it can be exploited by political leaders is 
largely a matter of specific histories rather than fixed and eternal properties.”278  Again, 
the ASC is a means of identifying these properties and their situational expressions. 
Ultimately, the ASC is intended to provide a process for objectively assessing 
internal wars, phenomena whose impartial interpretation is oftentimes obscured by 
emotional appeal and biased interests.  “The purpose would be to tease out analytical and 
policy implications . . . as a basis for a policy response that would admit its limitations 
and would not prescribe a single off-the-shelf remedy for a wide range of problems.”279 
When it comes to Sudan, to date the response has been largely composed of the latter. 
B. FUTURE TRENDS OF INSURGENCY IN SUDAN 
Both the apparent conclusion of a peace agreement in Southern Sudan and the 
recent explosion of violence in Darfur, have served to skew external perspectives of the 
intransigence of Sudan’s internal wars.  “Given the depth of the conflict over the identity 
of the Sudan, it is important to place the current tensions in historical perspective.  
Although that history establishes a framework for the struggle, the historical experience 
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itself is contested by the parties [involved].”280  Put another way, not only are the 
conditions of conflict fluid in Sudan, so are the perceived affiliations and preferences of 
the opposing combatants involved.  Such a complex and convoluted melee makes an 
emphasis on a singular and “democratic solution” to these wars largely untenable: 
It is of course fashionable . . . to assert that liberal democracy is the 
currency of legitimacy globally, but in Sudan’s case at least liberal 
democracy is no straightforward path to legitimacy and stability of 
government.  Sudan has had three periods of liberal democracy based on a 
first-past-the-post electoral system in a unitary state, and the political 
system that re-surfaced each time was a repeat of its predecessor with no 
sign of any prospect of reforming its clear shortcomings.281 
Sudan’s history has been defined by insurgent conflict.  The mere continuance of 
these conflicts in light of attempted peace negotiations demonstrates both the 
intransigence and apparent paradox of Sudan’s internal wars.  In the south an agreement 
exists in apparent opposition to the underlying secessionist movement.  In Darfur, an 
agreement would theoretically appear possible but has been extremely difficult to put into 
practice.  The complex perspectives that illuminate this paradox exist both internal to the 
Sudanese people and have been interpreted from an external perspective as well. 
1. Internal Sudan 
A common bias identified in contemporary assessments of conflict in Sudan, as 
portrayed by both media and non-governmental organizations, exhorts a need to solidify 
the Sudanese identity, to ensure popular equality and just representation.  In many ways, 
such an endeavor contradicts the very history of Sudan:  
The concept of nation-state prevalent in the Sudan has been based on an 
ethnic nationalism in which the Arab-Islamic majority defines the 
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political system . . . ethnic nationalism leads to an attempt to eliminate 
differences by defining them away and/or by instituting structures that 
marginalize minorities.282 
 Social identity plays a key role in quantifying insurgent conflict in Sudan.  
Chapter V showed that tribal affiliations rather than objective or coalition concerns are 
actually what define operational actions amongst Sudanese insurgent groups.  But ethnic 
identity is far from pre-determined, rather, it is a dynamic and volatile variable: “Elites 
and leaders (re)structure ethnic identity for instrumental reasons, such as to enhance their 
own power and to mobilize the populace behind their goals.  Identity can be manipulated 
and certain aspects can be more salient at certain times and in certain contexts.”283  
Nowhere is the depth of this manipulation more obvious than in Darfur, where 
populations of millions have been displaced in the pursuit of pragmatic objectives. 
The crisis in Darfur illustrates that “sustained genocidal warfare need not be 
organized and precipitated by national governments; it can easily emerge from the 
interactions of individual, unconnected individuals out of extreme environmental 
circumstances and competition over resources.”284  Such interactions have a long history 
in Sudan, having predated independence and only having been recently exacerbated by a 
combination of ecological drought and political marginalization.  The DPA, doomed at 
the outset by its untenable propositions, illustrates that from the perspective of the GoS, 
the lack of alternative strategies can itself strengthen an actor’s position.285  Having 
“proven” the stubborn nature of its adversaries, Khartoum is now empowered to pursue 
its unilateral agenda.  “This perspective makes clear that power is a function not only of 
the relative strengths of the actors and relationships between them, but also of the 
existing and possible relations between each of them and third parties.”286 
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Common amongst Sudan’s internal conflicts, and especially in Darfur, “warfare 
has . . . involved ‘asset transfer’, or theft and expropriation of land, livestock and people 
as labourers.  At the same time warfare has displaced large numbers of people.”287  This 
represents the overlapping of necessary but insufficient conditions of Sudan’s internal 
wars: ecological constraints and political marginalization.  Internally instigated reform in 
Sudan is unlikely, as even opposition groups seek to secure or supplant, rather than 
replace, current modes of governance.  The agendas of rebels and regime use ethnic 
affiliations to mobilize animosities, resulting in a pervasive aura or mistrust.  External 
arbitration presents a fragile means by which this aura can be bridged.  In the North-
South divide, the involvement of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), as well as other international actors, contributed to the signing of the CPA.  The 
spoilers that threatened the peace talks in Naivasha have not gone away, and the need for 
continued international supervision of the agreement was recognised even prior to its 
signing.288  Since then, monitoring of compliance and accountability has been lacking, as 
“modern-day Wilsonians assume that because a nation-state exists on paper, they can 
dispense with the need to forge alliances and compacts among sectarian, tribal, ethnic, 
and religious factions.”289  The record of the international community in arbitrating 
internal wars is not good, and on its present course in Sudan, it will only get worse. 
2.  External Sudan 
The continued intransigence of Sudan’s internal wars questions the likely or even 
possible success of external intervention.  Echoing the general liberalist perspective of 
war, international community reconstruction efforts are underpinned at the outset by what 
one author has termed the “nirvana fallacy.”290  The assumption inherent in such nation-
building is that foreign intervention is always preferable to the absence of domestic 
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security based on international standards.  Perhaps ironically, the same concept drives 
domestic populations to look for solutions elsewhere: “Whether because the government 
has ordered them to . . . or because they simply do not trust the state to provide them with 
reasonable security, individuals and private industry have, in fact, been looking after 
themselves to a growing extent and on a constantly increasing scale.”291  Thus, nation-
building efforts have by and large proved to be abject failures, and “if there is one 
generally applicable lesson that can be learned . . . it is that each weak and failed state 
will be characterized by a unique set of nested games that preclude a one-size-fits-all 
policy by the international community.”292  There are dangers in oversimplifying success 
or failure within a defined population: “Whether a country disintegrates or not after its 
state institutions collapse in many cases may reflect more the opportunities and 
inclinations of local and national elites than the sentiments of local people.”293 
These dangers suggest that an accommodation of local context is critical in 
examining external avenues toward conflict resolution in Sudan.  It is blatantly 
insufficient to insist on reform policies based on European models that have little 
historical relevance in Africa.  Rather than insist on a multi-lateral adherence to norms of 
governance that do not apply across the board, “[o]ur relationships to possible opponents 
should be such . . . that our options toward both of them are always greater than their 
options toward each other.”294  It remains for external actors to apply such a perspective 
in arbitrating an end to Sudan’s conflicts.  To wit, the application of broad-brush punitive 
measures such as economic sanctions disregards the specific political context of Sudan.  
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Ironically, rather than support reform, such policies instead encourage patrimonial 
mechanisms that reinforce the status quo.  To even suggest success requires local 
intervention in which the settings that encourage conflict are molded to allow resolution.   
The Adaptive Security Construct does not purport to offer a means by which the 
specific conflicts in Sudan will be resolved, let alone provide a solution to internal wars 
in general.  Rather it proceeds from an underlying supposition that dealing with internal 
wars requires a contextual perspective grounded within a holistic framework, rather than 
a singular reliance on postulated causalities.  The application of such a perspective to 
Sudan has revealed several distinct lessons.  In the North-South divide, it is apparently in 
both sides’ interest to assert the validity of the CPA while using it to work toward 
fundamentally opposed outcomes.  Though this has resulted in an artificial and temporary 
overlap of opposing interests, the long-term implications are not encouraging.  In Darfur, 
the nature of the conflict is self-reinforcing.  As expected outcomes yield less for each 
side, fighting is all the more likely and there is no “going back.”295  Ecological trends 
alone emphasize this latter point, as the increase in desertification and a lack of arable 
land will in the future only serve to exacerbate inter- and intra-tribal competition and 
conflict over local resources. 
As exemplified by this thesis’ case-study of Sudan, “distinctions such as those 
between state and society and public and private, which are so central to transformative 
expectations of African states, are difficult to discern.”296  In the south, the GoSS faces a 
conflict in identity; its majority representatives from the SPLM now possess a legally 
defined and vested interest in the “enemy” GNU.  In Darfur, factions of the SLA and 
JEM, complimentary only in their opposition to the regime status quo, work toward 
conflicting goals that preclude a unified insurgency.  Superficial analyses of internal wars 
gloss over their historic origins; such conflicts are not spontaneous.  Others have “argued 
that the stakes involved in sub-state conflicts are both unusually high and effectively zero 
sum, either because they are naturally indivisible or because both sides come to define 
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these stakes in antithetical ways.”297  While the stakes are undoubtedly high, examining 
the manner in which belligerents mobilize them is no less important than how they were 
raised in the first place.  Assessing Sudan’s internal wars requires a familiarity with their 
specific chronology and context, not a premature attempt to attribute causality.  The 
Adaptive Security Construct provides a perspective and process through which such an 
assessment is possible.  Internal wars are a complex not simple phenomenon.  If they 
were the latter, they would likely have been “solved” some time ago. 
When viewed in sum, the Adaptive Security Construct encompasses a multi-
disciplinary methodology that grants the outsider a better view of an internal war.  In the 
progression of this thesis, each analytic lens offers its own distinct point.  The Qualitative 
Situation Estimate illustrates how viewing internal wars through an objective actor-based 
framework identifies the contextual complexities of intrastate warfare.  The Dynamic 
Conflict Model frames those complexities in a game-theory based analysis, in turn 
illuminating the extent to which externally supposed suboptimal choices in fact reflect 
underlying rational contests between and amongst the involved belligerents.   Nexus 
Topography further analyzes the insurgent factions themselves, in this case revealing that 
networked ties formed along tribal and clan affiliations supersede the stated coalition and 
operational objectives of Sudan’s rebel groups.  When correlated, these points create an 
adaptive security assessment of internal war, an assessment whose process is universally 
applicable while the output remains contextually specific.  The assessment completed in 
this thesis provides a starting point from which to proactively engage Sudan’s internal 
wars.  Only with such an objective start can one begin to influence those wars to an end. 
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